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Abstract 
 
GRAEME A. WARD: Centurions: The Practice of Roman Officership 
(Under the direction of Richard J. A. Talbert) 
 
  
This dissertation examines the military and social roles of legionary centurions in 
the Roman legions during the late Republic and Principate.  It combines textual accounts 
of centurions from such authors as Caesar, Tacitus, and Cassius Dio, as well as 
epigraphic and archaeological evidence, including funerary monuments, dedicatory 
inscriptions, and the physical remains of legionary camps.  By evaluating this evidence 
with reference to contemporary military and critical social theory (which integrates 
concepts of civil-military relations, compliance, social structures, and symbolic systems), 
I argue that centurions were crucial to defining and preserving important Roman military 
practices, and that an analysis of their position reveals important developments in Rome’s 
military hierarchy and imperial administration. 
The dissertation is organized into six chapters.  The first chapter addresses the 
centurion’s disciplinary role in the legions, and reasserts the significance of corporal 
punishment in Roman military culture.  Chapter Two investigates the centurion’s 
idealized behaviour in combat, and how it affected views of his leadership and personal 
authority.  The third chapter demonstrates how in the Roman world these practices in 
asserting authority were complementary rather than contradictory.  Chapter Four 
evaluates centurions’ place in the legion’s command structure, including career 
structures, military expertise, and corporate identity, and identifies them as the singular 
iv 
 
corps of officers in the legions.  The fifth chapter explains their intermediate position in 
the legion’s social hierarchy between soldiers and aristocratic commanders, and how this 
position was important to integrating soldiers into the Roman military community.  
Finally, Chapter Six assesses political and administrative roles of centurions, arguing that 
they were the chief representation of Roman imperial authority among local populations. 
My dissertation has two fundamental goals.  The first is to combine and analyze 
textual, epigraphic, and archaeological evidence for centurions in order to establish their 
military, political, and cultural roles in the Roman Empire.  In doing so, the dissertation 
provides the first comprehensive study of the duties, characterizations, and expectations 
of the Roman legions’ intermediate officers.  The second goal is to demonstrate that this 
analysis of centurions is crucial to understanding how attitudes toward violence, military 
discipline, social status, and personal authority were manifested both within the Roman 
military community and throughout the Roman Empire. 
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Introduction 
 
 The death of Augustus in CE 14 prompted the most splendid public funeral in 
Rome up to that time.  The procession through the city included senators, equestrians and 
their wives, the Praetorian Guard, priests, and members of the Imperial family.  With the 
body’s final arrival at the Campus Martius for cremation, Dio describes the final phase of 
the funeral in detail:  
When the body was laid upon the pyre in the Campus Martius, first all of the 
priests filed around it, next came the knights, both those of the equestrian order 
but others as well, and soldiers from Praetorian Guard ran round it, casting upon it 
all the military decorations that any of them had received from him for valour. 
Next came the centurions bearing torches, as it had been decided by the Senate, 
and they lighted the pyre from beneath. And so it was consumed by fire, and an 
eagle released from it flew aloft, as if his spirit were being borne to the heavens.
1
 
 
In a private funeral, the final act of bearing the torches to the pyre was a duty usually 
designated to one’s closest family members.  That such pride of place at a public funeral 
was given to centurions instead illustrates their importance to the foundations of 
Augustus’ regime and the Roman army.  
 Centurions had long been an important organizational feature of the Roman 
legions.  During the Republic, soldiers traditionally selected through the annual levy 
                                                 
1
Dio 56. 42. 2-3: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐς τὴν πυρὰν τὴν ἐν τῷ Ἀρείῳ πεδίῳ ἐνετέθη, πρῶτοι μὲν οἱ ἱερῆς 
πάντες περιῆλθον αὐτήν, ἔπειτα δὲ οἵ τε ἱππῆς, οἵ τε ἐκ τοῦ τέλους καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ τὸ ὁπλιτικὸν τὸ 
φρουρικὸν περιέδραμον, πάντα τὰ νικητήρια, ὅσα τινὲς αὐτῶν ἐπ’ ἀριστείᾳ ποτὲ παρ’ αὐτοῦ 
εἰλήφεσαν, ἐπιβάλλοντες αὐτῇ. κἀκ τούτου δᾷδας ἑκατόνταρχοι, ὥς που τῇ βουλῇ ἐδόκει, λαβόντες 
ὑφῆψαν αὐτήν; καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀνηλίσκετο, ἀετὸς δέ τις ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀφεθεὶς ἀνίπτατο ὡς καὶ δὴ τὴν ψυχὴν 
αὐτοῦ ἐς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναφέρων. Cf., Suet. Aug. 98. 
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selected centurions from among their number.
2
  Military experience and a reputation for 
personal bravery are consistently cited by ancient authors as the primary factors in the 
election of centurions.  Dionysius of Halicarnassus claims: “Out of all the centuries the 
bravest men were chosen as centurions, and each of these officers took care that his 
century should yield a ready obedience to orders.”3  These middle-ranking officers were 
responsible for leading their centuria (comprising roughly sixty to eighty men) into 
battle, conveying orders from higher officers, and enforcing discipline.   
Their reputation for discipline, bravery, and experience later made them a crucial 
component in Augustus’ sweeping reforms of the Roman legions.  He transformed the 
legions into permanent, standing armies whose soldiers took on military service as a 
career, yet whose commanders remained drawn from the aristocracy and typically only 
served for several years.  To make such an institution function, however, required greater 
emphasis on its middle-ranking officers to maintain discipline, provide a continuity of 
command, and form a direct channel between the soldiers and the legions’ aristocratic 
leadership.  Augustus and his imperial successors therefore increased the pay and status 
of legionary centurions and assigned new military responsibilities to them, including 
tactical leadership of independent infantry units, combat training, logistics and supply, 
and authority to delegate soldiers to special tasks.  These responsibilities helped 
centurions to develop skills that eventually made them valuable for a variety of additional 
tasks in the Roman military’s role in administering the empire. 
                                                 
2
See below, Chapter Four, 136. 
3
Dion. Hal. 4. 17. 4: λοχαγοὶ δ’ ἐξ ἁπάντων ἐπιλεχθέντες οἱ γενναιότατοι τὰ πολέμια τοὺς 
ἰδίους ἕκαστοι λόχους εὐπειθεῖς τοῖς παραγγελλομένοις παρείχοντο. On λοχαγοὶ as centurions, see 
below, Chapter Three, n. 67. 
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Over the last century, modern authors have noted the importance of the centurion 
to the success of the Roman legions.  Delbrück called them the “crux of the legion,” 
while Parker described them as “the mainstay.”  Syme claimed that centurions “provided 
the bones and nerves of the Roman army,” to which Brand adds “the backbone.”4  In 
modern popular culture, legionary centurions have become one of the more recognizable 
figures from the Roman world, and have recently enjoyed a growing popularity.  Many 
works of historical fiction can be found in bookstores that feature centurions as 
protagonists and central characters.  In television, HBO’s two-season series, Rome, 
presents the civil wars and political revolution of the late Roman Republic largely 
through the eyes of one of Caesar’s actual centurions, Lucius Vorenus.  The films The 
Eagle (2011) and Centurion (2010), meanwhile, both tell the story of centurions caught 
in the chaotic events surrounding the (mistaken) destruction of the Ninth Legion in 
northern England.
5
    
In these media, centurions are presented with character traits idealized through 
ancient Roman literature: courage and prowess in combat, a strong adherence to 
traditional military and cultural values, sternness and severity in discipline, and a firm 
loyalty to the soldiers under their command.  Indeed, the centurion, or at least the idea of 
him, is so strong that even the name “centurion” is used in many contexts outside of the 
                                                 
4
H. Delbrück, History of the Art of War, Vol I, (Westport, 1975), 429-436; H. M. D. Parker, The 
Roman Legions (Oxford, 1928), 18; R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939), 395; C. E. Brand, 
Roman Military Law (Austin, 1968), 51. Cf., B. Campbell, The Roman Army, 31 BC-AD 337 (London, 
1994), 47; L. Keppie, Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire (Totowa, 1984), 98. 
5These films are loosely based on Rosemary Sutcliffe’s The Eagle of the Ninth (London, 1954). 
Noteworthy also is John Cleese’s portrayal of a fearsome (yet stupid) centurion in Monty Python’s Life of 
Brian (1979). 
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Roman world, and is especially popular for describing both real and fictional characters 
in the military or law enforcement, as well as modern types of tanks and submarines.
6
 
 In spite of this wide popularity, however, the centurion has received curiously 
little attention from modern scholarship, and remains a relatively poorly understood 
officer.  While monographs on the Roman army and its organization are plentiful and 
continuing, they typically take no more several paragraphs or pages to describe the career 
paths or various prescribed duties of centurions.
7
  Several authors have combined 
epigraphic evidence of centurions and their careers for a given region or period of time, 
but offer little analysis of their broader functions and activities.
8
  Among all the 
acclamations by modern authors of centurions comprising the crux or backbone of the 
Roman legions, therefore, there is little explanation as to how or why centurions managed 
to ascend to this vaunted status, and even less attention to their broader impact on Roman 
military practices.  There is, therefore, a significant need to address several important 
questions regarding this topic: what were the practices centurions employed to maintain 
military discipline, and to demonstrate qualities of leadership in combat?  By what means 
was their military authority within the Roman military hierarchy asserted and preserved?  
How were centurions defined as officers by legionary rank and file and by aristocratic 
military leadership, as well as by civilians?   
 
                                                 
6
E.g., R. Leuci, All the Centurions: A New York City Cop Remembers His Years on the Street, 
1961-1981 (New York, 2005); J. E. Persico, Roosevelt's Centurions: FDR and the Commanders He Led to 
Victory in World War II (New York, 2012). 
7
E.g., G. Webster, The Imperial Roman Army of the First and Second Centuries AD (London, 
1969) 116-120; A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army At War: 100 B.C.-A.D. 200 (Oxford, 1996), 13-16; Y. 
Le Bohec, The Imperial Roman Army (London, 1994), 43-45, 73-78. 
8
B. Dobson, Die Primipilares: Entwicklung u. Bedeutung, Laufbahnen u. Persönlichkeiten e. röm. 
Offiziersranges (Köln, 1978); Olivier Richier, Centuriones Ad Rhenum (2004); J. R. Summerly, Studies in 
the Legionary Centurionate (PhD Dissertation, Durham University, 1992). 
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Historiography 
There are several major studies that have focused on leadership and the roles of 
officers at the higher ranks within the Roman military.  Brian Campbell’s The Emperor 
and the Roman Army (1984) emphasizes the important symbolic, administrative, and 
military roles of the emperor within the army, and what effect his relationship with the 
army had on how and for whom the soldiers fought.  The impact of Roman generals on 
the Roman army’s successes and practices has also long been a popular topic among 
military theorists.  M. H. Liddell Hart’s treatment of Scipio Africanus in Scipio 
Africanus: Greater than Napoleon (1926), and J. F. C. Fuller’s Julius Caesar: Man, 
Soldier, and Tyrant (1965), focus on these men’s generalship and tactics in war.  
Goldsworthy’s In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire (2003) 
argues for the impact of Roman generalship in key battles from the Republic to late 
antiquity.  More specific works have explored in detail the status, roles, and attitudes of 
legionary commanders from the Republic and Principate.
9
  Even equestrian officers such 
as legionary tribunes and auxiliary unit commanders have received thorough analysis.
10
  
That centurions, so commonly acknowledged to be crucial to the success of the Roman 
legions, have not yet received similarly comprehensive analyses is a serious gap in 
scholarship that needs to be addressed. 
In exploring the legionary centurion’s military status and roles within the Roman 
military hierarchy, this dissertation also engages with studies that consider the army’s 
                                                 
9
See B. Campbell, “Teach Yourself to Be a General,” JRS 77 (1987), 13-29; J. E. Lendon, “The 
Rhetoric of Combat: Greek Military Theory and Roman Culture in Julius Caesar’s Battle Descriptions,” CA 
18.2 (1999), 273-329. S. P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (Berkeley, 
1999); A. R. Birley, “Senators as Generals” in G. Alföldy, B. Dobson, & W. Eck eds. Kaiser, Heer und 
Gesellschaft in der Römischen Kaizerzeit (Stuttgart, 2000), 97-119. 
10
H. Devijver, The Equestrian Officers of the Roman Imperial Army (Amsterdam, 1989). 
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role in the development of Rome’s imperial system, and how the army developed over 
time and interacted with changing Roman political and social institutions.  Theodor 
Mommsen, in his Römische Geschichte (1854-56), combined the traditional textual 
accounts of the Roman army with rapidly growing epigraphic evidence to illuminate 
many aspects of the army that were directly related to the development of the imperial 
system and mechanisms of Rome’s empire.  Many later studies of the Roman army have 
followed Mommsen’s lead.  Lawrence Keppie’s The Making of the Roman Army: From 
Republic to Empire (1984), for example, demonstrates how the Roman professional army 
under Augustus grew out of the civil wars of the Triumviral period, and that its 
development reflected specific goals of the new regime.
11
   
A greater number of studies on the Roman army have focused on the army as an 
institution in its own right, such as Alfred von Domaszewski’s benchmark Die 
Rangordnung des römischen Heeres (1908).  This massive work compiled and analyzed 
evidence of the imperial army’s organization, as well as the ranks, duties and careers of 
its soldiers and officers.  Von Domaszewski demonstrated that the Roman army was an 
extremely complex, structured, yet efficient military institution; he set the standard for 
monographs on the Roman army’s organization by Parker, Harmand, Le Bohec, Davies 
and others.
12
  Despite the age of many of these works, they are invaluable for their 
accumulation of evidence for the Roman army’s organization and broader, non-military 
                                                 
11
Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire (Norman, 1984), esp. 132-
133, 191-198.  For further works in this vein, cf. W. V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 
327-70 B.C. (Oxford, 1979); B. Isaac, The Limits of Empire: The Roman Empire in the East (Oxford, 
1990); A Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome (2006); S. James, Rome 
and the Sword: How Warriors & Weapons Shaped Roman History (London, 2011). 
12
Domaszewski, Die Rangordnung, 2
nd
 ed., (Köln, 1967); H. M. D. Parker, The Roman Legions; J. 
Harmand, L’Armée et le soldat à Rome de 107 à 50 avant nôtre ère (Paris, 1967); R. W. Davies, Service in 
the Roman Army (New York, 1989). For Le Bohec and others, see above, n. 7. 
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activities, but the breadth of their topic necessarily limits thorough discussion of any one 
military practice or rank.    
Military studies that describe specific organizational or social features of the 
Roman army are largely influenced by the work of the so-called “Durham School,” 
named after the academic affiliation of its founder, Eric Birley.  Birley combined 
epigraphic and archaeological evidence in his prolific studies of the Roman army, using 
methods and assumptions of the studies of more modern militaries to determine the 
Roman order of battle, organization, social structure, equipment, and interaction with 
civilians.
13
  The Durham School that followed Birley has produced Anglo-German 
scholars such as Brian Dobson, David Breeze, and Michael P. Speidel, whose works 
similarly employ epigraphic and archaeological evidence to determine career paths, 
equipment, daily life in the camp, and the army’s “peacetime” activities.14  This approach 
has even been applied to describing the career patterns and transfers of centurions, such 
as in Brian Dobson’s Die Primipilares (1978), J. R. Summerly’s Studies in the Legionary 
Centurionate (1992), and Olivier Richier’s Centuriones Ad Rhenum (2004).  While these 
studies provide invaluable insight into centurions’ careers and social status, however, 
they offer little discussion of the strictly military and institutional aspects, that is, how 
and why centurions successfully fought, led, and were obeyed. 
 Studies of a more military perspective on the Roman army and its members have 
remained largely dominated by authors of general military, rather than ancient, history.  
                                                 
13
Cf. E. Birley, The Roman Army: Papers 1929-86 (Amsterdam, 1988). 
14
See Dobson and Breeze, Roman Officers and Frontiers (Stuttgart, 1993); M. P. Speidel, Roman 
Army Studies (Amsterdam, 1984). Cf., V. Maxfield, The Military Decorations of the Roman Army 
(Berkeley, 1981); A. R. Birley, Locus virtutibus patefactus?: zum Beförderungssystem in der Hohen 
Kaiserzeit (Opladen, 1992); M. A. Speidel, Heer und Herrschaft im römischen Reich der hohen Kaiserzeit 
(Stuttgart, 2009). 
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Older military treatises such as Max Jähns’ Handbuch einer Geschichte des 
Kriegswesens von der Urzeit bis zur Renaissance (1880) remain useful for their 
discussion of how the army’s organization affected its combat performance.15  Most 
influential is Hans Delbrück’s Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen 
Geschichte (1900-36), in which he evaluated Roman officers and soldiers according to 
the organization and strategies of the contemporary Prussian army, and subjected literary 
accounts of ancient battles to vigorous logistical analysis.
16
  This focus on the logistics 
and practical realities of warfare was later adopted enthusiastically by John Keegan, 
whose extremely influential The Face of Battle (1976) probes military events and their 
consequences through a vivid account of the experiences of soldiers in combat.  His 
closest disciple in Roman military studies is Adrian Goldsworthy, whose The Roman 
Army At War: 100 B.C.-A.D. 200 (1996) evaluates the Roman army in battle according to 
contemporary military theory, arguing that its conduct was directly reflective of its 
complex social and administrative organization.
17
 
 A weakness of this approach, however, is that it often relies on modern military 
categories and assumptions at the expense of specifically Roman social characteristics 
and attitudes.  W. V. Harris first argued in his War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 
327-70 B.C. (1979), for example, that specifically Roman attitudes among both its 
aristocracy and soldiers towards warfare fundamentally influenced its organization and 
                                                 
15
See esp. 167-268. 
16
See above, n. 4.  
17
Other examples of Keegan’s influence can be found in V. D. Hanson, The Western Way of War: 
Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (New York, 1989) and in P. Sabin, “The Face of Roman Battle,” JRS 90 
(2000), 1-17. For problems in this approach to ancient history, see E. Wheeler, “Firepower: Missile 
Weapons and the ‘Face of Battle’” in E Dabrowa, ed., Roman Military Studies (Kraków, 2001), 169-184. 
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practices.
18
  This approach to the study of cultural factors in warfare has drawn increasing 
attention in recent studies of the Roman military.  Jon Lendon’s Soldiers and Ghosts: A 
History of Battle in Classical Antiquity (2005) argues that changing Roman notions of 
disciplina and virtus and the interplay between them affected how Romans engaged in 
and understood war, and he cautions against viewing the legions as functioning like a 
modern military.
19
  Susan Mattern and Sara Phang similarly explain Roman military 
deployment, institutional structures, and ideologies according to cultural attitudes and 
strategies of the Roman elite.
20
  These studies demonstrate the important influence of 
uniquely Roman cultural factors in Roman military organization and culture; however, 
individual judgment and agency of soldiers are sometimes subordinated to readings of 
Roman military culture interpreted through primarily textual, rather than epigraphic and 
archaeological evidence.  What is needed, therefore, is an approach that bridges the gap 
between “calculation and culture” in determining Roman military practices, and those of 
its officers in particular.
 21
 
 
Scope and Sources 
The dissertation focuses on the period from the late Republic to mid-third century 
CE.  This is a lengthy period of study, to be sure, but is necessary for two main reasons.  
The first is the changing structure of the Roman army.  The last century of the Republic 
                                                 
18
See esp., Harris, War and Imperialism, 18-27, 41-53. 
19
See esp., Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts, 176-178, 211, 312-313. 
20
S. P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (Berkeley, 1999), 
passim, esp. 113-116; S. E. Phang, Roman Military Service: Ideologies of Discipline in the late Republic 
and early Principate (Cambridge, 2008), esp. 21-32, 99-100. 
21
On culture and individual agency the study of in warfare and the balance between , see W. Lee, 
“Warfare and Culture” in W. Lee, ed., Warfare and Culture in World History (New York, 2011), 1-11. 
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forms a logical terminus post quem because of the major developments in the legions 
regarding their recruitment, organization, and deployment across the empire during this 
period.  C. Marius (157-86 BCE) adjusted the composition and recruitment of soldiers by 
eliminating the need for property qualifications, and he and later Roman generals 
gradually transformed the Roman legions from a militia recruited through annual levy to 
more permanent, standing armies who served for years at a time.
22
  During the civil wars 
of Caesar and his successors, moreover, legions were increasingly organized by cohorts 
and began to acquire permanent titles and designations.  Augustus and his successors 
during the Principate transformed the legions into a permanent military force, with more 
typical (though hardly standardized) careers, organization, duties, and pay, which formed 
the organizational basis for the legions during our period.  Diocletian’s reforms to the 
legions at the end of the third century, however, fundamentally reorganized this structure, 
adding new legions, reducing the size others, and altering their deployment and 
hierarchical organization to a degree that requires analysis far beyond the scope of this 
discussion.
23
 
Another reason for choosing this period is the state of our evidence.  Polybius 
(200-118 BCE) is the only writer of the mid-Republic to discuss centurions, and his 
account is brief.  Textual sources from the late Republic and early Principate, in contrast, 
provide much greater detail.  Sallust (86-35 BCE) and Cicero (106-43 BCE) provide 
numerous details about centurions in both military and non-military contexts, while 
                                                 
22
See below, Chapter Four, 125-126. 
23
For more on officers of Roman army during this period, see  M. J. Nicasie, Twilight of Empire: 
The Roman Army from the Reign of Diocletian until the Battle of Adrianople (Amsterdam, 1998), 43-76, 
97-106; P. Richardot, La fin de l’armée Romaine (284-476), 2nd ed. (Paris, 2001), 49-62; Le Bohec, 
L'armée romaine sous le Bas-Empire (Paris, 2006), passim; A. D. Lee, War in Late Antiquity: A Social 
History (Malden, 2007), chapters 5-6. 
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Caesar’s (100-44 BCE) commentaries on the Gallic and Civil wars provide by far the best 
textual account of them in combat during the late Republic.  Livy (59 BCE-CE 17) and 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus (60 BCE-c. 7 BCE) describe centurions in major events 
during the early to mid-Republic, but their distance from the actual events suggests a 
good deal of projecting backward the status and prestige of legionary centurions of 
Caesar’s and Augustus’ age.   
Numerous historians from the Principate, such as Josephus (CE 37-100), Plutarch 
(CE 46-120), Tacitus (CE 56-117), Appian (CE 95-165) and Cassius Dio (CE 155-c. 
229), offer stories of both individual centurions and groups of them in a variety of 
contexts, but are limited in detail.  Military manuals by Onasander (first century CE) and 
Arrian (CE 86-160) describe ideal deployments and use of soldiers and officers, but only 
mention the role of centurions occasionally.  Vegetius (fourth to fifth century CE) offers 
more, but since his work presents his ideal of the Roman army from the early Principate 
long before, his descriptions should be used cautiously.
24
  Textual accounts of centurions 
in non-historical literature, such as in the letters of Pliny the Younger (CE 61-c. 112), or 
in fictional literature, poetry, and philosophy, also suggest attitudes towards their status 
and reputation.
25
  Accounts of centurions in authors such as Apuleius, Eusebius, or the 
writers of Rabbinic and New Testament texts are especially useful in providing 
perspectives outside of the Roman political and social elite.
26
 
 The textual evidence for centurions, however, becomes scarce by the second 
century CE, which compels us to use other kinds of sources.  The earliest surviving 
                                                 
24
On dating and using Vegetius, see below, Chapter One, n. 12. 
25
E.g., Juv. 16. 13-19; Hor. Sat. 1. 16. 72-74; Plin. NH 7. 20; Sen. Clem. 1. 16. 
26
Apul. Met. 9. 39; Euseb. HE 7. 15. On references in New Testament and Rabbinic texts, see 
below, Chapter Six. 
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epigraphic and visual evidence for centurions is from the Triumviral period,
27
 but 
increases dramatically during the Principate.  Thousands of dedicatory and 
commemorative inscriptions from the reign of Augustus to the mid-late third century CE 
provide details on military transfers and social activities of centurions across the empire.  
Surviving papyrological evidence for centurions is found as early as the first century CE, 
but is largely limited to the Roman army’s presence in Egypt and the Near East.  These 
documents include private correspondence, contracts for loans, formal petitions and 
complaints, as well as thanks from communities to centurions who served as local judges 
and patrons.
28
 
Funerary epitaphs from this period also describe many centurions’ careers, major 
assignments, and military decorations that reveal attitudes and expectations of the 
centurion, his family, or comrades towards his service.  Epitaphs that include visual 
imagery of centurions, their armor, or decorations, moreover, similarly suggest what 
features or duties of the centurion required emphasis.
29
  Archaeological evidence, finally, 
offers another avenue to understanding the roles of centurions.  The physical remains and 
plans of legionary fortresses at Caerleon, Inchtuthil, Lambaesis, Novaesium, and 
Vindonissa give us details on the size, layout, and location of centurions’ quarters.  
Although this sampling is limited to the northern and western parts of the empire, it can 
suggest how centurions’ authority and military relationships were defined through 
physical space.
30
  In contrast to the relatively rich evidence for the Principate, the marked 
                                                 
27
E.g., Minucius Lorarius. See Appendix A, fig. 1. 
28
Many are collected in R. O. Fink, Roman Military Records on Papyrus (Cleveland, 1971). 
29
Visual evidence contained largely in Appendices A and B. 
30
Representations of camps are presented in Appendix C. 
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decrease in surviving textual, epigraphic, and archaeological evidence during the crisis-
ridden mid-late third century CE makes analysis of the legionary centurions beyond this 
period nearly impossible. 
 
Method 
This dissertation presents a comprehensive examination of the legionary 
centurion’s varied functions in the Roman military.  In this context, the goal is not merely 
to describe the centurions’ various military duties or careers, but to explain their social 
roles within the Roman army, and the impact of these roles on structuring the Roman 
army’s unique organizational and cultural features.  This analysis of officership, 
therefore, seeks to understand not only the characteristics of the legionary centurion, but 
also important features of the Romans’ military practices more broadly. 
To describe comprehensively the varied roles of legionary centurions poses 
several major challenges regarding the use of evidence.  In contrast to discussions of 
certain Roman generals, we possess few texts written by centurions themselves.  Papyri 
from Egypt and the Near East from the imperial period record certain letters, petitions, 
and orders from centurions, but this is a far cry from any “diary” that can describe their 
day-to-day activities and attitudes.  We are thus left to interpret their status, behaviour, 
and identity through literature, imagery, and physical space.  Despite their dissimilarity in 
genre and origin, however, these sources can share many formal characteristics, cultural 
perspectives, and biases, all of which helped to construct the centurions’ identity and 
shape their behaviour.  Many of the duties, perceptions and symbols of self-
representation of the centurion were part of a persistent yet dynamic cultural construction 
14 
 
that developed through interaction between imagery and literature (mythical, historical, 
didactic), and were institutionalized through the actions of centurions themselves. 
In addition to building upon the vast scholarship on the Roman army itself, the 
dissertation integrates several analytical approaches from military theory.  Some of the 
same challenges confronting centurions and the Roman army – discipline, military 
authority, officership, social cohesion, civil-military relations – have been discussed by 
scholars of military history in many other contexts.  John Lynn’s application of 
compliance theory to the army of Revolutionary France, for example, provides a model 
for understanding coercive and normative methods in acquiring the compliance of 
soldiers.
31
  Military studies on combat motivation by authors such as Kindsvatter and 
Kellett also offer insight into how the nature of combat and the size of unit affects social 
cohesion between officers and soldiers.
32
  Both Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, 
moreover, have heavily influenced concepts of professionalism and officership that can 
be tested in evaluating the centurion’s status within the Roman military.33  The purpose in 
using these analytical tools is not to provide simple models to explain the role of the 
centurion as an officer.  That would be to ignore the fundamentally different values and 
social structures of the Roman army.  In several cases, the dissertation demonstrates that 
the centurion transcends categorizations or definitions of officership that are often taken 
for granted in military studies.  These approaches do, however, provide greater insight 
                                                 
31
Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary 
France, 1791-1794 (Boulder, 1984), 22-40. 
32
P. S. Kindsvatter, American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam 
(Kansas, 2003); A. Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle (Boston, 1982), esp. 
41-52, 73-79, 133-136; See also S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (New York, 1947), 132-159, 186-201. 
33
Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, 1957), 7-20, 61-65; Janowitz, The 
Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York, 1962), 5-54. 
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into how other armies have understood or addressed fundamental military problems that 
are also relevant to Roman military culture.   
In addition to drawing from scholarship on military history, the dissertation 
engages several approaches in contemporary critical social theory.  Foucault’s theories of 
technologies of representation help to articulate the relationship between soldiers, 
centurions, and the emperor through punitive acts in military discipline.
34
  Pierre 
Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic capital and symbolic violence have proved similarly 
influential in describing how authority can be defined and structured through social 
action.
35
  Again, however, these concepts are used to provide insight into comparative 
social structures rather than a mold in which to pour evidence of Roman military 
practices.  A feature of this dissertation is to posit another challenge to the broad 
application of Weberian categories of authority to Roman institutions.
36
 
 
Organization 
The organization of the dissertation is topical rather than chronological.  This 
approach makes the best use of the sporadic evidence of the centurion’s status from 
Republic to Principate, and allows each of his roles in the Roman military to be analyzed 
in turn.  This is not to suggest that there were no major developments in the centurionate 
during the period of study, and such developments – particularly in the centurion’s duties 
                                                 
34
Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, A. Sheridan trans. (New York, 1977), 
23-27, 43-58, 104-111; Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, M. Bertani 
and A. Fontana eds., D. Macey trans. (New York, 2003), 28-46. 
35
Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, R. Nice trans. (Cambridge, 1977), 76-89, 163-179, 
184-194. 
36On this problem in general, see Lendon, “The Legitimacy of the Roman Emperor: Against 
Weberian legitimacy and imperial ‘strategies of legitimation,’” Herrschaftsstrukturen und 
Herrschaftspraxis: Konzepte, Prinzipien und Strategien der Administration in römischen Kaiserreich 
(Berlin, 2006), 53-63. 
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and status within the military hierarchy – will be addressed.  The dissertation argues, 
however, that in many cases, despite fundamental changes to the Roman army and its 
activities, there remained an (often deliberate) continuity in the duties, imagery, and 
expectations of centurions between the Republic and Principate. 
The first two chapters explore two major functions of centurions and how they 
became fundamental to characterizing the rank.  Chapter One begins by examining the 
centurion’s role in military discipline in the legions.  Through analysis of textual and 
visual evidence, it demonstrates that the centurion was strongly associated with corporal 
punishment in both his duties and commemorative representation, and that this 
association with corporal punishment was crucial to defining his status.  It argues, 
moreover, that the centurion’s execution of corporal punishment was central rather than 
peripheral to defining Roman disciplina as a whole.  Chapter Two examines the 
centurion’s role as a combat officer.  It shows that an individual, aggressive form of 
bravery in combat defined legionary centurions during the imperial expansion of the 
Republic and early Principate, and continued to do so even later, when major military 
campaigns of the Roman army became the exception rather than the norm.  It also 
demonstrates that, although such acts of bravery were motivated at least in part by 
individual desire for rewards and social prestige, they were also often calculated to 
produce an effect on the centurion’s soldiers. 
The third chapter is directly related to the first two, in that it addresses how both 
of these characteristics served to define and assert the centurion’s military authority.  The 
chapter discusses the concept of an organizational strain in the Roman military between 
individual courage and collective discipline, and it interprets the centurion’s dual function 
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with reference to military officership.  It demonstrates that the centurion’s association 
with severe discipline as well as with seemingly unbridled aggression in combat 
represented complementary rather than contradictory practices in asserting military 
authority in the Roman army: the centurion was expected to represent both of these 
virtues as a requirement of his status as a middle-ranking officer. 
While the first three chapters analyze how ideals of the centurion’s behaviour 
defined his authority, the next three chapters focus instead on the centurion’s 
intermediate position in the Roman command structure and social hierarchy, and how this 
position affected military interaction with Rome’s imperial subjects.  Chapter Four 
examines how we may evaluate the centurionate as a corps of officers.  It shows that the 
Roman legions during both the Republic and Principate lacked a corps of commanding 
officers, either by training or by social status.  This organizational characteristic in the 
legions necessarily placed greater emphasis on expertise of the centurionate.  The 
centurions’ relatively consistent levels of experience, training, and sense of corporate 
identity gave them a unique status in the Roman military.  Chapter Five addresses the 
impact of this status within the social hierarchy of the legion.  It shows how through pay, 
social status, duties, and physical space, the rank both functionally and symbolically 
occupied an intermediate position between the rank and file and aristocratic commanders.  
It contends, moreover, that this intermediate position was crucial to integrating new 
recruits into the legion and defining their place within the Roman military hierarchy. 
Chapter Six explores the legionary centurions’ so-called “non-military roles” as a 
form of civil-military relations.  It describes briefly several important duties performed 
by centurions outside of military contexts: engineering, diplomacy, local law and order, 
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and regional administration.  It demonstrates first that the varied skills, military authority, 
and experience of centurions made them indispensable tools in many facets of Roman 
imperial administration during the Principate.  It also shows that centurions often became 
seen by local inhabitants to represent the most immediate and powerful source of Roman 
imperial authority.  As such, centurions lay at the intersection of Rome’s military 
apparatus and imperial power. 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Disciplinarians 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Legionary centurions performed an essential role in defining and preserving 
Roman military discipline.  While both ancient and modern armies have employed fear 
and brutal punishments to gain compliance from their soldiers,
1
 scholars have long 
considered the Roman army to be especially strict.  Commonly described as forming the 
“backbone of Roman discipline,”2 centurions in particular had the authority to inflict 
corporal punishment.  Equipped with their vine-stick cane (vitis), the tool with which 
they flogged disobedient soldiers, centurions possessed the rare legal authority to beat a 
Roman citizen.
3
  Sternness or near savagery (saevitia) in their disposition towards 
discipline, in fact, seem to have been the centurions’ hallmark, and many textual accounts 
of them highlight this characteristic.  Exemplary is the centurion named Lucilius, who 
was murdered during the mutiny of the Danube legions in CE 14.  He had apparently 
                                                 
1
The Spartan general Clearchus argued that soldiers should fear their commanders more than the 
enemy (Xen. Anab. 2. 6. 10; Frontin. Strat. 4. 1. 17). Frederick the Great echoed this sentiment, while 
Wellington was a strong advocate of the use of flogging. Discipline was exceptionally harsh in Hitler’s 
Wehrmacht. See Keijzer, Military Obedience (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1978), 36; E. S. Turner, Gallant 
Gentlemen: A Portrait of the British Officer, 1600-1956, (London, 1956), 195; O. Bartov, Hitler's Army: 
Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York, 1991), 59. 
2
C. E. Brand, Roman Military Law, 51; Delbrück, History of the Art of War, 429; J. Keegan, A 
History of Warfare (New York, 1993), 268. 
3
Phang, Roman Military Service, 119. See esp. n. 19; Le Bohec, The Imperial Roman Army, 61; O. 
Richier, Centuriones ad Rhenum: les Centurions Legionnaires des Armées Romaines du Rhin, (Paris, 
2004), 431. 
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earned the nickname cedo alteram or “Give me another” because whenever his vitis 
broke when beating a soldier, he called for another to finish the job.
4
   
The question of to what degree centurions relied on physical coercion to maintain 
the discipline of their soldiers and assert their authority addresses a larger discussion on 
Roman concepts and practices of punishment in the legions.  The focus of this discussion 
has shifted considerably in recent years.  Earlier European military theorists from 
Machiavelli to Delbrück maintained that rigid codes of obedience, strictly enforced 
through harsh physical punishment, were instrumental in preserving Roman 
commanders’ authority and ensuring the army’s success.5  More recent studies, however, 
have contrasted these so-called “dominating” or external types of discipline with what are 
deemed more “positive” or mental aspects of Roman disciplina, such as appeals to 
legionary traditions, the binding forces of military and imperial cult, or a cultural ethos 
that exalted obedience and self-restraint.
6
  Phang has recently defined disciplina militaris 
as a social and political ideology, a normative strategy in acquiring the soldiers’ 
compliance, serving to legitimate the authority of the Roman military elite.
7
   
                                                 
4
Tac. Ann. 1. 23. 
5
See A. Gat, The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford, 
1989), 1-9, 16; G. E. Rothenberg, “Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli and 
the ‘Military Revolution’ of the Seventeenth Century” in P. Paret ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Princeton, 1986), 32-63; Keijzer, Military Obedience, 33-37, 48; H. 
Delbrück, History of the Art of War, 286, 288: “Only with the Romans were the concept and power of 
discipline fully recognized and accomplished.”  On Roman discipline generally, cf. Goldsworthy, Roman 
Army at War, 1-11, 283-286; Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts, 169-171; W. S. Messer, “Mutiny in the Roman 
Army: The Republic”, CP 15. 2 (1920), 159-162.  
6
Shame: Caes. BC 2. 31. Cult: A. Pegler, “Social Organizations within the Roman Army”, TRAC 9 
(1999), 40-42; J. Hegeland, “Roman Army Religion,” ANRW ii.16. 2 (1978), 1470-1505. Disciplina as 
cultural ethos: Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts, 172-211. On mental and physical aspects of discipline, see G. 
Horsmann, Untersuchungen zur militärischen Ausbildung im republikanischen und kaiserzeitlichen Rom 
(Boppard am Rhein, 1991), 2-3, 102-109, 189-197. 
7
Phang, Roman Military Service. 
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One aspect of this shift in focus has been either to downplay or question outright 
the role of corporal punishment that was once seen to be so ideologically important to the 
Roman army.  Kiesling, for example, sees the scholarly tendency to posit harsh 
punishment in Roman discipline as anachronistic “wishful thinking,” and claims that 
there is little evidence that the vitis served to identify centurions.  Phang, meanwhile, 
claims that punishment requires legitimation, and officers cannot rely alone on “pure 
domination (the imposition of authority by force), which is inefficient.”  More to the 
point, William Harris declares: “The army that needs very brutal discipline (and practices 
such as decimation) is precisely the army that cannot rely on the courage of its ordinary 
soldiers.”8  To put these arguments simply, in motivating Roman soldiers to fight, the 
carrot was at least as important as the stick. 
This change in attitude reflects studies in military theory following the Second 
World War that questioned the efficacy of corporal punishment and other more violent 
forms of discipline.  In such studies, a strong categorical distinction is made between two 
kinds of discipline: coercive discipline is employed through direct (often physical) and 
institutional means; normative discipline, in contrast, promotes practices that seek 
indirectly to foster self-discipline and restraint, such as encouraging pride in one’s unit 
and its history, bonds of loyalty between soldiers, group consensus, and primary unit 
                                                 
8E. C. Kiesling, “Corporal Punishment in the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion: Modern 
Images and Ancient Realities,” Historical Reflections-Reflexions Historiques 32 (2006), 242-246; Phang, 
Roman Military Service, 111; W. V. Harris, “Readings in the Narrative Literature of Roman Courage”, 302. 
Supp. by G. W. Currie Diss., The Military Discipline of the Romans from the Founding of the City to the 
Close of the Republic (Bloomington, 1928), 47. 
 22 
 
cohesion.  In evaluating the effectiveness of the two types in military institutions, 
historians have generally shown clear preference towards the latter.
9
   
Little attention in recent discussions of Roman disciplina, however, has been 
given to the role performed by the centurions.  While these middle-ranking officers 
during the late Republic and Principate had many administrative and combat duties, they 
are portrayed in literature and commemorated in stone regularly in their function of 
administering corporal punishment.  That they are largely absent from discussions of 
disciplina is thus, to say the least, problematic.  One reason for the lack of attention given 
to them is perhaps because a focus on cultural or political origins of disciplina has 
invariably dwelled on Rome’s “elite” members of the aristocracy, or how this elite 
transmitted its ideologies to the soldiers.   
This chapter, in contrast, identifies the centurion as a key instrument in defining 
and guaranteeing discipline in the Roman military.  It explores the evidence for 
centurions’ disciplinary duties in the legions during the Republic and Principate, and 
considers the ideological bases of this form of authority.  It then demonstrates that the 
duty of enforcing compliance through corporal punishment was critical to defining the 
centurion’s authority as an officer.  The conclusion that follows argues that corporal 
punishment and similar physical forms of discipline hardly diminished in importance 
during this period, but rather continued to define Roman concepts of disciplina and 
military authority. 
 
                                                 
9
Cf. A. Kellett, Combat Motivation, 92, 133-159. Cf. M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 8-9, 
38-44; S. R. Frey, “Courts and Cats: British Military Justice in the Eighteenth Century,” MA 43.1 (1979), 9; 
G. Phillips, “To Cry ‘Home! Home!’: Mutiny, Morale and Indiscipline in the Tudor Armies,” JMH 65 
(2001), 313-332. J. E. Hamby, “The Mutiny Wagon Wheel: A Leadership Model for Mutiny in Combat,” 
AFS 28.4 (2002), 585-586. 
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1.2 Corporal Punishment in the Legions 
 Ancient authors took great interest in Roman military discipline, and generally 
favoured harsh actions toward transgressors.  Polybius famously devotes an entire section 
of his Historia to describing admiringly the brutal punishments in the Republican 
legions.
10
  Writers of the Imperial period continued to support strict disciplinary practices 
in order to prevent mutiny and disturbances in what was now a permanent, standing 
army.  Valerius Maximus warns that if soldiers “stray from the right path they will crush 
unless crushed,” while Josephus claims that capital punishment was employed even for 
minor infractions.
11
  The fourth century CE writer, Vegetius,
12
 later advocated a strong 
stance against any kind of transgression by soldiers.  He advises that the strictest severity 
is necessary in order to maintain discipline and prevent mutiny.
13
   
Some references to military offences and their punishments during the Empire 
were later recorded in the Digest of Justinian.
14
  The punishments listed include corporal 
punishment (castigatio), fines, the imposition of additional duties, transfer to another 
branch of the service, degradation from rank, and dishonourable discharge (ignominiosa 
missio).
15
  The most severe military crimes, such as desertion, early flight from battle, 
and disobedience against a superior’s direct order (even if resulting in a successful 
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Polyb. 6. 37. 1. 
11
Val. Max. 2. 7. 14: quae ubi a recto tenore desciuerint, oppressura sunt, nisi opprimantur; Jos. 
BJ 3. 102-7. Cf. Frontin. Strat. 4. 1-2. 
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The period in which Vegetius wrote is debated. Cf. M. B. Charles, Vegetius in Context: 
Establishing the Date of the Epitoma Rei Militaris (Stuttgart, 2007), 183-184, who suggests between CE 
383-450. I follow T. D. Barnes, “The Date of Vegetius,” Phoenix 33. 3 (1979), 254-257, in his suggestion 
of the late 4
th
 century. 
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Veg. Mil. 3. 4: ad omnem disciplinam artissima seueritate teneantur. 
14
Menenius, Dig. 49. 16. 2; 16. 6: Omne delictum est militis, quod aliter, quam disciplina 
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15
Modestinus, Dig. 49. 16. 3. 1. 
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conclusion) are described as warranting capital punishment.
16
  Execution for such 
shameful actions could be carried out by beheading, rods (virgis caedi), and stoning and 
clubbing (fustuarium).   
Because of the limits of the literary record, which tends to focus on large-scale 
unrest and serious military transgressions such as desertion and mutiny,
17
 evaluations of 
the significance of the role of physical punishment from Republic to Principate have 
primarily focused on the apparent frequency of capital punishment or the attitudes of 
individual commanders toward it.  Less serious military transgressions, however, such as 
insubordination, theft, perjury, sodomy, false witness, or drunkenness, while less 
interesting to historians like Tacitus, were nonetheless far more common.  Castigatio was 
prescribed for such infractions.
18
  During the Republic, while tribunes were in charge of 
supervising disciplinary actions, centurions were responsible for executing them.
19
  By 
the Principate, however, corporal punishment seems usually to have been left to a 
centurion’s discretion.20   
The centurion’s authority to punish soldiers, moreover, was distinctly different 
from that of a tribune or legate because of its personal character.  While higher officers 
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The most commonly cited episode of the latter is recorded in Livy 8. 7. 17, in which T. Manlius 
Torquatus had his own son executed in 340 BCE for engaging against orders. 
17Cf. L. Brice, “Holding a Wolf by the Ears: Mutiny and Unrest in the Roman Military, 44 B.C.-
A.D. 68” (PhD Dissertation, UNC Chapel Hill, 2003), 41-43. 
18
Menenius, Dig. 49. 16. 6. 3; Papinianus, Dig. 49. 16. 15; Frontin. Strat. 2. 8. 8-9, 11, 14. 
Polybius (6. 37. 9) states that capital punishment was administered for all these crimes in the Republic, but 
he is not corroborated elsewhere, and such brutality seems extreme. Cf. Campbell, The Emperor and the 
Roman Army, 261; Phang, Roman Military Service, 113, 123-125. 
19
Polybius (6. 37-8) attributes supervision of disciplinary matters to military tribunes, but implies 
that the tribunes did not themselves inflict punishment. See M. Dobson, The Army of the Roman Republic: 
The Second Century BC, Polybius and the Camps at Numantia, Spain (Oxford, 2008), 54-55. 
20
Since crimes were to be judged closest to where the crime was committed (Modestinus, Dig. 
49.16.3), military tribunes often were not present to make judgment, and there is no evidence of them ever 
giving an order in the Empire. See Garnsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire 
(Oxford, 1970), 137-138, 246-247. 
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might indicate to subordinates those who should be punished,
21
 centurions implemented 
the discipline and deployed the brutal force by their own hand, with their own vitis.  This 
activity was not confined to camp, moreover, but could be performed in the heat of a 
battle.  During the sack of Jerusalem in CE 70, for example, a centurion and an 
accompanying soldier were ordered to beat with the centurion’s cane any soldiers who 
did not desist from damaging the Temple.
22
  Legionary commanders took full advantage 
of centurions’ experience in applying discipline, sometimes requesting their advice on 
what sort of punishment was appropriate in various situations, especially mutinies.
23
  
From the Republic onward, therefore, their authority as officers was closely linked to 
corporal punishment.   
In the Roman world more broadly, authority was often articulated through terms 
and objects of physical violence or punishment.  Certain visual signs, for example, could 
be employed to portray the disadvantages of punishment as more intense and certain than 
any advantages of transgression or resistance.
24
  The Roman state commonly employed 
such signs in attempting to deter rebellion and lawlessness or to proclaim its imperial 
power.  These signs could be as crude as the crucifixion of six thousand rebellious slaves 
along the Appian Way, or as artistically refined as the triumph of Roman over barbarian 
narrated on the Column of Trajan.  Such visual representations of physical punishment 
could also reaffirm the authority of specific individual positions.  Most famous is the 
                                                 
21
Tribunes indicated with a tap that a soldier suffer fustuarium (Polyb. 6. 38). On centurions using 
their vitis, see Richier, Centuriones ad Rhenum, 538; Phang, Roman Military Service, 129. 
22
Jos. BJ 6. 262. 
23
Tac. Hist. 4. 19. See also Tac. Ann. 1. 30; Sen. De Ira. 1. 18; Veg. Mil. 1. 25. 
24Foucault explains these signs as “obstacle signs,” necessary in creating  a larger “technology of 
representation” regarding punishment. See Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, A. Sheridan 
trans. (New York: 1975; 1977), 104-108. 
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bundle of rods and axes (fasces) that came to represent a Roman magistrate’s imperium, 
or supreme power and authority.  In a speech by Tacitus, the Cherusci leader, Arminius, 
refers to the fasces and the toga themselves as signs of Roman domination between the 
Rhine and Elbe rivers.
25
  Rome is not unique among ancient cultures in using such signs.  
The great monarchs of Mesopotamia and Egypt were imperial predecessors in this art.
26
  
Spartan commanders, moreover, bore a curved staff (βακτηρία) both as a disciplinary 
tool and a badge of office.
27
  Rome does appear rather uncommon among its 
contemporaries, however, when we find such signs used by its middle-ranking military 
officers.  Centurions too symbolized their authority through a sign of physical 
punishment: the vitis. 
 
1.3 Representations of the Vitis 
Military equipment and clothing were important to constructing Roman military 
identity.  The soldier’s sword (gladius) and belt (cingulum), for example, were not merely 
useful tools or props, but visual elements that actively defined the man’s status, authority, 
and profession in the legion.
28
  Sculptors were also well aware of how to show military 
equipment, and by the Principate, there was a tradition of depicting equipment to 
represent specific ranks: the muscled cuirass for senior officer, the signum for standard-
                                                 
25
Tac. Ann. 1. 59. Cf. McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 143. 
26
Mesopotamia: Z. Bahrani, Rituals of War: The Body and Violence in Mesopotamia (New York, 
2008), passim. Egypt: A. M. Gnirs, “Ancient Egypt” in War and Society in the Ancient and Mediterranean 
Worlds (Cambridge, 1999), 71-104, with bibliography.  
27
E.g., Thuc. 8. 84. 2; Xen. Anab.2. 3. 11; Frontin. Strat. 4. 9. 
28
S. James, Excavations at Dura-Europos, Final Report VII, the Arms and Armour, and Other 
Military Equipment (London, 2004), 243-263, esp. 257. Cf. I. Hayes, “Introduction: The Roman Army as a 
Community” in The Roman Army as a Community, 9-10; M. A. Speidel, “Dressed for the Occasion: 
Clothes and Context in the Roman Army,” in Heer und Herrschaft im römischen Reich der hohen 
Kasierzeit (Stuttgart, 2009), 237; James, Rome and the Sword, 16-19. 
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bearer, the horn for musician.
29
  By the first century CE, commemorative inscriptions of 
centurions that gave visual prominence to the vitis became widespread.  The repetition 
and circulation of this symbol through commemorative inscriptions became crucial to 
defining the centurion’s military duties and authority as a whole.30   
The earliest known visual commemoration of a centurion is that of Minucius 
Lorarius, who died in 43 BCE.  His cognomen, Lorarius, means “the flogger” – one can 
speculate just how he or one of his ancestors acquired this cognomen.  In case his name 
did not make the point obvious, Lorarius is shown boldly facing forward, with his left 
hand ready on the pommel of his sheathed sword, and his right hand holding the vitis.
31
  
This kind of display of the vitis came to characterize centurions’ commemorative 
inscriptions during the Principate and beyond.  One of the best preserved visual 
commemorations of a centurion is that of M. Caelius, who perished in the disaster in the 
Teutoburg Forest in CE 9.  In this monument, the vitis actually passes below the frame of 
the image and overlaps the commemorative text, directly over Caelius’ own name.32   
By the late second to early third century CE, both soldiers and centurions were 
increasingly depicted in tunics or cloaks rather than in full gear.
33
  Despite this trend, 
however, centurions still often chose to show the vitis as specific insignia of their rank 
                                                 
29The centurion’s deputy (optio) is similarly presented with his staff. See M. C. Bishop & J. C. N. 
Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, 2
nd
 ed. (Oxford, 2006), 10. 
30
Cf. Bourdieu, Outline, 165: social representations of a group and of properties attached to that 
group “rank among the institutionalized instruments for maintenance of the symbolic order, and hence 
among the mechanisms of reproduction of the social order….” 
31
Appendix A, fig. 1. 
32
Appendix A, fig. 2. 
33
C. Franzoni, Habitus atque habitudo militis: monumenti funerari di militari nella Cisalpina 
Romana (Roma, 1987), 139. Speidel’s suggestion that this trend reflects a desire to appear more as fellow 
civilians or “family men” is debatable. See “Dressed for the Occasion,” 237-238. 
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and authority.
34
  The prominent depiction of the vitis was also not limited to strictly 
“military” commemorations that were established by comrades.  A third century 
commemoration from Chester of M. Aurelius Nepos depicts him in this same stance, with 
vitis and sword, yet beside an image of his wife in civilian garb.  The detached nature in 
which a centurion could represent his symbol of his military authority simultaneously 
with familial responsibilities is illustrated most vividly in the commemoration of Fl. 
Augustalis, who stands with his wife and young son.  Although he bears no other military 
equipment, Augustalis grasps the large knob of the vitis with his left hand, and his son’s 
small shoulder with his right.
35
  For some centurions, finally, a coiled vitis is the only 
visual image by which they are commemorated.  Monuments to C. Anarius Felix and M. 
Creperius Primus from the mid-first century CE, for example, detail each man’s career as 
a centurion and depict what appear to be coiled vine branches.
36
 
As early as the first century CE, the vitis so identified centurions that it became 
metaphorical for the rank itself – its own badge of office.  Much like the expression 
“contending for the purple,” described the pursuit of becoming the emperor, Juvenal 
expressed the process of becoming a centurion as “petitioning for the vitis.”37  According 
to Eusebius, “The vine-stick is a certain mark of honour among the Romans, and those 
who obtain it become, they say, centurions.”38  Conversely, to lay down one’s insignia or 
                                                 
34
Appendix A, figs. 5-6, 8-11. 
35
Nepos and Augustalis: Appendix A, figs. 9, 11. On factors that can influence style and content of 
commemoration, see Keppie, “Having Been a Soldier: The Commemoration of Military Service on 
Funerary Monuments of the Early Roman Empire” in J. J. Wilkes ed., Documenting the Roman Army 
(London, 2003), 31-49. 
36
Appendix A, figs. 12-13. On curved vine sticks, see below, Appendix B, 276. 
37
Juv. 14. 193 
38
HE 7. 15: τιμή τίς ἐστι παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις τὸ κλῆμα, οὗ τοὺς τυχόντας φασὶν ἑκατοντάρχους 
γίνεσθαι. 
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be compelled to give them up typically symbolized one’s departure from the Roman 
military community.  Epigraphic evidence shows that for the highest-ranking centurion, 
the primuspilus, his final act was to “lay down his vitis” at the end of his term of 
service.
39
  Civilians across the empire, moreover, could recognize the centurion by this 
instrument alone.  When Apuleius’ transformed protagonist and his master have their 
unfortunate run-in with an unnamed and cruel Roman soldier, this soldier’s rank as a 
centurion is identified by his clothing and bearing (habitus atque habitudo), as well as his 
vitis, which he employs viciously on both victims.
40
     
The vitis was symbolic of more than just the centurion’s function in disciplinary 
matters.  Pliny the Elder stresses this fact: 
What more? Need I mention that the vitis has been introduced into the camp and 
placed in the centurion's hand to preserve supreme authority and command, and 
that this is the high reward which summons the lagging ranks to the sturdy eagles, 
and that even when used for punishing crimes it honours the punishment itself 
(poenam ipsam honorat)?
41
  
 
In representing the centurion’s supreme authority and command (summam rerum 
imperiumque), the vitis served at once as the centurion’s device for physical punishment, 
a symbol of his disciplinary functions more broadly, yet also of his overall authority to 
command soldiers in battle.  Pliny, therefore, appears to associate positively the 
centurion’s exercising of corporal punishment with military discipline and authority.  
This association seems to have remained strong through to late antiquity.  According to 
                                                 
39
CIL VII 2634; ILS 2296. On centurion’s laying down insignia, Cf. B. Dobson, “The Significance 
of the Centurion and ‘Primipilaris’ in the Roman Army and Administration” in Roman Officers and 
Frontiers, 163 with n. 85; Speidel, “Dressed for the Occasion,” 244. 
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See below, Chapter Six, n. 89. 
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John Lydus, as late as the reign of Justinian in the sixth century CE, the Praetorian 
Prefect, a civil servant far removed from the legionary centurion, adopted the older 
military rank’s symbol of the vitis as his own badge of authority.42  What was once 
merely a centurion’s disciplinary tool had (apparently) transformed into a broader symbol 
of imperial power.   
The centurion was, therefore, crucially defined by his authority to administer 
corporal punishment.  Pliny’s statement, that when a centurion punishes crimes he 
honours the punishment itself, makes an additional point: the centurion’s use of the vitis 
was established to be a sanctioned, honourable act for him to perform.  Soldiers must in 
the end, however, choose whether or not to obey orders, to suffer or avoid punishment, to 
help or condemn friends.
43
  If the centurion’s punitive power did in fact gain a form of 
collective approval or tolerance, what were the limits of his punitive authority, and how 
might these limits have been defined by both officers and soldiers?  Did this articulation 
of a centurion’s authority, moreover, endure from the Republic to the Principate?  These 
questions are important, for while discipline explicitly provides ways to increase an 
army’s cohesion and combat effectiveness, it also more subtly reflects that army’s self-
image, and reveals many of its underlying concepts of authority.
44
  The reasons how and 
why a centurion punished, therefore, are essential to understanding the nature of a 
centurion’s authority as well as the concept of disciplina in the legions more broadly.   
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Joh. Lydus, Mag. 2. 19. Cf. A. H. M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 284-602: A Social, 
Economic and Administrative Survey (Oxford, 1964), 566. 
43
See Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic, 23, 36. Cf. Hamby, “The Mutiny Wagon Wheel,” 586. 
44
Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 62. 
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1.4 Limits of Legal Authority and Social Status 
Both ancient and modern soldiers are often believed to have accepted a punitive 
power based nominally in the authority of law.  Such was the case of the classical Spartan 
army.  Although unwritten, “the laws” of Sparta were authoritative and normative, and 
conformity to them was idealized.
45
  French soldiers of the Armée du Nord during the 
Revolutionary period likewise recognized that their obedience was to la loi more than 
their officers.
46
  Understood today, military law comprises official, specific mandates on 
acceptable and unacceptable actions by military personnel, their punishments, as well as 
guidelines for military judicial processes.
47
  The authority vested in modern military law 
has become essential to defining and understanding the military status of officers, and 
their subordinates’ willingness to accept punishment.  In the American military of the 
nineteenth century, for example, officers and soldiers blamed a weakly-enforced judicial 
system for loosening the bonds of military authority.  A lack of legal standards led 
officers to flog soldiers without due process: “With free men allegedly equal before the 
law, conflicts took sharp focus when officers, in pursuit of obedience, neglected to obey 
                                                 
45On Sparta, see Paus. 3. 5. 2; Hdt. 7. 104, 228: “For their master is the law (νομός), which they 
fear more than your subjects fear you.” The Macedonian system is seen as disciplined, but more flexible: 
see F. Naiden, “The Invention of the Officer Corps,” JHS 7.1 (2007), 35-60; Delbrück, History of the Art of 
War, 286. 
46“Every good soldier should obey without resistance, every time la loi commands him,” from 
journal of the Armée du Nord, Argus 79 (10 July 1792), quoted by J. Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic, 99. 
Cf. 97-105.  
47
Brand, Roman Military Law, vii, who applies this definition from Anglo-American legal-military 
practice to the Roman army. See also A. W. Lane, “The Attainment of Military Discipline,” Journal of 
Military Service Institution 55 (1944), 1-19: “Military law protects personal rights and liberties by limiting 
the powers of the commander.” 
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the law intended to bind all in the justice system.  No self-respecting citizen of the 
republic willingly accepted such abuse….”48 
Although Roman soldiers had no “legal rights” as we might understand them, 
military historians have argued that their concepts of military discipline and law evolved 
to a degree that they were more comparable to modern armies than their ancient 
contemporaries.
49
  Some ancient authors portrayed military discipline of the middle and 
late Republic as far more brutal than that of the Principate, that is, that it had softened 
over time.  Decimation, for example, is described as exceptional by the reign of 
Tiberius.
50
  Despite acknowledging that the decline from the austerity of prior 
generations is all too common a theme in elite writing of the Empire,
51
 some studies find 
a linear development of formal discipline in the Roman army: while more primitive 
modes of punishment through hardcore obedience and severity were common to the 
Republic, gifted generals of the late Republic (e.g. Caesar) maintained discipline 
according to a more normative mode: shame and rhetorical persuasion.  The military 
reforms of Augustus and his successors finally led to a more rationalized, bureaucratic 
military institution, with a more professional outlook, which relied increasingly on the 
authority of law.  While severity could be perceived as illegitimate cruelty, authority 
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M. Vargas, “The Military Justice System and the Use of Illegal Punishments as Causes of 
Desertion in the U.S. Army, 1821-35,” JMH 55. 1 (1991), 1-4. Cf., R. A. Herrera, “Self-Governance and 
the American Citizen as Soldier, 1775-1861,” JMH 65.1 (2001), 21-52, esp. 33.  See also Lynn, Bayonets 
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E. Carney, “Macedonians and Mutiny: Discipline and Indiscipline in the Army of Philip and 
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petulantiae certamen erat. Cf. Phang, Roman Military Service, 121. See also E. Wheeler, “The Laxity of 
the Syrian Legions” in D. Kennedy ed. The Roman Army in the East (Ann Arbor, 1996), 229-276. 
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vested in law “displays administrative rationality…[the] bureaucratic process may have 
helped legitimate punishment in the soldiers’ eyes.”52 
Upon closer examination of the ancient evidence, however, this narrative is 
problematic on several points.  First, many non-violent forms of punishment were also 
advocated and employed during the Republic, while punishments for some crimes 
became far crueller during the Imperial period.
53
  Second, the corpus of Roman military 
law is little more than a collection of treatises and opinions on military disciplinary 
procedure; there was no such thing as a Roman code of criminal law, let alone military 
law.
54
  What treatises and opinions on military affairs that do exist, moreover, are 
inconsistent.  While some sections treat desertion as an automatic capital crime, others 
advocate deductions in rank, transfer to another unit, or dishonourable discharge.
55
  This 
inconsistency existed because punishments were meant to be exemplary in nature, and 
based more on specific circumstances (e.g., age of recruit, prior convictions, number of 
participants) than according to strict adherence to the letter of the law.
56
  There was no 
systematic response to military transgressions, and officers could either petition the 
emperor to acquire his opinion, or more likely, decide themselves, as the circumstances 
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warranted.
57
  That the execution of a centurion by Cn. Calpurnius Piso in CE 19 for 
exercising this very privilege of command was seen to be so unjust suggests that 
centurions too had acquired such licence by the Principate.
58
   
Additionally, it is unwise to extrapolate the example of one commander to the 
entire army of a given period.  Caesar was not the only general of the late Republic, and 
he did not always show clemency toward his soldiers.
59
  Augustus too was well known 
for his sternness, while Galba and Vitellius favoured approaches opposite to each other 
during the same period.
60
  There is certainly no evidence that centurions carried out 
corporal punishment any less harshly or frequently over time.  The choices by Roman 
officers concerning physical punishment probably reflect individual styles of leadership 
and circumstances that survive more or less randomly in our textual sources rather than 
general trends in the legions.  The laws were not absolute, and initiative was left largely 
to the judgment and character of the individual officer, commander, or emperor.
61
  It 
remains difficult, therefore, to describe the extent to which law supported a centurion’s 
punitive authority.  Military laws as recorded by Roman jurists provided a blueprint and 
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On petitions to the Emperor by soldiers and officers, see Campbell, Emperor and the Roman 
Army, 278-289, 305-311; Phang, Roman Military Service, 111. 
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might have added some symbolic weight to his authority, but they were not the 
foundation on which soldiers accepted it.
62
   
The other major factor that has been seen to affect who may suffer or inflict 
corporal punishment in the Roman army is the social status of the officer or soldier.    
Unlike the “peers” (οἱ ὅμοιοι) of the Spartans or the “foot companions” (οἱ πεζέταιροι) 
of the Macedonian king, Roman milites were ideologically distinguished from the status 
of their commanders.
63
  Roman military tribunes, for example, were drawn from 
senatorial and equestrian families alone, and they were not to suffer either corporal or 
capital punishment.
64
  In Roman penal action more generally, much depended on one’s 
status, with common categories including male/female, free/slave, citizen/non-citizen, 
honestiores/humiliores.  MacMullen put it succinctly: “rank and distance set apart the 
men who ordered and the men who suffered violence.”65 
The use of physical punishment in the Roman world, moreover, not only was 
contingent on one’s social status, but perhaps helped to define it.  Saller has argued that 
the act of beating or whipping was actively used to distinguish Roman citizen from 
slave.
66
  The damage from whipping, Saller asserts, was not just physical, but 
psychological, since it infringed on one’s honour and dignity.  Corporal punishment, 
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therefore, was appropriate primarily for slaves but not for adults or citizens.  This 
interpretation draws from Patterson’s comparative study of slavery: “Whipping was not 
only a method of punishment. It was a conscious device to impress upon slaves that they 
were slaves.”67   
Hornblower sees this distinction as particularly important to ancient Greece, 
where striking someone could amount to charges of hubris, and in several incidents in 
which military officers or commanders employed it, they either made things worse or 
were forced to persuade their soldiers of justice their actions.
68
  The use of physical 
punishment in the Spartan army should be understood as anomalous, unique to a political 
culture where it was employed to distinguish between Spartiate and helot, but was 
apparently proven ineffective when threatened against citizens of other Greek poleis.
69
  
Kiesling, however, has applied this distinction in physical punishment to the Roman 
legions as well: if flogging distinguished a citizen from slave at Rome, then how could 
soldiers tolerate the shame of being publicly flogged?
70
 
Attitudes in the Roman military towards the role of status in determining the use 
of corporal punishment, however, appear to have been more complex.  While developing 
from a broader social structure and interacting with it, the Roman legions, particularly 
during the Principate, possessed their own standards of conduct and distinct military 
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values.
71
  Within this military community, the centurion occupied a unique position in 
regards to his status and potential to inflict or suffer punishment.  On the one hand, 
centurions during both the Republic and Principate were distinctly inferior in rank and 
social status to the legates and military tribunes.  Unlike the higher officers who were 
excluded from suffering corporal or capital punishment, centurions were hardly 
untouchable.  Caesar, although known for his clemency toward his soldiers, executed a 
centurion for false witness.
72
  M. Antonius executed centurions whom he blamed for 
failures in his Parthian campaign, while Domitius Calvinus, as governor of Spain in 38 
BCE, subjected Vibillius, a primuspilus, to fustuarium for leaving the line of battle.
73
  
This policy did not change in the Principate.  Although Augustus and his successors are 
credited with narrowing the source and form of punishment for centurions,
74
  these 
officers nonetheless remained subject to brutal punishment.  Augustus himself reasserted 
the rule that centurions could be executed for desertion or abandoning their post.
75
  The 
evidence suggests, therefore, that centurions were liable to suffer some of the same 
punishments as the rank and file. 
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On the other hand, in pay, reputation, and expectations, centurions were 
considered to enjoy a status far above that of the ordinary miles.
76
  Greater contact with 
the rank and file neither eliminated this distinction nor precluded any need for centurions 
to validate their punitive power.
77
  While most centurions had once been milites, they 
were no longer considered such by their soldiers in matters of discipline.  Those 
centurions and former centurions who failed to grasp this reality suffered.  Such was the 
case of Aufidienus Rufus, a camp prefect (praefectus castrorum) and former centurion, 
who was surprised by soldiers’ violent treatment of him in the Danube mutiny.  He had 
mistakenly believed that his application of the sternest discipline would necessarily be 
accepted by his inferiors, simply because he himself had once endured it as a soldier.
78
  
Centurions, therefore, occupied a unique position in the Roman military hierarchy in 
which they sometimes suffered violence but yet were also foremost in inflicting it.  
It is also important to consider how the specific context or tools employed in these 
disciplinary measures implies different levels of shame or status.  Although citizens are 
supposedly distinguished from slave or criminal by their freedom from physical 
punishment with impunity, Roman authors claim that parents also may (with due 
moderation) flog an errant child.  Although Saller considers this likely because children 
were, like slaves, seen to lack “reason” (ratio) and therefore occasionally required a stern 
hand, he admits that the striking of a student by his teacher (ludi magister) is also a trope 
in Roman literature, and that this relationship appears to have been different from that 
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between parent and child, or master and slave.
79
  The centurion, tasked with both training 
and disciplinary duties, might very well have seen his relationship with soldiers as 
something like that between a magister and his discipuli.
80
 
Saller’s distinction between citizen and slave is also more applicable to the 
specific use of the club (fustis) and rods (virgae), which were strongly associated with 
tools used in punishing criminals in a civil context, and especially the whip (flagella), 
which was connected with the heavier beating (verberario) of slaves.
81
  The centurion’s 
use of his vitis, however, was considered distinct from these forms of corporal 
punishment: it was used in a specific military context with consideration given to both 
crime and transgressor, and those flogged by the centurion’s cane were understood to 
bear less of the greater infamia associated with the punishment by such tools as the 
flagella and virga.
82
   
A modern parallel in distinguishing between different forms of corporal 
punishment is found in the British Navy of the eighteenth century.  Middle-ranking 
officers such as the boatswain’s mate bore a rattan cane, two to three inches in diameter, 
which was occasionally used to strike the back of an errant seaman.  An officer 
employing this kind of non-judicial punishment was seen to be both more humane and 
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less likely to earn the enmity of those below deck than one who favoured the judicial 
punishment of flogging with the cat-of-nine-tails, which was closely associated with 
slaves.  As one Captain Peyton observed, if officers got in trouble “for conveying now 
and then the lesser punishment of a stroke instead of applying to me [for a flogging], 
discipline at sea would become impossible.”83 
 Evidence that social status in the Roman army either determined or was 
determined by corporal punishment, therefore, is at best mixed.  Rather than examining 
the ideological underpinnings of institutional discipline in the Roman army merely 
according to legal treatises or assumptions of social status, it is more fruitful to explore 
the specific military contexts in which legionary centurions performed their disciplinary 
role, and how this role evolved over the course of the Principate to become associated 
with important social, political, and religious concepts in the legions. 
 
1.5 Positive Associations of Corporal Punishment 
Pliny’s statement that the use of the vitis “honours the punishment itself” appears 
to fit a Roman literary trope in which authors claim that soldiers harboured a “love of 
obedience.”  Plutarch, for example, states that the exercises and punishments that Marius 
introduced to his legions during the late second century BCE, at first appearing stern and 
inflexible, later seemed to the soldiers salutary and just once they were accustomed to 
                                                 
83
Quoted in N. A. M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (Annapolis, 
1986), 219. On use of the rattan, cf. 213-225. 
 41 
 
it.
84
  Corbulo, Titus, and other first century CE commanders are likewise credited for 
gaining support of their soldiers through constant drilling and harsh discipline.
85
 
Such claims typically draw modern accusations of elite moralizing or nostalgia 
for the archaic severitas of the early Republic, since it is assumed that no Roman soldier 
could ever have supported or even tolerated such an overt form of coercive discipline, as 
opposed to the more “indirect” form of disciplina as an idealized ethos of labour or self-
restraint.
86
  Besides the caution that should be used in gauging the attitudes of a Roman 
soldier according to modern assumptions, however, it is important to consider not the 
degree to which legionaries welcomed or were “socialized” into accepting elite 
ideologies towards punishment, but rather the degree to which conformity among peers is 
often idealized in military communities.
87
   
In many military communities, transgressors against this form of “virtuous 
conformity” are cast as a danger to the entire group’s cohesion and security, and both 
officers and fellow soldiers often advocate the use of corporal or capital physical 
punishment to address it.  Perhaps the most famous example of this attitude from ancient 
Greece is found in the Iliad, when Greek soldiers’ applaud Odysseus’ beating of the 
obnoxious Thersites with the sceptre – another example of a reassertion of conformity 
through both a physical and symbolic object of authority.
88
  Statements by British 
soldiers from nineteenth century are replete with examples of this viewpoint.  One 
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infantry commander under Wellington, although pursued by a hostile army, stopped his 
unit in order to flog several transgressors.  His actions were described with admiration by 
one soldier under his command: “No man but one formed of stuff like General Crauford 
could have saved the brigade from perishing altogether, and if he flogged two he saved 
hundreds from death by his management.”89  Simply put, soldiers did not necessarily see 
the use of physical violence as inconsistent or incompatible with relationships with their 
officers. 
Disciplinary systems must, moreover, be relatively consistent with the beliefs and 
standards of the soldiers as well as officers.  Indeed, formal discipline can often offer 
soldiers an “excuse” for something that they must do anyway.90  In institutions where 
such values as conformity, self-restraint, and obedience are cultivated and idealized, 
punishments often can appear natural, even virtuous.  Necessity, in effect, can be made 
into a virtue, and it is for this reason that officers such as drill sergeants – typically 
characterized as tough, unflappable disciplinarians – frequently become role models and 
sources of pride to their soldiers rather than merely antagonists.
91
   
In the Roman army, centurions occupied this institutional role, and their 
punishment of disobedience through the use of castigatio was sanctioned further by 
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religious tradition.
92
  Disciplina in the sense of obedience to commands had strong 
religious associations.  There was a cult established to Disciplina by the time of Hadrian 
in the early to mid-second century CE, and Tacitus refers to divine custom or law of 
discipline (fas disciplinae), whose violation carried severe consequences.
93
   
The religious nature of disciplina is seen most clearly in the responsibilities 
incurred through the military oath (sacramentum).  Sanctified by religious ties and 
Roman military tradition, it was crucial to the process of fostering cohesion and identity 
among legionaries.
94
  During the Republic, soldiers who joined the legions were required 
first to swear to assemble at their commander’s call, obey his and their subordinates’ 
orders, and not to desert or flee from battle.  This oath was reiterated with the arrival of 
new commanders.
95
  The nature of the oath changed during the Principate, however, 
when the emperor became the oath’s sole recipient, and the swearing of it became a 
liturgical feature.  New recruits swore the sacramentum not only at their enlistment, but 
also annually on the emperor’s accession day, and each third of January.96  The oath also 
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had to be formally dissolved (sacramentum solvere) in a solemn ceremony at end of a 
soldier’s service.97   
The many incidents of mutiny or outright revolt against commanders and 
emperors in Rome’s history have inevitably raised questions as to the importance of the 
sacramentum to the soldiers’ behaviour and loyalties.  Phang, in particular, questions 
outright whether religious activities and oaths played any role in determining disciplinary 
practices in the Roman military.
98
  Examples of revolt and mutiny, however, should not 
necessarily make us cynical of the religious authority of the sacramentum or of its 
influence on both soldiers and commanders.  Religio is consistently associated with the 
sacramentum in Roman literature, and Dionysius claims that Romans “observed the 
military oath beyond all others.”99  It is also clear that the oath was taken seriously by 
both commander and soldiers.  Soldiers sometimes swore or renewed oaths on their own 
accord to restate their loyalty to a new commander, strengthen their resolve after severe 
defeats, atone for poor behaviour, or promise not to abandon each other in battle.
100
  
Following their witness of a lunar eclipse, mutineers of the Danube legions in CE 14 
were persuaded that their violation of the sacramentum had displeased the gods.  At the 
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same time, Tiberius apparently trusted the loyalty of those units based in Italy simply 
because they had sworn their oath to him.
101
   
Even in the context of civil war, when military loyalties fluctuated, rival 
commanders consistently appealed to the soldiers’ sacramentum.  In attempting to secure 
the loyalties of soldiers who had joined Caesar from his rivals during the Civil wars, 
Curio went to great rhetorical lengths to convince soldiers that they had not in fact 
abandoned their earlier oaths, arguing that they were invalid for both legal and moral 
reasons.  Brutus, in contrast, told soldiers who had followed Caesar that they should not 
feel ashamed for fighting against the state, since the dictator had taken advantage of their 
devotion to their oaths.
102
  Even today, military oaths that lack a religious element still 
carry great moral weight, and although they are sometimes ignored or broken, it does not 
follow that they are insignificant.
103
  
The authority of the sacramentum during the Principate was particularly 
significant because it combined disciplinary, political, and religious elements.  In tying 
the oath to one’s service to the legion’s supreme commander, mutiny, desertion, 
insubordination, and other acts of disobedience constituted a grave act of indiscipline and 
a breach of trust that tarnished the image of both the legionary community and the 
authority of the Emperor.
104
  The retribution of Jupiter was therefore invoked for all oath-
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breakers – transgressors became scorned as sacer and deserving of divine vengeance.105  
A defining role of centurions was to act as the avenger.   
In Roman civic contexts, transgressions against social norms and imperial 
authority could be met with public punishments or executions in the arena.  Here, the 
public disapproval against different transgressions could be manifested, and society 
allowed to participate as spectators.
106
  In the Roman military context, transgressions that 
defied imperial authority and violated the sacramentum implied divine anger not only 
towards the individual transgressor, but his entire legion.  For this reason, from the 
Republic onward, it was prescribed that the entire unit’s soldiers participate in 
institutional discipline.  Such participation could amount merely to bearing witness, or 
assisting in executing it.
107
  This practice was not only employed to impress on fellow 
soldiers a fear of disobeying orders, but also to guarantee the centurion’s action, who was 
understood to be acting on behalf of the community.
108
  In effect, the centurions 
themselves were both symbolic and physical adversaries of military indiscipline.  
The centurion’s function in administering corporal punishment, therefore, 
reinforced not only his own authority, but the soldiers’ bond to the legion and emperor.  
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A centurion could render this symbolism explicit, as occurred in CE 69, when rebellious 
soldiers came to murder Emperor Galba.  Only one man rose to defend him: 
This was Sempronius Densus, a centurion, who, although having received no 
personal favours from Galba, nonetheless in defence of honour and the law placed 
himself before his litter. Initially, raising the cane with which centurions punish 
those soldiers who deserve a caning, he shouted at the attackers and ordered them 
to spare the emperor. Then, when they advanced to close quarters with him, he 
drew his sword and warded them off a long time, until he fell with a wound to the 
thigh.
109
 
 
That Densus’ first reaction to the assassins was to draw his vitis before his sword 
demonstrates his and his instrument’s symbolic importance in helping to define Roman 
military authority in the Imperial period.   Wielding it was not only a logical step in 
attempting gain compliance from the soldiers with a minimum level of force, but it also 
implicitly reminded the soldiers of their oath and duty to the emperor.  In essence, 
Densus attempted to enforce normative compliance before being compelled to turn to a 
more coercive form.   
Conversely, a perceived lack of loyalty of the centurion to the emperor barred him 
from bearing this insignia.  A vacancy in the centurionate, for example, became available 
to a soldier named Marius during the third century CE.  When he was about to receive the 
honour of the vitis, and thereby assume the rank, a rival claimed that it was not legal for 
him to receive the Roman dignity (Ῥωμαίων ἀξίας), since he was apparently a Christian, 
and did not sacrifice to the emperors.  He duly lost the rank, and was eventually 
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executed.
110
  Another centurion, Marcellus, is attested throwing down his vitis and belt 
during a celebration of the emperor’s birthday in Tingis and loudly proclaimed himself as 
a Christian.  When he was arrested and brought before the governor of Mauretania, he 
was apparently condemned not for being Christian, but for violating discipline in 
throwing down his belt and vitis.
111
  The centurion’s strong association with corporal 
punishment thus carried political and divine weight, and helped to define the institutional 
ties between soldier, officer, and emperor.   
 
1.6 Resistance to Punishment 
 Inevitably, Roman soldiers could and did resist this form of discipline, and it is 
clear that they understood well who its chief representative was.  Strict penalties were 
prescribed for any soldier who laid hands on a centurion: 
For the ancients branded anyone who resisted a centurion who desired to punish 
him. If he seizes the vitis of the centurion, he must change his unit; if he breaks it 
on purpose, or raises his hand against the centurion, he is punished with death.
112
 
 
Literature from the late Republic and Principate indicates that this fear was well justified, 
since among officers centurions were the most common victims of assaults by soldiers.  
This was particularly true in the ultimate form of resistance – mutiny.  Centurions were 
beaten or murdered during mutinies against Caesar and Octavian during the civil wars.
113
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When the Rhineland legions under Vitellius refused to recognize the legitimacy of Galba 
as emperor in January 69, centurions who attempted to protect the imperial images 
(imagines) suffered a similar fate.
114
 
 Perhaps the most famous and detailed account of an assault on the centurions 
specifically as a group is found Tacitus’ version of the mutinies of the legions stationed 
on the lower Rhine and upper Danube Rivers in CE 14.  Tacitus’ description of the initial 
stages of the mutiny on the Rhine is particularly revealing: 
The legate offered no resistance, for the degree of the soldiers’ madness broke his 
nerve.  With sudden rage, swords drawn, they advanced on the centurions, who 
were the long-standing source of the soldiers’ bitterness and the focus of their 
brutality. They knocked them down and flogged them, sixty lashes each to match 
the centurions’ number. They then cast them, maimed, lacerated, and in some 
cases already dead, before the rampart or into the Rhine.
115
 
 
The soldiers’ focus on the centurions is striking, not only because of the centurions’ 
complete loss of authority over their men, but also because of the method to the soldiers’ 
violence.  Each centurion was flogged by his own soldiers, likely with his own vitis.  
Tacitus not only conveys a sense of the breakdown of the authority of Roman military 
hierarchy, but worse, a complete reversal of it.  It is no coincidence that he uses the term 
“brutality” (saevitia) to describe the soldiers’ actions – this was the very charge that he 
has the soldiers raise earlier against their centurions.
116
   
Although lower-ranking officers are often made scapegoats in violent mutinies, 
Tacitus seems to suggest here that these centurions got what they deserved.  As 
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centurions during the Principate acquired the authority to inflict corporal punishment, 
some of them were clearly susceptible to becoming “petty tyrants” over their 
subordinates and dealing out punishment with little justification, and we may wonder 
whether centurions like “Give me another” Lucilius were so aberrant.117  Indeed, Tacitus’ 
account of this incident and the mutiny of the Danube legions have been interpreted by 
scholars as evidence that Roman soldiers were generally hostile to the use of corporal 
punishment.  According to Phang, they saw it as archaic, or a form of illegitimate cruelty 
(saevitia).
118
  Kiesling, moreover, argues that the attacks on the centurions in CE 14 
“attest to the existence of corporal punishment in the armies of the Principate but not to 
its institutional status,” which could not have been significant if floggings ultimately 
drove the legions to mutiny in CE 14.
119
 
As with any mutiny, however, those of the Rhine and Danube legions had many 
structural and precipitating causes.
120
  The accusations of brutality made against the 
centurions is only one among several complaints of the soldiers recorded by Tacitus, 
including their distance from home, the duration of service and campaigning, the poor 
state of supplies, and the meagre pay.
121
  In other accounts of this mutiny, moreover, any 
centurions’ alleged behaviour is absent from the soldiers’ complaints, and the authors 
focus instead on how the soldiers saw the uncertain political and military situation 
following Augustus’ death as an opportunity to acquire either greater benefits or 
                                                 
117
On impact of destructive leadership and discipline, see G. E. Reed and R. C. Bullis, “The 
Impact of Destructive Leadership on Senior Military Officers and Civilian Employees,” AFS 36.1 (2009), 
5-18. On lower-ranking officers as scapegoats, see Hamby, “The Mutiny Wagon Wheel,” 592. 
118
Phang, Roman Military Service, 112, 129. Cf. Saller, Patriarchy, 139. 
119“Corporal Punishment,” 242. 
120Cf. L. Brice, “Holding a Wolf by the Ears,” 148-239; I. Kajanto, “Tacitus’ Attitude to War and 
the Soldier,” Latomus 29 (1970), 699-718. 
121
Tac. Ann. 1.17-18, 31. 
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discharge.
122
  Tacitus himself stresses that the mischief from the Danube legions began 
when news of the death of Augustus caused the commander to break the normal round of 
duties (solita munia) in order to hold proper ritual for mourning.
123
  Finally, although 
centurions were targeted in the mutiny, it is noteworthy that, when Drusus arrived from 
Rome to quell the mutiny on the Danube, the soldiers chose a centurion, Clemens, to 
speak on their behalf.
124
  This would make little sense if their cause for complaint and 
hostility were focused towards the entire rank. 
That the centurions in the Rhine mutiny received sixty lashes (to match exactly 
their number) suggests another interpretation.  Tacitus here does not appear to describe 
merely a haphazard lynching, but a mockery of the centurion’s disciplinary role.  The 
irony that we and Tacitus see in the punishment of a centurion by his own vitis may well 
have been the soldiers’ intention.  To flog a centurion provided them with more than 
revenge – it was a visceral and symbolically powerful tool to articulate their resistance.  
In the case of CE 14, depending on the soldiers’ perceived audience, this extraordinary 
act could have served to rally other mutinous northern legions, or served to challenge 
obliquely the military authority of the newly-ascended emperor, Tiberius.
125
  It is no 
coincidence that the majority of assaults on centurions recorded by ancient authors 
occurred during periods of civil war and strife, when the military authority of the 
soldiers’ commander or emperor was in doubt or challenged.  Since centurions were 
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Cf. Vell. Pat. 4. 125. 4; Suet. Tib. 25; Dio 57. 4. 1-2.  
123
Ann. 1. 16. On mutinies typically occurring during times of rest and other factors, see Hamby, 
“The Mutiny Wagon Wheel,” 575-578.  
124
Ann. 1. 26. 
125
See Suet. Tib. 25. 2 on how the legions on the Rhine “were even rejecting the princeps who was 
not chosen by themselves…” (Germaniciani quidem etiam principem detractabant non a se datum….) On 
mock trials as statements of revolt or resistance, cf. R. Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre, and Other 
Episodes in French Cultural History (New York, 1985),75-104. 
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understood to be an embodiment of disciplina and imperial authority, rebellious soldiers 
saw them as the logical target in a mutiny, and a useful symbol that they could 
appropriate to achieve their own ends.  
From the Roman soldier’s point of view, therefore, there was clearly a limit to the 
level of violence that a centurion could consistently deploy, and the centurions who 
misjudged this limit lost respect and authority and – if discipline or morale were already 
poor – suffered the wrath of their subordinates.  Although we possess Tacitus’ account of 
soldiers’ hostile reaction to the punitive authority of specific centurions, however, there is 
insufficient evidence to suggest some general resistance by the soldiers to the premise of 
that authority.  The legitimacy or illegitimacy of the centurion’s use of corporal 
punishment in the legions appears to have been defined more by degree than absolute. 
 
1.7 Conclusion: Between Coercive and Normative Discipline 
The ideological connection between the use of physical punishment and the 
centurionate during the late Republic and Principate is clear.  In both juridical opinion 
and literary narratives, the centurion, more than any other Roman officer, was depicted 
enforcing discipline and executing castigatio against transgressors.  Centurions 
themselves visually commemorated this function above all others, and the military 
insignia most commonly associated with centurions was the vitis.  The centurion’s 
disciplinary authority, moreover, although perhaps supported by the legal opinions in the 
Digest and other Roman military treatises, nonetheless was not based primarily on law.  
Nor was a superior social status the determining factor, since the centurionate included 
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men of varying wealth and education, as well as geographic and social origins.
126
  Their 
punitive authority, rather, was impermanent and indefinite, requiring at least the passive 
support of the rank and file.  In a community where conformity and moderation were 
virtues, centurions supported these virtues by punishing transgressors, while assuming a 
role that became strongly associated with imperial political authority and religious 
custom. 
This point returns us to the questions raised at the beginning of the chapter, as to 
the importance of the centurion and physical punishment to disciplina.  The argument 
that brutal disciplinary measures and punishments were inevitably inefficient and 
suggestive of a military that could not rely on its soldiers’ courage is simply 
anachronistic.  The idealization of the centurion’s punitive authority did not diminish, but 
rather appears to have endured in the legions of the Principate, a period during which 
other aspects of the army’s organization and practices are thought to have formalized, 
routinized, and professionalized.  The evidence is therefore inconsistent with a view that 
a more professional atmosphere (with more complex and well defined organization, 
hierarchy, and symbols) necessarily militates against the need for corporal punishment.
127
  
Harsh punishments and strictly codified behaviour, in fact, are often more rather than less 
prominent in professional military institutions, which tend to enforce firm dogmas and 
stereotyped procedures.
128
  Evidence suggests that this was true for the Roman army and 
the centurionate.     
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See below, Chapter Four, 137-147. 
127
Gilbert, “The Changing Face of British Military Justice”, 83, applies this reasoning to the lower 
number of cases of formal discipline in the British Navy, widely regarded as more professional than its 
land-based counterpart. 
128
Kellett, Combat Motivation, 136. See also Turner, Gallant Gentlemen, 278. 
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In approaching ancient evidence from political, ideological, and cultural 
standpoints, moreover, recent studies have rigorously and creatively challenged an 
enduring yet often narrow understanding of Roman military discipline as something 
based only on rigid codes of obedience, backed by equally harsh punishment.  In making 
this challenge, however, the role of formal military discipline has been pushed from the 
ideological center to the periphery to a degree that may not take sufficient account of the 
evidence for corporal punishment, and would doubtless surprise Roman soldiers and 
centurions themselves.  Ostensibly, the centurion used fear and violence rather than 
fostering more internal and “legitimate ” forms of discipline.  Such a distinction, 
however, is less usefully applied to Roman disciplina.  The centurion’s authority to 
employ corporal punishment was based in fundamental Roman concepts of military 
tradition, imperial authority, and religious custom.  Far from being necessarily perceived 
as illegitimate, physical punishment (or the fear of it), it seems, was fundamental to 
defining a centurion’s authority and Roman disciplina more broadly. 
It is also true, however, that whatever the extent to which fear of the centurion 
affected the Roman army’s discipline, soldiers had to be led, not merely driven, into 
battle.  Seneca recognized this:  
There is not only one type of rule – the princeps rules over his subjects, a father 
over his children, a teacher over his pupils, a tribune or a centurion over his 
soldiers. Will he not seem the worst sort of father who restrains his children by 
assiduous blows for even the most trifling offences?
129
     
 
To be sure, Seneca’s stoic perspective was not necessarily widespread during his day, but 
it does describe a reality for many military institutions: an officer’s authority cannot 
                                                 
129
De Clem. 1. 16. 2-3: Non unum est imperandi genus; imperat princeps civibus suis, pater 
liberis, praeceptor discentibus, tribunus vel centurio militibus. Nonne pessimus pater videbitur, qui 
adsiduis plagis liberos etiam ex levissimis causis compescet? 
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endure through the fear of physical punishment alone.  Military systems succeed or fail 
largely because of the status (i.e. prestige and respect) of the officers, which has to be 
achieved through actions other than punishment.
130
  Centurions had a vested interest in 
continually demonstrating their worth to their subordinates, and the necessary price for 
their status was a high degree of conformity to the values of the soldiers, not just the elite 
leadership.  One of these values was an expectation to face an enemy bravely and not 
retreat, even at the cost of one’s life.  As we shall see, centurions were counted on to 
adhere to this ideal as closely as they were to that of the stern disciplinarian. 
                                                 
130
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Chapter 2: Combat Officers 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the Roman army’s siege of Jerusalem in CE 70, Roman assaults on the 
stronghold on the Temple Mount were stubbornly resisted by the Jewish defenders.  Even 
after the Roman capture of the Tower of Antonia, Jewish defenders continued to inflict 
heavy losses on the Roman soldiers as they attempted to capture the Temple.  The event 
gave Josephus an opportunity to narrate an individual exploit in bravery: 
There was a centurion from Bithynia, Julian, a man of great repute, whom I had 
formerly seen in that war, and a man of very great fame for his skill in war, his 
strength of body, and courage in spirit.  Seeing the Romans now falling back, and 
becoming demoralized, (for he was standing beside Titus at the Tower of 
Antonia), he leaped forward, and single-handedly put the Jews to flight, when 
they were already victorious, and he made them retreat into the inner corner of the 
Temple court.  Their vast number fled from him in a mass, believing that neither 
his strength nor his aggression were humanlike. Because of this, he rushed 
through the midst of them as they were widely dispersed, killing those whom he 
caught. To be sure, there was no sight that appeared more amazing to Caesar’s 
eyes, or more terrible to others present, than this.
1
 
 
Authors as early as Homer have described this type of heroic exploit in narratives of 
combat.  Authors of the Roman Empire were no exception, and they often portray 
situations in which the actions of a single soldier turn the course of a battle.  What makes 
                                                 
1
BJ 6. 1. 8: Ἰουλιανὸς δέ τις ἑκατοντάρχης τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Βιθυνίας, οὐκ ἄσημος ὢν ἀνήρ, ὧν ἐγὼ 
κατ’ ἐκεῖνον ἱστόρησα τὸν πόλεμον ὅπλωντε ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ ἀλκῇ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς παραστήματι 
πάντων ἄριστος, ὁρῶν τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐνδιδόντας ἤδη καὶ κακῶς ἀμυνομένους, παρειστήκει δὲ Τίτῳ 
κατὰ τὴν Ἀντωνίαν, προπηδᾷ καὶ νικῶντας ἤδη τοὺς Ἰουδαίους τρέπεται μόνος μέχρι τῆς τοῦ ἐνδοτέρω 
ἱεροῦ γωνίας. ἔφευγε δὲ τὸ πλῆθος ἄθρουν, οὔτε τὴν ἰσχὺν οὔτε τὴν τόλμαν ἀνθρωπίνην 
ὑπολαμβάνοντες. ὁ δὲ διὰ μέσων τῶν σκεδαννυμένων ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ διᾴττων ἐφόνευε τοὺς 
καταλαμβανομένους, καὶ τῆς ὄψεως ἐκείνης οὐδὲν οὔτε τῷ Καίσαρι θαυμασιώτερον οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις 
παρέστη φρικωδέστερον. 
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many Roman accounts unique among their contemporaries, however, is the frequency in 
which middle-ranking officers, the centurions, are the protagonists.   
 While the previous chapter examined the role of physical punishment as a key 
component in defining centurion, this chapter explores an equally important component: 
their idealized behaviour in combat.  While centurions were expected at the very least to 
fight and lead soldiers from the front, ancient authors also frequently record them 
charging enemy lines or fortifications by themselves.  Centurions often paid for these 
exploits with their lives – they perish in most of these vignettes and, in many cases, the 
Roman army is still defeated in the skirmish or battle for which they sacrificed 
themselves.
2
  Indeed, when ancient authors differentiate between ranks in accounts of 
Roman casualties in battle, centurions suffer highly disproportionately, both in victory 
and defeat.
3
   Describing these officers’ casualties even seems to have been a favoured 
documentary method to illustrate the fierceness of a battle.   
While the potential cost to the legions of losing valued and experienced officers is 
obvious, by the late Republic, the centurions’ aggressive behaviour in combat 
nonetheless became an important characterization of the rank.  Although considered 
champions of discipline and experience, centurions also cultivated a reputation as the 
Roman legions’ “natural fighters.”4  Understanding the traditions, motivations, and 
ideology behind this reputation is thus crucial to understanding the centurions’ roles as 
combat officers.   
                                                 
2
Eg. App. Mithr. 89; Caes. BG 5.35; BC 3. 53; Hisp. 23; Tac. Ann. 15. 11.   
3
One hundred and fifty centurions at Zela in 67 BCE (Plut. Luc. 35. 2); forty-six at Gergovia, 
thirty at Pharsalus (Caes. BG 7. 50-51; BC 3. 99; App. BC 2. 80); six primi ordines centurions and a 
primuspilus in Second Battle of Cremona (Tac. Hist. 3. 22). On generally high level of casualties among 
centurions, see Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts, 217-231. 
4On natural fighters or “soldier-adventurers,” see Kindsvatter, American Soldiers, 185-191. 
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Many studies have attempted to describe some of the characteristics of a “Roman 
way of war,” and to understand the motivations for Romans to fight both individually and 
collectively.
5
  Harris has argued that the Romans were simply more aggressive and 
bellicose than their contemporaries.  A competitive senatorial aristocracy hungry for 
prestige and wealth idealized the laus and gloria to be gained through war.  These 
characteristics were found too among the mass of Roman citizens, who were especially 
brutal in warfare, and were the driving force behind Rome’s aggressive expansion during 
the Republic.
6
  Other analyses have emphasized the role played by material self-interest.  
The rewards of combat (i.e. land, booty, and slaves) doubtless motivated both soldiers 
and officers to fight, as did an opportunity for promotion within and outside the legions, 
and hopes of social advancement.  Many Roman military decorations (dona militaria) 
were awarded to soldiers for individual bravery (ob virtutem/ex fortia).  By the 
Principate, these awards typically marked them for promotion.
7
  Most recently, however, 
the behaviour of Roman soldiers in combat has been attributed largely to the existence of 
a high degree of martial competition, with Roman soldiers vying with each other in acts 
of bravery not only to be esteemed by a commander or emperor, but also by each other.  
                                                 
5
For general discussions of Roman morale and combat motivation, see Goldsworthy, Roman Army 
at War, 248-282; Phang, Roman Military Service, passim; Lendon, Empire of Honour, 237-268; Soldiers 
and Ghosts, passim; A. D. Lee, “Morale and the Roman Experience of Battle” in A.B. Lloyd ed., Battle in 
Antiquity (London, 1996), 207-212; V. Maxfield, The Military Decorations of the Roman Army (Berkeley, 
1981), 236-248. 
6Harris has consistently supported this view. See “Readings,” 309, 316; War and Imperialism, esp. 
18-27, 41-53. See also A. Santosuosso, Soldiers, Citizens, and the Symbols of War: From Classical Greece 
to Republican Rome, 500-167 B.C. (Boulder, 1997), 158-160. 
7
Material benefits of booty and confiscated land: P. A. Brunt, Italian Manpower, 225 B.C.-A.D. 14 
(London, 1971), 29-33; The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays (Oxford, 1988), 240-275; S. P. 
Oakley, “The Roman Conquest of Italy,” in J. Rich & G. Shipley eds., War and Society in the Roman 
World (London, 1993), 18-22; Harris, War and Imperialism, 9-68, 75-104, 264. Marked for promotion: 
Maxfield, Military Decorations, 236-248. 
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This competitiveness encouraged and preserved a highly aggressive behaviour in 
combat.
8
   
While these factors applied equally and, in many cases, most to centurions, this 
chapter argues that they had the added motivation and responsibility as officers to adopt a 
very personal style of leadership.  For military officers at many levels of command in 
modern armies, there is a benefit to “being seen” in performing acts of bravery.  Good 
leaders should be prepared to lead by example and (at least appear) to share their 
subordinates’ dangers and hardships.  Such behaviour, especially in dire situations, 
buttresses lagging spirits.  This concept was well understood in the Roman army of both 
the Republic and Principate, and centurions in particular were expected to assume this 
role.  In asserting and defining their privileged position in the legions, centurions relied 
on the example of their sword no less than the threat of their vitis. 
 
2.2 “Connoisseurs of Violence” 
 To understand the centurions’ behaviour in combat, one must consider their 
actions in the context of what military theorists have described as the “fighter spirit.”  Not 
easy to define, it is generally expressed as the combination of psychological and cultural 
motives that spur a soldier to “seek success in combat, regardless of his personal safety.”9  
While doubts remain whether the morale and motivations of Roman soldiers can be 
understood without more sophisticated psychological analysis than our sources can 
support, studies attempting to describe a Roman fighter spirit have nonetheless continued 
                                                 
8
Lendon, “The Rhetoric of Combat,” 310-311. Cf. Soldiers and Ghosts, 186; Goldsworthy, 
“Community under Pressure: The Roman Army at the Siege of Jerusalem” in A. Goldsworthy & I. Hayes 
eds., The Roman Army as a Community (Portsmouth, 1999), 201-202. 
9
Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 32.  
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to rely on comments by ancient writers on this topic.
10
  Caesar himself described 
something similar to morale or aggressive fighting spirit as animus.  He advocated that 
Roman commanders ought to nurture animus among their soldiers in order to preserve 
their energy or onslaught (impetus) against enemy forces.  Caesar considered the fighting 
spirit to be crucial to victory.
11
   
The Roman military concept of virtus, however, has received the most attention in 
modern scholarship.  Virtus was more complex and fluid an idea than its loosely 
translated English equivalent, “courage,” and its scope and connotations in the Roman 
Empire appear to have expanded over time.
12
  McDonnell and Harris, among others, view 
this courage as exceptionally aggressive and violent.  In this sense, the virtus of Roman 
soldiers was not what one might consider the kind of valour that was conscious of danger 
(exemplified by a modern soldier who saves a comrade while under fire), but a far more 
aggressive reaction, described better with words such as fierceness (ferocia), rage (ira), 
or madness (furor).
13
  By such descriptions, one should see the Roman legions less as 
methodical, armoured machines than armies whose soldiers were tensed with rage, ready 
                                                 
10E.g., A. M. Eckstein, “Bellicosity and Anarchy: Soldiers, Warriors, and Combat in Antiquity,” 
The International History Review 27.3 (2005), 481-497. On doubts, see W. V. Harris, “Readings in the 
Narrative Literature of Roman Courage” in S. Dillon & K. Welch eds., Representations of War in Ancient 
Rome (Cambridge, 2006), 300-304; Lendon, Empire of Honour, 237-238. Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic, 
26, divides morale  into five elements: basic societal and group values, opinions and codes from army 
indoctrination, wartime opinions, reactions to service conditions, and esprit de corps. 
11
Animus: Caes. BC 3. 92. Impetus: BG 1. 52; Sen. Ira. 1. 9. 1. Cf. Lendon, “Rhetoric of Combat”, 
286-287, 290-298; Phang, Roman Military Practice, 37. 
12Harris, “Readings,” 300-301. D. C. Earl, The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome (Ithaca, 
1967), 20, said virtus was “untranslatable.” For the most extensive study on virtus, see M. McDonnell, 
Roman Manliness: Virtus and the Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2006). 
13
McDonnell, Roman Manliness, passim; Harris, War and Imperialism, 53; “Readings,” 309. Both 
authors refer to Polybius’ description (6. 52. 7) of the Romans’ ὀργή. Keegan (History of War, 265-266) 
claims that the Romans were so eager for war and ferocious that they can be compared only with the 
Mongols and Timurids. 
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to be unleashed on their victims.
14
  This primal aggression is argued to have been most 
prominent in the manipular army of the Republic.  The youngest men formed the velites, 
whose loosely-formed units and emphasis on manoeuvrability required youthful agility 
and offered men opportunities to prove themselves in virtus.  These velites often bore 
wolfskins into battle, while early Roman cavalrymen apparently fought with a bare torso, 
seemingly to acquire both a fearsome appearance and to be noticed by peers and 
commanders.
15
 
Challenges, however, have been raised against the concept of Roman virtus as 
first and foremost an aggressive courage, rather than a concept that Romans understood 
and used far more flexibly.
16
  Several studies convincingly refute the idea that the 
commanders and soldiers of the Roman Republic were exceptionally aggressive in 
warfare, pointing out that Rome’s contemporaries were no less aggressive, and that there 
were many complex and often external factors that drew Rome into conflicts.
17
  However 
Roman aggression is compared with that of their contemporaries, the trait of ferocia 
seems actually to have been embraced and idealized for characterizing the centurion in 
combat.  By the late Republic, this reputation was proverbial.  Cicero contrasts the ira of 
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Lendon, “The Rhetoric of Combat”, 309-310; Phang, Roman Military Service, 100; C. M. 
Gilliver, “The Roman Army and Morality in War” in Battle in Antiquity, 219; Harris, “Readings”, 309, 
316.  
15
Velites: Polyb. 6. 21-22; Liv. 26. 4; 30. 33; Keppie, Making of the Roman Army, 33-35, 66-67. 
Bare torso of cavalry: Polyb. 6. 25. 3-4. See also J. B. McCall, The Cavalry of the Roman Republic: 
Cavalry Combat and Elite Reputations in the Middle and Late Republic (London; New York, 2002), 26-30, 
78-99, 100-136. On warlike nature and organization of maniples, see Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts, 185-
186, 197. 
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For broader meaning of virtus, see Earl, The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome, 34-36; W. 
Eisenhut, Virtus Romana: Ihre Stellung im römischen Wertsystem (Munich 1973), passim. Virtus as 
technical skill: Goldsworthy, Romany Army at War, 170. 
17
Both Polybius (5. 2. 6) and Livy (45. 40. 7) saw the Macedonians as more violent. Cf. J. Rich, 
“Fear, Greed and Glory: The Causes of War-making in the Middle Republic” in J. Rich and G. Shipley 
eds., War and Society in the Roman World (London, 1993), 9-37; A. M. Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, 
passim. 
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the centurion with the emotionally detached reason (ratio) of the wise man.  Lucan 
likewise refers to the mad rage (rabies) of Crastinus, one of Caesar’s heroic centurions 
who fought at Pharsalus.
18
   
Such aggression went above and beyond merely fighting beside their subordinates 
in the front line – ancient authors depict it primarily as near-suicidal, individual assaults.  
Appian, for example, explains how Mithridates’ victory over C. Valerius Triarius in the 
Third Mithridatic War was made incomplete when a disguised centurion furiously 
attacked him.  Before being cut to pieces, the lone centurion wounded the king severely 
in the thigh, forcing him to withdraw to his camp.
19
  Caesar several times portrayed his 
centurions charging alone into the midst of an enemy line, or as the first to attempt to 
scale a city’s walls.20  Such was the case with L. Fabius, a centurion in Caesar’s failed 
assault on Gergovia: 
He refused to let anyone else scale the wall before him.  He grabbed three of his 
fellow soldiers, got them to hoist him up, and climbed the wall.
21
 
 
Such idealization continued well into the Principate.  Josephus describes a 
centurion in the siege of Gamala who, cut off from his legion that remained outside of the 
city walls, led ten of his soldiers quietly into a private house.  When night came with the 
chance for escape, he evacuated the house, but not before bursting into the bedrooms of 
the house’s occupants and one by one slitting their throats.22  Part of Hadrian’s speech 
                                                 
18
Cicero: Tusc. Disp. 4. 25: Et quidem ipsam illam iram centurio habeat…. Cf. De Fin. 1. 3 (9). 
Rage of Crastinus: Luc. 7. 471-4; Florus, 2. 13. 46. 
19
Mithr. 89. 
20
Caes. BG 2.25; 5. 35, 44; 6. 38; BC. 3.91, 99. Cf. Hisp. 23. 
21
Caes. BG 7. 47: neque commissurum, ut prius quisquam murum ascenderet, tres suos nactus 
manipulares atque ab eis sublevatus murum ascendit. 
22
Jos. BJ 4. 37. Centurions appear to have been specially selected for daring raids in sieges. See 
Liv. 25. 23. 
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(adlocutio) to Legio III Augusta at Lambaesis in CE 128 continues this theme: “But in 
fact you have not been lax in your training... the primi ordines centurions and the other 
centurions were as agile and strong as fits their character.”23  Caracalla, when he granted 
the title and status of centurions on his Scythian and German bodyguards, also nicknamed 
them “the lions,” so fearsomely were centurions idealized.24   
A reputation for virtus applied in the strictest sense also to a centurion’s male 
sexuality.
25
  As an community, the Roman legions appear to have been highly masculine 
in their ideals and dispositions.  Battles and individual combat were contests in 
“competitive male excellence,” and viewed as direct challenges to one’s masculinity, to 
one’s own virtus.26  Similarly, masculinity and sexual behaviour were relevant to one’s 
perceived martial prowess and status.  While such expectations could generally apply to 
Roman males of all military ranks,
27
 centurions seem to have been held to particularly 
high standards.  A breach of it directly undermined their self-perception and authority.  A 
centurion’s lack of sexual restraint, for example, could be censured by ancient authors as 
characterizing a lower social status.   Livy, for example, recounts a centurion’s rape of 
the imprisoned wife of a Gallic chieftain.  Livy condemns this centurion as being 
                                                 
23
ILS 2487: videtur attendisse vobis; primi ordines et centuriones agiles et fortes more suo 
fuerunt. See also Dion. 4. 17. 4; Frontin. Strat. 2. 8. 1-5; Dio 68. 22b. 3; 74. 6. 6. Orosius (Hist. 4. 1. 10) 
tells how a centurion maimed one of Pyrrhus’ elephants at Heraclea (280 BCE), causing it to turn on its 
own army. 
24
Dio 79. 6. 1. 
25On “phallic aggression” in Roman sexuality, see A. Richlin, The Garden of Priapus: Sexuality 
and Aggression in Roman Humour, 2
nd
 ed. (Oxford, 1992), passim. McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 167, 
denies any connection between virtus and male sexuality. 
26Lendon, “Rhetoric of Combat”, 310-12. This sense is expressed by Caesar (BG 2. 8; 6. 40). See 
also Phang, The Marriage of Roman Soldiers, 252, 262. 
27
A notable exception is Julius Caesar, whose sexual submission to Nicomedes IV of Bithynia was 
the source of gibes from his own soldiers (Suet. Iul. 2, 49). 
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“characterized by both the lust and greed of a soldier” (libidinis et avaritiae militaris).28  
Writing during the early first century CE, Valerius Maximus mentions an earlier 
primuspilus, C. Cornelius (c. 149 BCE), who finished a brilliant career with great 
honours, yet after having admitted to sexual intercourse with a young man of free birth, 
he was thrown into a prison and died there in disgrace.
29
   
While a lack of sexual restraint could damage a centurion’s authority, so too could 
accusations of excessive sexual passivity.  According to Suetonius, the primary 
motivation for Cassius Chaerea’s decision to assassinate Gaius Caligula in CE 41 was the 
emperor’s constant gibes concerning Chaerea’s effeminacy.  For a former centurion (one 
of the few from the lower Rhine legions not to be killed or demoted during the mutiny of 
CE 14), this was more than he could bear.
30
  A centurion on the losing side of L. 
Antonius Saturninus’ revolt in CE 89, moreover, was spared by Domitian after he 
convinced the emperor that he had been used for other men’s pleasures, that is, that he 
had been a sexually passive partner (pathicus/cinaedus).  This convinced Domitian that 
he was no threat, since he could never have commanded any respect from his superiors or 
subordinates.
31
  An insult to the centurion’s masculinity, by extension, was an insult to 
his military authority.   
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Liv. 38. 24. 2. 
29
Val. Max. 6. 10. 11. 
30
Suet. Cal. 56. Cf. Dio 59. 29. 2, in which Caligula calls Chaerea “womanish” (γύννις). On 
Chaerea surviving the mutiny, see Tac. Ann. 1. 32. Epictetus (Discourses 1. 16. 11) sees secondary sexual 
characteristics as social signs – they announce from afar, “I am a man” (ἀνήρ εἰμι). 
31
 Suet. Dom. 10: impudicus. On the deviance of a male as receptive partner, see M. W. Gleason, 
Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome (Princeton, 1995), 64, 70: “to do” (δρᾶν) is 
mark of a man; “to suffer” (πάσχειν) is that of a woman. On ties between social, spatial, and biological 
identities (e.g., nif-haram, exterior-interior, male-female, active-passive, penetrating-penetrated), see 
Bourdieu, Outline, 87-93; The Logic of Practice, R. Nice trans. (Stanford, 1990), 71, 293, n. 5. 
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If centurions were to remain fierce soldiers in battle, therefore, they were to be 
held to a high standard in masculinity.  This sense of masculinity was applied further 
toward idealizations of the centurion’s physical aspects, such as their clothing and 
equipment.  For example, centurions wore greaves on active service, and they often 
displayed them in commemorative relief.  The Roman soldier of the early and middle 
Republic apparently had worn a single greave on his left leg – a traditional practice 
associated with gladiatorial combat.  Centurions alone among soldiers and officers, 
however, continued to use them during the Principate, perhaps to emphasize the rank’s 
ties to individual combat and traditional Roman military culture.
32
 
Status and prestige can also be embodied in the individual, incorporated into the 
body in one’s principles, dispositions, inclinations, and even physical features such as 
gait, stance, and body language.  It cannot be divorced from them.
33
  For centurions, 
physical manifestation of experience in combat was important.  When M. Antonius 
decided to face Octavian’s forces at Actium in a sea rather than land battle, Plutarch has 
him criticized by one of his veteran legionary centurions.  The unnamed centurion, whose 
body was covered with scars from his service, inquired, “Imperator, why do you put your 
trust in these wretched wooden logs rather than these wounds or this sword here?”34  By 
indicating his sword, he voiced a preference to fight an infantry over a naval battle.  By 
indicating his scars, he notified his commander of his own past bravery and experience in 
                                                 
32
On greaves and other distinctive accoutrements of the centurionate, see Appendix B. 
33
On deportment as language (i.e., physiognomy, gait, and other physical characteristics), cf. 
Gleason, Making Men, 56-81.  
34
Plut. Ant. 64: ὦ αὐτόκρατορ, τί τῶν τραυμάτων τούτων ἢ τοῦ ξίφους καταγνοὺς ἐν ξύλοις 
πονηροῖς ἔχεις τὰς ἐλπίδας; 
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combat – such scars were a show of military status for any experienced Roman soldier, 
and for centurions in particular.
35
 
Centurions are portrayed in literary sources as being exceptionally tall and strong.  
Cicero refers to T. Pontius, a centurion in the age of Cato the Elder, as the strongest man 
of his time.  During the Principate, Pliny the Elder’s discussion on instances of 
extraordinary strength included an account of Vinnius Valens.  This centurion of 
Augustus’ Praetorian Guard could lift fully-laden carts, hold carriages against the 
strength of horses, and perform other wonderful feats of strength, which he later had 
inscribed on his tomb.
36
  Josephus claims that the aforementioned Cassius Chaerea was 
strong enough to kill with his bare hands.  These traits were apparently still highly 
desirable in the Roman army centuries later.  Vegetius later expressed the ideal qualities 
of centurions as including not only obedience, discipline, and skill in weapons, but also 
great strength and stature.
37
   
This stature, moreover, was heightened further by the centurion’s unique helmet.  
While milites’ helmets of the Imperial army were unadorned in combat, the centurion’s 
helmet bore a transverse crest (crista transversa), which increased his height and recalled 
the feathery plumes of the legions of the Middle Republic.
38
  This height-enhancing 
headgear was meant not only for the centurion to be noticed in battle, either for drawing 
troops together or catching a commander’s eye, but also to boost the image of his virile 
                                                 
35
See also Caes. BG 2. 25; BC 3. 53; Tac. Ann. 1. 20. 
36
 Cic. Sen. 33; Plin. NH 7. 82. 
37
 Jos. AJ 19. 1. 5-6, 11;  Veg. Mil. 2. 14. 3-8. Cf. Cic. Phil. 8. 9; Liv. 2. 55; 25. 19. 9; Juv. 14. 
193-195; Apul. Met. 9. 39-40. According also to Vegetius (Mil. 1. 5), there was a standard minimum height 
for different ranks in the legions. See CTh. 7. 13. 3. 
38
Crista transversa: See Appendix B, 278. Cf. Veg. Mil. 2. 13, 16. Plumes: Polyb. 6. 23. 12-13. 
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potency and martial skill.
39
  Florus hinted that the centurion’s already imposing form 
could be made even fiercer with the aid of some pyrotechnics.  In fighting in Moesia 
during the first century BCE, a centurion named Cornidius apparently carried a pan of hot 
coals on the top of his helmet which, when fanned by his movement, appeared to wreath 
his head in flame.
40
   
While this last account is fanciful, it nonetheless reveals the reputation in combat 
that centurions enjoyed as the legion’s “natural fighters,” with great physical stature and 
strength matched by aggression in combat.  They seem to exemplify the tense, enraged 
Roman soldier, eager to fight.  Lendon has suggested that the centurions’ bravery 
represents more closely the commitment to traditional, heroic virtus in Roman military 
culture rather than the calculated courage of a Roman commander, who behaved with 
consideration for the spirit of his soldiers.
41
  Unlike the young men typically perceived to 
be the most aggressive in battle, however, centurions were among the oldest, most 
experienced veterans, most of whom had only reached the rank in the middle to later part 
of their life – not usually considered the type to rush heedless into an enemy line.42  
During the Principate, moreover, these officers enjoyed increased pay, status, and 
prestige, which many were doubtless reluctant to throw away so carelessly.
43
   
                                                 
39
Physical accessories could be designed to enhance evolutionary, often unconscious senses of 
height, health, and reproductive power, which was closely linked to martial prowess. See A. Gat, War in 
Human Civilization (Oxford, 2006), 89-90. Cf. Polyb. 6. 23. 13. On deportment, physiognomy, and gait as 
“language,” See Gleason, Making Men, 56-81. 
40
Florus 2. 26. 
41
Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts, 218-220. 
42
On the youth of Roman soldiers who sacrifice themselves, see McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 
199-200; H. S. Versnel, “Self-Sacrifice, Compensation, and the Anonymous Gods,” in La Sacrifice dans 
l’antiquité (Geneva, 1981), 141. A Famous example is that of Horatius (Polyb. 6. 55. 1-4; Liv. 2.10; Dion. 
Hal. 5. 23). On the statistical frequency of younger, unmarried men engaged in aggressive behaviour in 
more modern warfare, see Kellett, Combat Motivation, 301. 
43
See below, Chapter Five, 182-184. 
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In fact, there is little reason to doubt that centurions were quite capable of making 
conscious decisions to perform such dangerous acts, and, according to ancient sources, 
they were motivated by several factors, including material rewards, social and 
professional advancement, and prestige.  Most importantly, it should be remembered that 
centurions were officers as well as soldiers.  As such, their actions could be calculated to 
affect the psychological behaviour of their soldiers.  Indeed, we shall see that an 
aggressive behaviour in combat was an essential aspect to a centurion’s authority as an 
officer.   
 
2.3 Promotion and Decoration 
The opportunity for “being seen” by a superior officer, commander, or emperor 
was a consistent motivation for any Roman soldier to perform brave, individual actions, 
since a noteworthy performance in battle could be rewarded in material or promotion.
44
  
Onasander advocated this martial tradition, arguing that the bravest miles ought to receive 
small commands, while officers who distinguish themselves should have higher 
commands, since such rewards both strengthen self-esteem and encourage others to prove 
themselves.
45
  Caesar consistently promoted soldiers to the centurionate for their valour 
(ob virtutem or virtutis causa).  Commanders such as Caesar, however, expected the 
behaviour that first earned them their promotion to continue in their new rank.  Caesar 
makes this expectation clear in his praise of several centurions during the battle against 
the Sugambri in 53 BCE: 
                                                 
44
Hyg. 114.1; Sic. Flacc.156. 9; Hyg. Grom. 176. 13; LC 214. 12; 216. 11; 232.2. Cf. Richier, 
Centuriones ad Rhenum, 571. Lendon, “Rhetoric of Combat”, 310; Maxfield, Military Decorations, 236.  
45
Strat. 34. 2. For career paths of centurions more generally, see below, Chapter Four, 137-147. 
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The centurions, some of whom had been promoted for their valour from the lower 
ranks of other legions to higher ranks in this legion, in order not to lose this glory 
for military exploits, fell together fighting most bravely.
46
 
 
By at least Caesar’s time, valour was a key to promotion also within the ranks of 
the centurionate.  At Caesar’s defeat at Dyrrachium in 48 BCE, for example, one of his 
centurions, Scaeva, bravely and single-handedly defended his position.  Having suffered 
his shield to be pierced over one hundred times, losing an eye in the process, he 
nonetheless held his ground.  Caesar rewarded him with money, dona militaria, and 
promotion to primuspilus.
47
  This behaviour was rewarded even among the high-ranking 
primipili, such as Crastinus, a primuspilus who fought at Pharsalus that same campaign.  
Crastinus fell in battle, but was posthumously awarded many dona and burial in a large 
tomb.
48
 
The potential for promotion and material gain was greater for the centurionate as 
it developed under Augustus and his successors.  A legion’s fifty-nine centurions aspired 
to become those of the first cohort (the primi ordines), a rank which offered greater 
prestige and pay.  With skill and luck, they might rise to the rank of primuspilus, earning 
them enrolment into the equestrian order and possible candidacy for equestrian 
administrative posts.
49
  Promotion ob virtutem remained common.  Commemorations to 
                                                 
46
BG 6. 40: Centuriones, quorum nonnulli ex inferioribus ordinibus reliquarum legionum virtutis 
causa in superiores erant ordines huius legionis traducti, ne ante partam rei militaris laudem amitterent, 
fortissime pugnantes conciderunt. See also promotions of Q. Fulgenius (BC 1. 46) and centurions to naval 
commands (BC 1. 57). 
47
Caes. BC 3. 53; App. BC 2. 60; Val. Max. 3. 2. 23. This account is missed by Maxfield, who 
denies that dona were rewarded without a victorious outcome. See Military Decorations, 115.  
48
Caes. BC 3. 91: faciam, inquit, hodie, imperator, ut aut vivo mihi aut mortuo gratias agas. Cf. 
App. BC 2. 80.  Crastinus is singled out with hostility by Lucan as the one who “first stained Pharsalus with 
Roman blood.” See above with n. 18. 
49
See below, Chapter 4, 141. Cf. Dobson, “The Centurionate and Social Mobility during the 
Principate” in Breeze and Dobson, eds., Roman Officers and Frontiers, 201-217; “The Primipilares in 
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centurions describe their promotion through brave deeds, sometimes combined with 
support from their units.
50
  As “Commander in Chief” of the Roman army, the emperor 
was nominally responsible for all officer promotions and transfers, including centurions.  
Although it is difficult to determine the form or degree of their involvement,
51
 emperors 
themselves occasionally seem to have had a hand in promoting centurions for their 
bravery.  One such case was that of a centurion under Caracalla, T. Aurelius Flavinus, to 
whom a commemorative monument was established: 
To T. Aurelius Flavinus, son of Titus, of the Papirian Tribe, 
primipilaris…honoured by the divine Magnus Antoninus Augustus with 75 000 
sesterces and a promotion in rank because of keen bravery (alacritatem virtutis) 
against the hostile Carpi, and an action accomplished both prosperously and 
effectively.
52
 
 
Rewards of less immediate material value were dona militaria, which Roman 
commanders had long rewarded as a way to motivate their soldiers.
53
  In the same way 
that the Roman army used punishments to discourage transgressions, dona were given to 
encourage specific forms of positive behaviour: 
                                                                                                                                                 
Army and Society” in Alföldy, Dobson, and Eck, Kaiser, Heer, und Geselleschaft in der römischen 
Kaiserzeit, 139-151. 
50M. P. Speidel, “Becoming a Centurion in Africa: Brave Deeds and the Support of the Troops as 
Promotion Criteria” in Roman Army Studies, Vol. 2 (Stuttgart, 1992), 124-8; E. Birley, Carnuntum 
Jahrbuch (1963), 21-33; Cowan, For the Glory of Rome, 133, 233. 
51
Pliny (Pan. 15) praised Trajan for remembering fortia facta of soldiers. Emperors’ involvement 
in promotion: ILS 2666; ILS 2081; ILS 9200. Cf. Domaszewski, Die Rangordnung, 90-112; Campbell, 
Emperor and the Roman Army, 104-6. The image of the emperor’s personal involvement in award and 
promotion had ideological precedents in Eastern dynasts, especially the Achaemenids. See Xen. Cyr. 1. 9. 
14; Diod. 17. 59. 2. Cf. Briant, “The Achaemenid Empire” in War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval 
Worlds, K. Raaflaub & N Rosenstein Eds. (Cambridge, 1999), 109. 
52
ILS 7178; AE 1961, 208: T. Aurelio T. fil. Papir. Flavino primipilari et principi ordinis col. 
Oesc., et buleutae civitatu[m] Tyranorum Dionysiopol. Marcianopol. Tungroru[m] et Aquincensium, 
patron[o] college fabr., honorato a divo Magno Antonino Aug. HS L milia n. et XXV [et] gradum 
promotionis [ob] alacritatem virtu[tis adv]ersus hostes Ca[rpos] et res prospere et va[lide ges]tas. Cl. 
Nicom[edes] buleuta civitatis [Tyra]norum amico dign[issimo]. L. d. d. d. Cf. Campbell, Roman Army, no. 
92. 
53Polyb. 6. 39; Liv. 26. 48. The principal work on this topic is Maxfield’s monograph, cited above, 
n. 5. See also Domaszewski, Rangordnung, 68-70, 109-111, 137-139, 184-185; Y. Le Bohec, The Imperial 
Roman Army, 61-63. 
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They also have an admirable method of encouraging the young soldiers to face 
danger. After a battle in which some of them have distinguished themselves, the 
general calls an assembly of the troops, and bringing forward those whom he 
considers to have displayed conspicuous valour, first of all speaks in laudatory 
terms of the courageous deeds of each and of anything else in their previous 
conduct which deserves commendation, and afterwards distributes the following 
rewards…By such incentives they excite to emulation and rivalry in the field not 
only the men who are present and listen to their words, but those who remain at 
home also.
54
 
 
Polybius understood the symbolic connection between reward and punishment through 
the use of military ceremony.  As discussed in the previous chapter, punishment was 
often administered in full view of the entire legion.  As witnesses to a flogging, attending 
soldiers were as much the ideological targets of the punishment as its actual victims.  The 
ceremony for awarding dona mirrored this, in that declarations of the individual’s actions 
were glorified and rewarded by the legionary commander in full view of other soldiers in 
order to promote the desired behaviour both among them and “those who remain at 
home.”55   
By the mid-Republican period, the Roman legions had already begun to award 
many different kinds of dona, and by the second century CE, they had developed the 
most sophisticated system of decorations pior to those of modern armies.
56
  Legionary 
centurions are prominent winners of dona in literary narratives, and the centurionate 
accounts for the largest group of decorated men in surviving epigraphic evidence where 
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Polyb. 6. 39. 1-2, 8: Καλῶς δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους ἐκκαλοῦνται πρὸς τὸ κινδυνεύειν. ἐπειδὰν γὰρ 
γένηταί τις χρεία καί τινες αὐτῶν ἀνδραγαθήσωσι, συναγαγὼν ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ 
στρατοπέδου, καὶ παραστησάμενος τοὺς δόξαντάς τι πεπραχέναι διαφέρον, πρῶτον μὲν ἐγκώμιον 
ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου λέγει περί τε τῆς ἀνδραγαθίας, κἄν τι κατὰ τὸν βίον αὐτοῖς ἄλλο συνυπάρχῃ τῆς ἐπ’ 
ἀγαθῷ μνήμης ἄξιον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῷ μὲν τρώσαντι πολέμιον γαῖσον δωρεῖται… ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης 
παρορμήσεως οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἀκούοντας καὶ παρόντας ἐκκαλοῦνται πρὸς τὴν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις 
ἅμιλλαν καὶ ζῆλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν οἴκῳ μένοντας. 
55
See also Liv. 26. 48. For other examples of award ceremonies in the legions, see Caes. Afr. 86; 
Alex. 77; Suet. Div. Claud. 28; Jos. BJ 7. 5-17. Cf. Santosuosso, Soldiers, Citizens, and the Symbols of War, 
157. 
56
Maxfield, Military Decorations, 55. 
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courage in battle is listed as the main identifier.  A large number of awards to centurions 
from the Flavian period, for instance, were earned during the Jewish war.  This was not 
only a major conflict of that period, but also one that offered tactical situations that 
allowed for spectacular displays of bravery, such as the sieges that Josephus delights in 
describing with such vivid detail.
57
   
There were great material incentives for centurions to win dona militaria.  By at 
least the second century BCE, the rewarding of dona for brave acts seems to have 
accompanied or led to promotion to and within the centurionate.  While Roman 
commanders often promoted many soldiers and centurions solely ob virtutem, even those 
centurions not immediately promoted were nonetheless marked for it through 
decorations.
58
  Despite difficulties in pinpointing the stage of a centurion’s career in 
which they received their dona, roughly one quarter of all decorated legionaries are 
recorded as being promoted to the centurionate, while over half of the centurions known 
to have received dona were promoted to primuspilus or higher.
59
   
As the high casualty rates recorded by ancient authors demonstrate, these same 
acts of bravery could just as likely kill the centurion as distinguish him.  Acts of valour 
and the dona rewarded for them, however, also offered great social prestige within the 
Roman military community.  Judging by funerary inscriptions, when in full military 
                                                 
57
Jos. BJ 1. 148; 3. 333-334. Centurions assaulting walls or ramparts generally: Liv.25. 14, 23; 26. 
48; Caes. BG 7. 47 BC 1. 46; Jos. BJ 1. 149; AJ. 14. 476. Cf. See Dobson, “The Roman Army: Wartime or 
Peacetime Army?” in Roman Officers and Frontiers, 113-128, esp. 125-126; Maxfield, Military 
Decoraions, 137, 141, 189-191. 
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Vegetius (2. 7) associates dona with rank. The best known example from the Republic is that of 
Sp. Ligustinus (Liv. 42. 34), who rose from miles to primuspilus. Caesar (BC 1. 46; 3. 53; BG 6. 40) 
commonly promoted men ob virtutem, as did Vespasian and Titus (BJ. 6. 135; 6. 53; 7. 15). 
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E.g., C. Velius Rufus (ILS 9200; AE 1903, 368) and L. Aconius Statura (CIL XI 5992). Cf. 
Breeze & Dobson, Roman Officers and Frontiers, 139; Maxfield, Military Decorations, 186-187, 243-244. 
On centurions failing to mention earlier career, see below, n. 118. 
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dress, centurions proudly bore their various dona overtop of their armour.  In several 
cases, moreover, their career and achievements are represented visually only by these 
decorations.
60
  In an institution that honoured and glorified martial prowess and bravery 
in all ranks, dona and the prestige associated with them likely helped to define one’s rank 
and authority.
61
  It is no surprise, then, that these awards were fiercely competed for by 
both soldiers and officers, simultaneously drawing from and encouraging a competitive 
atmosphere that was a hallmark of Roman warfare and a major motivating factor in the 
legions of the Republic and Principate. 
 
2.4 Competition in Combat 
 Martial competition is often seen as characteristic for many cultures, especially 
among those broadly described as “heroic societies.”  In such societies, physical strength 
and martial prowess were marks of recognition in one’s household and community.  
Individual contests between warrior elites were especially common in military 
traditions.
62
  This phenomenon included not only the fierce combat between opposing 
champions, but also rivalry within an army.  Such rivalry is famously idealized in the 
Iliad, and was praised in wars between Greek poleis and the Hellenistic armies that 
followed.
63
  It has been often argued, however, that such martial competition was 
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E.g., Appendix A, figs. 14, 17. On how these dona were displayed, see also Appendix B, 288.  
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On dona defining rank and status, see below, 85-90. 
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Gat, War in Human Civilization, 215-217; A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 
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 Ed. (Notre Dame, 2007), 121-130. For idealized elite warrior combat in other cultures, see chapters in 
War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds, esp. J. J. Farris, “Japan until 1300”, 60-67; D. 
Webster, “Ancient Maya Warfare” 345; G. Halsall, Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West 450-900 
(London, 2003), 193; J. Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Boulder, 2003), 93-99. 
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Greek: Hom. Il. 2.362-366; 8. 253-257; 13. 446-447; Hdt. 7. 226-277; Thuc. 6. 31. 3; Plut. Ages. 
18. 3; Pel. 19. 4; Phil. 7. 4-5. On the likelihood of ritualized competition (ἀγών) between Greeks of 
opposing sides, see J. C. Dayton, The Athletes of War: An Evaluation of the Agonistic Elements in Greek 
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particularly prominent in the Roman military tradition, in which gloria and fama were 
sought through individual bravery and hand-to-hand combat.
64
  While many Roman 
narratives tended to focus on the competition between social elites, writers such as Sallust 
projected this desire for gloria in combat on all Roman citizens in earlier times:   
At first, the young man, as soon as he could to endure war, learned martial arts 
through labour in camp, and took greater pleasure in elegant arms and war horses 
than in prostitutes and the pleasure of feasts… But among them the great contest 
was for glory, and each sought to strike an enemy, to scale a wall, and to be seen 
while performing such deeds. This they regarded as wealth, fine fame, and great 
nobility.
65
 
 
Although Sallust has in mind primarily the young members of the Roman 
aristocracy rather than its broader citizenry, a form of gloria was indeed contested within 
other ranks of the Roman army.  Caesar employs a highly stylized and heroic narrative in 
his account of two centurions in combat against the Nervii in 54 BCE, T. Pullo and L. 
Vorenus.  These two centurions were long-time competitors with each other.  Caesar 
describes their colourful behaviour: 
While the fight proceeded fiercely before the fortifications, one of them, Pullo, 
said, “Why do you hesitate, Vorenus? What better opportunity for showing your 
bravery do you want? This very day will decide our contests.” After he said this, 
he advanced beyond the fortifications, and rushed against the section of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Warfare (Toronto, 2006), passim. Macedonian: Arr. Anab. 1. 21. 1-3; 2. 27. 6; 7. 5. 4-6; Diod. 2. 25. 5. On 
competition more generally between Greek soldiers, see Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts, esp. 45-47, 103-105, 
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E.g., Siccius Dentatus (Dion. Hal. 10.36-7; Plin. NH 7. 29); M. Valerius Corvus (Aul. Gell. 9. 
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“War and Society” in CHGRW I, 503-516.  
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Cat. 7. 4-6: iam primum iuventus, simul ac belli patiens erat, in castris per laborem usum 
militiae discebat, magisque in decoris armis et militaribus equis quam in scortis atque conviviis lubidinem 
habebant… sed gloriae maxumum certamen inter ipsos erat: se quisque hostem ferire, murum ascendere, 
conspici, dum tale facinus faceret, properabat. eas divitias, eam bonam famam magnamque nobilitatem 
putabant. 
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enemy forces that appeared densest. Nor did Vorenus remain within the rampart, 
but, mindful of everyone’s high opinion, followed…and both having slain a great 
number, they retreated within the fortifications amid the highest applause. Fortune 
thus dealt with both in this rivalry and contest, that one rival was an aid and a 
safeguard to the other, nor could it be determined which of the two appeared 
worthy of being preferred to the other.
66
 
 
Caesar’s account recalls epic combat in the Iliad, where Greek and Trojan warriors spur 
one another in competition for honour and renown (τιμή, κλέος).
67
  This was, of course, 
Caesar’s intent – to relate the noble deeds of his soldiers to epic battles of the past, and to 
demonstrate the fierce rivalry between his soldiers in winning approval from their 
commander and peers.  It is noteworthy, however, that the lone vignette of this kind in 
Caesar’s commentary features neither aristocratic commanders and tribunes, nor rank and 
file soldiers, but centurions.   
Beyond the individual desire for prestige or material reward, however, a 
competitive atmosphere in the legions is argued to have practical military advantages, 
since friendly competition can create bonds of friendship and cohesion within military 
units, as well as help to define the identity of the unit as a whole.
68
  Alexander appealed 
to specific individuals and units in his army to foster competition.
69
  Goldsworthy in 
particular has argued how Roman legionary commanders also actively encouraged 
competition by recalling the reputations of specific legions and individuals within them 
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before or during battle in order to spur the soldiers and create a stronger sense of pride 
and military identity.
70
   
For the centurion, “being seen” was not only a contest for the attention of one’s 
commander in hope of receiving material reward, therefore, but essential to validating the 
centurion’s position in the eyes of both other centurions and his soldiers.71  Centurions of 
the Republic in particular were outstanding participants in the pursuit of gloria.  For 
Caesar, this competitive behaviour was exactly what he expected of them, and Pullo and 
Vorenus are not alone among centurions whom Caesar praises for it.
72
  In a skirmish 
preceding the great battle at Munda in 45 BCE, two other of Caesar’s centurions, seeing 
their soldiers in danger, threw themselves into the middle of the fray.  They died “in the 
cause of gloria.”73  Centurions could be expected to measure their bravery not only 
among each other, but with members of other ranks as well.  Livy, who projected the 
aggressive and competitive nature of centurions very early into Roman history, describes 
one vying for gloria in Scipio Africanus’ siege of Carthago Nova, in 209 BCE.74  In this 
case, the centurion was not even competing with a Roman citizen, but a sailor from an 
allied state.  At Gergovia, the centurion L. Fabius would not allow any milites to scale the 
city’s walls before him.75 
                                                 
70
E.g., Caes. BG 1.40-1; 8.19; Tac. Hist. 3. 23-24; 5. 16; Agric. 26. 2; Jos. BJ 6. 142. See 
Goldsworthy, Roman Army at War, 248-254; “Community under Pressure,” 201-202; S. P. Oakley, “Single 
Combat in the Roman Republic,” CQ 35. 2 (1985), 392-410. On the potentially destructive product of this 
competition, however, see Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts, 185-7, 254-256, 431-432, and below, Chapter 
Three. 
71
Cf. Lendon, Empire of Honour, 239: “esteem and disapproval of fellow members was a 
tremendously powerful force.” 
72
Other examples in Caesar: BC. 1. 46; 3. 53; BG. 2. 38; 5. 43; 6. 40; 7. 47; Hisp. 25. 
73
Caes. Hisp. 23: desideratus gloria se efferentes.  
74
Q. Tiberilius (Liv. 26. 48). See also Liv. 8. 8. 17-18. 
75
See above, n. 21. 
 77 
 
Not every centurion, of course, was so interested in glorious formalities of 
competitive combat.   In a twist to the traditional “David and Goliath” contest, Josephus 
describes an enormous and haughty Jewish warrior who challenged any Roman to meet 
him in single combat.  An arrogant Roman cavalryman, whom Josephus claims was 
motivated by contempt for the giant’s lower social stature, accepted the challenge and 
was killed.  Josephus praises instead Priscus, a centurion who then stepped forward and 
simply slew the giant with a dart while the latter celebrated.
76
  Here Priscus appears to 
have sacrificed personal adulation for efficiency in order to terminate the giant’s jeering 
of nearby Roman soldiers.   
Competition within a unit, of course, can sometimes have its drawbacks, since it 
can lead to contention rather than cooperation among soldiers.  Lendon sees this as a 
problem particularly in the Roman legions, where the soldiers’ desire to prove their virtus 
sometimes conflicted with a commander’s desire for strategies and caution – the Roman 
soldier did not see himself as part of a team, and he was not considered as such by his 
superiors.
77
  As we shall see, however, although competition and individual aggression 
among soldiers might stress discipline, for centurions, such behaviour was essential to 
their leadership and success as officers, since it both strengthened their military authority, 
and helped the soldiers’ overall performance on the battlefield.     
 
2.5 Leadership in Combat 
 Long before Ardant du Picq and Clausewitz, ancient writers emphasized the 
importance of psychological factors in warfare.  Although some Greek and Roman 
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authors focus on logistics and more tactical elements of psychology in war (e.g. the use 
of surprise, numbers, noise), others, such as Xenophon, Caesar, and Onasander, place 
great weight on morale in achieving victory.
78
  One traditional morale-building strategy 
that persists to this day is for commanders to be seen by their subordinates.  It is often 
critical to preserving their authority and lends moral strength to their leadership.
79
  
Commanders must demonstrate that they too bear a proportionate burden of labour and 
war.  This was well understood by commanders in the ancient world.  Mesopotamian and 
Egyptian kings went to great pains to depict themselves at the forefront of their soldiers’ 
battles.
80
  The kings of Sparta fought and sometimes died alongside his fellow soldiers (οἱ 
ὅμοιοι).81  Philip II of Macedon, moreover, proudly bore the scars of battle that helped to 
strengthen his position as king.  His heir, Alexander, took this kind of leadership to 
extraordinary lengths, leading charges of the companion cavalry (οἱ ἑταῖροι) and sallies 
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in sieges that nearly killed him on numerous occasions.
82
  Several Roman commanders 
from the early Republic likewise are recorded both fighting and dying in the front lines.
83
 
 By the middle-late Republic, however, a different portrayal of the Roman 
commander emerges.  No longer expected to engage in hand-to-hand combat, legionary 
commanders (often consuls) are better described as “military managers” than heroic 
leaders.  Famous is P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus’ own reported distinction between the 
two: “My mother bore me as a general, not a warrior.”84  Still, there remained an ideal for 
the good Roman general.  Marius perhaps best fit the standard description: 
And though the war brought many hardships, he neither shunned any great labour, 
nor disdained any that were small, but surpassed the officers of his own rank in 
giving good counsel and foreseeing what was advantageous, and vied with the 
common soldiers in frugality and endurance, thereby winning much goodwill 
among them…and it is a most agreeable spectacle for a Roman soldier when he 
sees a general eating common bread in public, or sleeping on a simple pallet, or 
taking a hand in the construction of some trench or palisade.
85
 
 
Symbolic acts such as sharing the soldiers’ diet, sleeping on the ground, assisting in 
manual labour – all of these could be expected from Roman generals.86  Even in modern 
armies, officers who are never required to participate physically in battle nonetheless feel 
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the need at least to maintain the image of physical fitness and of performing military 
tasks themselves.  Examples include General Patton’s conspicuous display of his sidearm 
in the Second World War, or air force commanders’ desire to fly their own plane.87   
Roman commanders too were expected to lead through personal example, and 
occasionally, Roman commanders are recorded fighting actively in the front line.
88
  Such 
commanders, however, were exceptional rather than the norm during the late Republic 
and Principate, and the scattered accounts of them in the textual record are probably 
meant to highlight their rarity.  Personal example by a commander became limited more 
often to placing himself near danger and encouraging or spurring the troops in front of 
him, rather than engaging themselves in hand-to-hand combat.  Indulgence in the latter 
was sometimes seen as foolhardy, and a commander’s death or mere rumour of it could 
spread panic throughout the army.
89
  A Roman commander was not expected to be an 
Alexander. 
 The characterizations of centurions in combat are quite different.  Not only were 
these officers expected to place themselves in danger near the front line, but to be the first 
to engage the enemy and the last to retreat.  Unlike expectations for the military tribunes 
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and commander, bravery among centurions did entail hand-to-hand combat.
90
  This 
expectation can be understood largely with the centurions’ subordinates in mind.  
Centurions who hurled themselves into an enemy line were not only seeking individual 
gloria in “competitive male excellence,” but attempting to produce a collective, 
psychological effect on their soldiers.  Both ancient and modern military writers have 
often interpreted battles as fluid and sporadic, where enthusiasm and confidence or 
discouragement and panic could quickly turn the outcome.  In such situations, the natural 
fighters who engaged in skirmishes on their own initiative were critical to maintaining 
the confidence of their comrades.
91
  For the Roman army of the Republic and early 
Empire, the centurion was expected to be the natural fighter par excellence. 
 Although centurions’ aggressive behaviour has been interpreted as being 
motivated primarily as a desire for gloria, the situations in which these acts occurred are 
consistently those where their legion or unit was in desperate straits.  The actions of one 
of Caesar’s favourite centurions, P. Sextius Baculus, are illustrative.  In 57 BCE, when 
his twelfth legion faced a desperate situation in a battle on the edge of the Sambre River 
against the Nervii, Baculus, already dazed and wounded in several places, nonetheless 
noticed many of his men beginning to break.  He rushed to the front line in order to spur 
the soldiers and nearby centurions to hold their ground.
92
  This same Baculus, now a 
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near-invalid, was later critical to saving Q. Cicero’s camp against the advancing 
Sugambri in 53 BCE: 
Concerned for his own and everyone else’ safety, he went forth unarmed from his 
tent.  He saw that the enemy were close at hand and that the issue was in great 
danger.  He snatched arms from those closest, and stationed himself by the gate.  
The centurions of the cohort that was on guard followed him; they sustained the 
battle together for a little while.  After receiving many wounds, Sextius’ spirit 
weakened; he was barely saved, drawn off by the soldiers’ hands.  Because of this 
respite, the others steeled themselves enough to venture to take their place on the 
fortifications and offer the appearance of defenders.
93
 
 
Similarly, in a vicious fight between the legions of Vitellius and Antonius Primus during 
the second battle of Bedriacum (CE 69), the latter’s seventh legion was badly mauled, 
having lost six primi ordines centurions, as well as its eagle (aquila).  Another 
primuspilus, Atilius Verus, threw himself alone into the enemy, retrieved the eagle, and 
fell after killing many of the enemy.
94
  Julian, the centurion in the Jewish War whom 
Josephus praises, likewise made his aggressive attack when he saw his own soldiers 
giving ground to the defenders.
95
   
Although the deaths of combat officers can be psychological blows to the spirit of 
their subordinates, they have equal potential to infuriate them; soldiers could be inspired 
to avenge their fallen leaders, and their deaths could assist an army’s fortunes.  A 
description of British soldiers’ reaction to the death of their captain during the Crimean 
War is illustrative: “The men rushed in the direction in which it was said he was, and 
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literally lifted the enemy from the field with the bayonet.”96  Roman commanders could 
expect this attitude from their soldiers as well.  Caesar cites approvingly his soldiers’ 
aggressive behaviour against Pompeian troops in another skirmish before Munda, during 
which the soldiers avenged deaths of the two centurions who had sacrificed themselves 
the day before.
97
 
Similar to the divine sanctioning of the centurions’ disciplinary role,98 their 
charges against the enemy seems to be given religious significance, in that their 
behaviour parallels the tradition of Roman devotio.  Devotio was understood to be a ritual 
self-sacrifice by a Roman commander, in which, having made a formal prayer to offer his 
life and that of his enemies to the gods of the Underworld in exchange for the army’s 
victory in battle, he would throw himself at the enemy line.  It was apparently performed 
by several Roman commanders in the early Republic, such as P. Decius Mus and his 
descendants.
99
  While devotio by commanders is exceptionally rare in the literary record, 
the idealized behaviour of some centurions in combat appears to echo this practice.  C. 
Crastinus, the primuspilus who fought and died for Caesar at Pharsalus, is presented most 
dramatically in Plutarch (described here as C. Crassianus): 
The first to rush out from Caesar's lines was Caius Crassianus, a centurion 
commanding one hundred-and-twenty men, who was fulfilling his great vow to 
Caesar…and stretching out his right hand he cried: “You shall have a splendid 
victory, Caesar, and you shall praise me today, whether I live or die.” Mindful of 
these words, he rushed forward, drawing many with him, and threw himself into 
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the middle of the enemy line. The opponents immediately took to their swords 
and many were killed, and while Crassianus was forcing his way forward and 
cutting through the front ranks, one of them thrust his sword into his mouth with 
such force that its point drove through the nape of his neck.
100
 
 
Crastinus’ sacrifice lacks the formal ritualistic elements of the early acts of devotio 
described by Livy, but the parallel is clear.  Just as centurions succeeded the formerly 
aristocratic role in hand-to-hand combat, their idealized aggression in battle might also be 
portrayed by Roman commanders and writers as a real continuation of the semi-mythical 
devotio.  What appear to be suicidal charges by Crastinus, Verus, Julian, and others, 
therefore, might very well have been intended by these centurions as just that.
101
  
While ancient authors mention the centurion’s competitive desire for gloria, 
therefore, they simultaneously stress the necessity of the centurions’ actions as a boon to 
their subordinates.  In this sense, gloria had collective as well as individual implications 
for centurions.  Even the brave actions of Pullo and Vorenus, whose number-counting 
slaughter of Gauls at first seems little more than a competition in virtus, were nonetheless 
performed in specific circumstances; their legion under Q. Cicero was in a desperate 
situation, outnumbered and besieged by the Nervii led by Ambiorix.
102
  Centurions who 
failed to live up to this responsibility effectively relinquished their authority to command.  
Showing fear in battle in front of one’s own soldiers especially demanded harsh 
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punishment as was the case of the aforementioned Vibillius, the primuspilus who was 
executed by fustuarium for retreating before his soldiers in battle.
103
   
For centurions, therefore, competitive acts of bravery were desirable not only for 
the sake of personal prestige and status, but also the combat performance of their soldiers 
– it ensured the confidence of nearby subordinates while concomitantly asserting their 
status as preeminent fighters.
104
  The dual nature of the centurion’s responsibilities in 
combat, moreover, is effectively illustrated by the visual memorials to their actions: dona 
militaria. 
 
2.6 Defining the Centurion through Dona Militaria 
While failure in leadership during combat could be harshly punished, centurions 
were well rewarded for living up to the ideal.  As Rome’s military institution evolved into 
the standing legions of the Principate, their aggressive behaviour continued to be 
encouraged as a defining aspect of their rank.  The evolution of dona militaria during the 
Principate helps to demonstrate this point.  As a more elaborately structured system of 
ranks and careers developed in the Roman army of the Principate, so too did the system 
for awarding dona, and these decorations helped to define the centurionate.  In the mutiny 
on the Rhine frontier in CE 14, for example, Germanicus attempted to address his 
soldiers’ grievances toward their superiors by revising the list of that legion’s centurions.  
Each centurion, after giving his name, rank, and origin, was then asked to account for the 
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number of campaigns in which he had served, his courageous exploits, and the dona he 
had received for these acts.  Only if his account was satisfactory to the soldiers, and he 
was supported by the military tribunes, did he retain his rank.
105
  Centurions in the 
legions of the Principate frequently mentioned or depicted their dona in commemorative 
inscriptions.  In some cases, the dona themselves were the only indicators of their 
military service or rank.
106
   
More generally, decorations and ornaments are important symbols for defining 
and expressing authority and experience within a social group.
107
  In military institutions 
specifically, different decorations can even reinforce different types of behaviour 
expected from varying ranks.  In several modern armies, for instance, divisions of 
decorations were made between those “soldier-saving” awards that were given to 
soldiers, and “war-winning” given to officers.  During the First World War, the Victoria 
Cross tended to be awarded to British rankers for exceptionally aggressive acts in the face 
of the enemy, while officers received them for other acts of leadership.
108
  Such a scheme 
developed too in the Roman army.  The rewards that centurions were eligible to receive, 
therefore, are highly revealing of the legions’ expectations for them in battle.   
The oldest Roman military decorations comprised different crowns (coronae), 
which, at least during the Republic, seem to have been awarded regardless of rank 
according to specific actions.  The golden crown (corona aurea) was the lowest order, 
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and was given for general bravery.  The rampart crown (vallaris) was awarded to the first 
soldier to storm an enemy encampment, while the wall crown (muralis) went to the first 
to scale a fortress or town wall.  Centurions are recorded competing as early as the Punic 
Wars for the latter.
109
  The civic crown (civica), often compared by modern scholars to 
the Victoria Cross of the British Army, was awarded specifically to someone who saved 
the life of a fellow Roman citizen, and was “the most glorious award that can be 
bestowed for military valour.”110  By far the rarest award, however, was the grass crown 
(obsidionalis).  It could only be awarded through acclamation by the entire Roman army, 
and was given to those credited with saving not just an individual, but the entire army.
111
  
Lesser decorations for general acts of bravery included discs (phalerae), armbands 
(armillae), and necklaces (torques), while newer awards that were developed during the 
Principate included the silver standard (vexillum), and the silver spear (hasta pura).
112
 
In the Republic, all ranks theoretically were eligible to receive awards that were 
based on merit – whether a miles, centurion, or tribune, the first witnessed scaling a given 
wall could receive the corona muralis.
113
  The Principate, however, brought major 
changes to the award system.  Together with establishing a more formal system of ranks, 
it is also clear that awards were becoming far more rank-specific.  Equestrian and 
                                                 
109
Q. Trebellius competed for the muralis in Scipio Africanus’ siege of Carthago Nova (Liv. 26. 
48). L. Fabius was the first to scale the wall at Gergovia, fatally, and against Caesar’s orders, (Caes. BG 7. 
47). 
110
Plin. NH 16. 3: militum virtutis insigne clarissimum. For general account of  coronae, see NH 
16. 3, passim; Polyb. 6. 39; Dio. Hal. 10. 37; Aul. Gel. Noct. Att. 5. 6. 13-17; Maxfield, Military 
Decorations, 67-81. On comparisons to the Victoria Cross, see Parker, The Roman Legions, 228-229. 
111
Plin. NH 22. 6. The award does not seem to have survived past the reign of Augustus. See 
Maxfield, Military Decorations, 67-69. 
112
Maxfield, Military Decorations, 82-95; Watson, The Roman Soldier, 115-117. 
113
It would seem that one required a witness to confirm the exploit. See example of Q. Tiberilius 
(Liv. 26. 48). 
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senatorial officers (tribunes and legates) no longer received lower awards like torques, 
while milites were now ineligible for most of the coronae and newly established awards 
like the hasta pura and vexillum.  Even awards within the centurionate were 
differentiated, with only the highest-ranking centurions, the primi ordines and the 
primuspilus, being eligible for the hasta pura and vexillum.
114
   
By the Flavian dynasty, set patterns and progressions for awards at all levels 
emerged, and certain dona seem to have become awarded without the specific actions 
that they once required. A miles, for example, could not receive a corona muralis, while a 
centurion could do so, but without ever having scaled an enemy wall.
115
  As the Roman 
army developed during the Princiapte, therefore, their award system also became more 
systematized and complex.  This process has been interpreted as an ossification or 
“routinization” of dona, whereby a system that once awarded decorations according to 
charismatic acts and authority gave away to a more rationalized system of award by 
rank.
116
  Nevertheless, however much the system for dona became “routinized” during 
the Principate, the criteria for awarding dona seems to have remained relatively flexible.  
No evidence suggests that either seniority or direct commission from the class of equites 
were determining factors for centurions to win coronae.  Generally, although rank might 
determine the specific awards for which a man was eligible, specific acts of bravery that 
singled out an individual remained the most important criterion.
117
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Watson, The Roman Soldier, 114-115. This process parallels the gulf in rank between awards of 
the Military Medal and Distinguished Service Order in the British Army. See Maxfield, Military 
Decorations, 63; Watson, The Roman Soldier, 114. 
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Phang, Roman Military Service, 197 
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Awarded for acts of bravery, the corona aurea was most commonly won by centurions. As 
Maxfield notes, however, we should be cautious with this evidence, since centurions and higher officers are 
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Even in a system of decorations increasingly determined by rank, analysis of the 
specific dona for which the centurions were eligible remains instructive.  Similar to how 
centurions could both suffer and administer institutional punishment, in receiving 
decorations they again seem to occupy an intermediate position between ranker and 
aristocratic officer.  On the one hand, unlike tribunes and legates, centurions were eligible 
for the lesser decorations of torques, armillae, and phalerae.  Although their 
commemorative inscriptions tended not to mention lower ranks that they might have 
occupied, centurions still took pride in the dona that were more associated with those 
ranks, frequently citing them in inscriptions and bearing them on their cuirasses in visual 
commemorations.
118
  On the other hand, centurions were also eligible for higher awards 
for which milites were not, including the various coronae, vexilla, and hastae purae.  It is 
noteworthy that the lowest rank ever to receive the rare corona obsidionalis, a decoration 
awarded to some of Rome’s most famous commanders of the Republic, was a 
centurion.
119
   
The history and traditions of different awards likely also continued to encourage 
certain kinds of behaviour.  While it is doubtless true that the corona muralis and vallaris 
seem later to have been awarded without the specific requisite of storming a wall or 
encampment, the decorations still carried a history and distinction for highly aggressive 
individual action.  It should not surprise that the various coronae, once awarded during 
                                                                                                                                                 
over-represented in the epigraphic evidence. See Military Decorations, 48, 136, 185-187. Cf. 
Domaszewski, Die Rangordnung, 110. 
118
See Dobson & Breeze, “The Rome Cohorts and the Legionary Centurionate” in Roman Officers 
and Frontiers, 88-112, esp. 103; Maxfield, Military Decorations, 184. Centurions awarded armillae, 
phalerae, and torques: Tib. Claudius Vitalis (ILS 2656); Petronius Fortunatus (CIL VIII 217; ILS 2658); C. 
Velius Rufus (ILS 9200; AE 1903, 368). Displayed on cuirasses: Appendix A, figs. 2-3, 14, 17-18. 
119
The primuspilus Cn. Petreius Atinas in 101 BCE (Plin. NH 22. 5-6). Other recipients mentioned 
by Pliny include the famed L. Siccius Dentatus, P. Decius Mus, Q. Fabius Maximus, Scipio Aemilianus, 
Sulla, and Augustus. 
 90 
 
the Republic for outstanding examples of individual bravery, appear most commonly 
awarded during the Principate to centurions rather than tribunes or other senior ranks.
120
  
Even as the Roman system of awards began to designate certain dona to different ranks, 
therefore, centurions appear to have remained pre-eminent in receiving decorations that 
were traditionally rewarded for aggressive, individual bravery. 
The distribution of dona militaria effectively illustrate what was expected by the 
Roman military from centurions in combat.  Although eventually acquiring a rank and 
status in the imperial legions that made them eligible for the decorations of equestrian 
and senatorial officers, they nonetheless continued to receive and advertise the 
decorations of the miles.  This makes sense when considering the ideal for centurions as 
combat officers.  They were simultaneously expected to be leaders with the tactical 
function of commanding their centuriae, yet also individual combatants with equal if not 
higher expectations of bravery than the soldiers under their charge.   
 
2.7 Conclusion: The Roman Combat Officer 
 Personal, aggressive leadership in combat helped to define the centurionate.  An 
idealized conception of them as experienced yet highly aggressive officers in combat was 
well established by the late Republic, and persisted in literary narratives of the Empire.  
Even as the centurions progressively acquired greater pay, status, and logistic 
responsibilities, they themselves emphasized first and foremost whatever recognitions 
and decorations they had acquired in war.  This ideal was encouraged not only through 
promotion and public recognition based on fortia facta, but also by an institution that 
                                                 
120
Statius Marrax alone won five aureae (ILS 2638). See also Lepidius Proculus (CIL XI 390; CIL 
XI 391); Velius Rufus (ILS 9200; AE 1903, 368); Sex. Vibius Gallus (CIL III 13648; IGRR III 1432; ILS 
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supported competition for martial prestige at all ranks.  From the centurion’s perspective 
as an officer, however, the most important product of this behaviour was the respect to be 
earned from their subordinates.  As combat officers, centurions were expected not merely 
to place themselves in danger – for this was an expectation for a commander too – but to 
distinguish themselves consistently and actively in the “killing zone.”121   
Such a style of leadership, however, obviously came with great cost to individual 
centurions.  Despite the bravery of Julian in the siege of the Temple Mount, Josephus 
describes this centurion’s fate after he slipped on the stoned courtyard and was set upon 
by the defenders: 
He received very many strokes of these iron weapons on his shield, and he often 
attempted to get up again, but was hurled down by those who struck at him.  Yet 
as he lay, he stabbed many of them with his own sword.  He was not killed 
quickly, since all the parts of his body where he could be mortally wounded were 
covered by his helmet and cuirass; he also drew his neck closer to his body, until 
his other limbs were splintered, and no one dared to come to help him, so that he 
then yielded to fate… he left behind a very great fame, not only among Romans, 
including Caesar himself, but also among his enemies.
122
 
 
Some might be tempted here to recall the words with which General Pierre Bosquet 
described the Crimean War’s infamous Charge of the Light Brigade: “It is magnificent, 
but it is not war – it is madness.”123   
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Killing zone: Keegan, Face of Battle, 104-105. Cf. “Killing field” in Hanson, Western Way of 
War, 197-209. On the importance of risk and sacrifice for combat officers, cf. Kindsvatter, American 
Soldiers, 238-242. 
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BJ 6. 1. 8: ὁ δὲ πολὺν μὲν τῷ θυρεῷ σίδηρον ἐξεδέχετο, πολλάκις δὲ ἀναστῆναι πειράσας 
ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν τυπτόντων ἀνετράπη, καὶ κείμενος δ’ ὅμως ἔνυττε τῷ ξίφει πολλούς· οὐδὲ γὰρ 
ἀνῃρέθη ταχέως τῷ τε κράνει καὶ τῷ θώρακι πεφραγμένος πάντα τὰ καίρια πρὸς σφαγὴν καὶ τὸν 
αὐχένα συνέλκων· μέχρι κοπτομένων αὐτῷ τῶν ἄλλων μελῶν καὶ μηδενὸς προσαμῦναι τολμῶντος 
ἐνέδωκε… μέγιστον οὐ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καίσαρι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις κλέος 
καταλιπών. 
123C’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas la guerre - c'est de la folie. Quoted in R. D. Heinl, 
Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, (Annapolis, 1966), 346. 
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Certainly, this idealized behaviour sometimes deprived veteran officers of their 
lives and the legions of experienced and valuable leaders.  In addition to the danger to the 
centurions themselves, moreover, this individual, often competitive behaviour could 
sometimes prove counter-productive.  This has been argued to have been the case at 
Gergovia, when a centurion’s eagerness proved destructive to his unit and to the siege, 
much to Caesar’s frustration.124  Much later, commanders such as Wellington shared 
Caesar’s frustration.  Bravery was useful, but only in the right circumstances, since a 
display of thoughtless bravery could damage plans and waste lives.
125
  In both Roman 
myth and juridical opinion, moreover, even brave actions that ended in successful 
outcomes were intolerable if done against orders.  The Roman military hero, Cn. 
Domitius Corbulo, made this expectation clear in Armenia to a primuspilus, Paccius 
Orfitus, whom he forced to camp outside the ramparts as punishment for attacking 
Parthian troops against orders.
126
 
Such aggressive behaviour, moreover, appears opposed to the characterization of 
centurions explored in the previous chapter as stern disciplinarians, officers who brooked 
no disobedience.  This contrast is noted especially by Lendon, who argues that these two 
conflicting characterizations result from a cultural tension in the Roman army between 
ideals of disciplina and virtus.
127
  This tension that he describes is similar to what military 
theorists sometimes described as institutional or organizational strains, the innate yet 
often contradictory systems of authority and behaviour that some theorists see as 
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Caes. BG 7. 52. See Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts, 221-222. 
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Modestinus, Dig. 49. 16. 3. 15; Livy 8. 7. 17. Orfitus: Tac. Ann. 13. 36. 5. 
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Soldiers and Ghosts, 178, 210-211. See below, Chapter Three. 
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inevitable, yet often necessary in many military organizations.  The next chapter will 
consider this characterization of the Roman army in the context of organizational strains 
and military authority of the centurionate. 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: The Centurion’s Military Authority 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have demonstrated that two prominent idealizations of 
legionary centurions emerged from the Roman army of the late Republic and Principate.  
On the one hand, they were praised and feared in literature as stern officers, obedient to 
their superiors’ commands and brutal in disciplining transgressing subordinates.  Not 
only were centurions responsible for carrying out castigatio in the legions, but 
representations of them and their vitis, especially in visual commemoration, were 
circulated to an extent that by the first century CE they emerged as symbolic adversaries 
of disobedience towards the army and the emperor.  On the other hand, centurions were 
strongly characterized by an individual, seemingly undisciplined, aggression.  Although 
highly valued in the legions for their experience, they were honoured above all else in 
literature and commemorative monuments for personal bravery and fierce behaviour in 
combat.  This personal style of leadership was seen to be an essential method for 
centurions to earn praise both as individual fighters and as combat leaders.   
Both of the previous chapters, moreover, have discussed how these idealizations 
of the centurion are taken to reflect structural problems or strains in the Roman army’s 
organization, practices, and success from Republic to Principate.  First, the idealization of 
centurions in visual commemoration and literature as both obedient disciplinarians and 
aggressive individual combatants reflects what some Roman military studies describe as 
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a tension between traditional virtues that emphasized both the heroic, individual pursuit 
of gloria, and those that valued instead self-restraint, obedience, and rational planning.  
Lendon, for example, asks: “If the Roman army excelled as the only modern institution in 
a savage world, could it be that it excelled also by preserving the culture of a savage tribe 
in an increasingly modern world?”1  Harris sees something similar: “In many respects, 
their behaviour resembles that of many other non-primitive ancient peoples, yet few 
others are known to have displayed such an extreme degree of ferocity of war while 
reaching a high level of political culture.”2 
Second, the centurion’s association with corporal punishment is seen to contradict 
more normative codes of discipline and obedience that apparently developed during the 
Principate.  This strain appears to fit with a problem explored in modern studies of 
combat motivation and military sociology, which describe a strain between strategies that 
seek to exact compliance from soldiers through coercive methods of “domination” and 
those that employ normative or indirect methods of “manipulation.”3  Expressed in terms 
of Classical Greek thought, the authority of Roman officers relied on a precarious balance 
between force (βία) and persuasion (πειθώ).
4
 
These apparent problems illustrated by the centurionate are related in as much as 
they both concern Roman military authority and the different ways it could be expressed: 
                                                 
1Lendon, “Rhetoric of Combat,” 325. 
2
War and Imperialism, 53. Cf. Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts, 163-232, 310-313; Phang, Roman 
Military Service 15-25, 43-53, 73, 100-101; Harris, “Readings,” 300-320; McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 
62-71, 195-205, 300-310; Keegan, History of War, 265-266. 
3
E.g., Keijzer, Military Obedience 33-51; M. D. Feld, The Structure of Violence, 13-27, 71-75; 
Kellett, Combat Motivation, 41-52, 90-135, 152-159; Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic, 22-40, 97-100; R. 
Gal, “Commitment and Obedience in the Military: An Israeli Case Study,” AFS 11.4 (1985), 554-556. 
4
Cf. Saller, Patriarchy, 143: “Words, not the whip, are the appropriate mode of treatment for the 
honorable freeborn in the household, just as in the public sphere” 
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did Roman military culture idealize one kind of military behaviour or style of leadership 
over another in different periods of Rome’s history, perhaps reflecting changing attitudes 
in its military culture and structure?  Or, if these different ideals were consistently 
expected and encouraged during both the Republic and Principate, is it even feasible that 
an officer such as the centurion would be expected to embody both simultaneously?   
 This chapter addresses these questions by examining the centurionate as a case for 
the relationship between authority, obligation, and coercion in Roman military culture, 
and how military authority could be generated and expressed during the late Republic and 
Principate.  It describes first the role of certain theoretical models by Weber and 
Bourdieu, as well as more specific works of military sociology, have contributed to 
framing these contradictions in the Roman military’s ideologies and practices, and how, 
in each case, the centurionate seems to illustrate the problem.  The chapter argues, 
however, that the centurion’s idealized military traits, as expressed in textual and 
epigraphic evidence, are illustrative not of contradictions in Roman military thinking, but 
rather of a military practice that helped to nullify potential strains in the Roman military 
hierarchy.  Concepts of normative and coercive strategies, or virtus and disciplina were, 
for centurions, complementary rather than contradictory ideals that were crucial to 
preserving ties of obedience between the milites and their superiors. 
 
3.2 Categories of Authority 
To explain the willingness of an individual or group to accept subordination, 
Weber stressed that fear and expediency were insufficient bases for power.  Legitimate 
authority (legitime Herrschaft), he argued, must be accepted as a valid norm, and the 
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willingness to submit to that authority requires a belief in the legitimacy of its source.
5
  
“Authority,” however, erroneously suggests a single rather than the multiple, overlapping 
practices for defining and preserving certain social and institutional relationships.  Weber 
outlined three main categories of legitimate authority (rational-legal, traditional, and 
charismatic), and described them explicitly as “ideal types,” (reinen Typen) meant to 
promote systematic analysis.  He cautioned, therefore, against attempts to insert whole 
and concrete historical realities into one of these types.
6
   
Despite the caution expressed both by Weber himself and later scholars about the 
universal application of these reinen Typen, these categories have continued to influence 
understanding of authority and legitimacy.  Many studies continue to frame Roman 
military, political, and social institutions according to at least one of them.
7
  In several 
studies of more modern military organizations, moreover, bases of legitimacy for a 
western officer’s command has been expressed in one of three ways: a system of rational 
rules, a personal authority based on tradition, or personal authority based on heroic 
charisma.
8
  More generally, one of the consequences of applying Weber’s distinct, social 
categories to studies of the Roman army (among other military institutions) is that one is 
                                                 
5
Economy and Society, 37, 946-948, 953-954. Herrschaft is often translated as both “domination” 
and “authority” in Weber’s work, since he himself stressed different components of Herrschaft at different 
times. I translate it here as “authority” to distinguish it from a sense of “domination” used by other authors 
in this chapter (e.g., Janowitz, Feld), where the sense is closer to Weber’s definition of power (Macht). On 
this translation, See Economy and Society, 53, with n. 31. 
6
Economy and Society, 215-216. On these types, see 217-245. 
7
E.g., P. Veyne, Le pain et le cirque: Sociologie historique d'un pluralisme politique (Paris, 1976); 
R. P. Saller, Personal Patronage under the Early Empire (Cambridge, 1982), 79. T. Hölscher, “The 
Transformation of Victory into Power: From Event to Structure,” in Representations of War, 27-48. Cf. 
Phang, Roman Military Service, 21, n. 28. For analysis and criticism of the use of Weber, see M. Finley, 
Ancient History: Evidence and Models (New York, 1985), 88-103, and esp. Lendon, “The Legitimacy of 
the Roman Emperor,” 53-58. 
8
E.g., Janowitz & Little, Sociology and the Military Establishment, 3rd ed. (Beverley Hills, 1974), 
43-65; G. Teitler, The Genesis of the Professional Officers’ Corps (Beverly Hills, 1977), 14. 
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inexorably persuaded to see military authority according to several, distinct categories.  
These different forms of authority are argued to transform according to changes in a 
military institution’s structure of ranks, status and skills of its members, technology, size, 
and broader culture.  The existence of multiple forms of authority within an institution, 
therefore, can lead to contradictory ideals and practices, or what Janowitz once described 
in the military as “organizational strains.”9 
 
3.2.1 Primitive Aggression versus Rational Discipline 
The Roman army is often viewed to be more sophisticated and professional in its 
organization, equipment, skill-structure, and discipline than any army preceding it and 
many following it.
10
  Recent studies, however, have argued that its comparatively modern 
organization and discipline coexisted with an extremely violent and primitive emphasis 
on individual combat.  Even during the Principate, as Rome’s army settled into the role of 
a “peacetime” army of occupation rather than a “wartime” army of conquering,11 the 
historical-mythical bravery and aggressive spirit of soldiers and commanders of the early 
Republican army continued to be idealized.  The legions’ overall success arguably relied 
on cultivating this traditional “fighter spirit.”  Weber once described this as a tension 
between the primitive, individual bravery and disciplined, organized behaviour in the 
Roman army.  It was the product of the routinization from charismatic to rational-legal 
                                                 
9
Cf. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 8-51. 
10
See above, Chapter One, 32. 
11
For changing role of the army, see B. Dobson, “The Roman Army: Wartime or Peacetime 
Army,” in D. J. Breeze & B. Dobson eds., Roman Officers and Frontiers (Stuttgart, 1993), 113-128; 
Keppie, Roman Army At War, 51-57, 146, 174. Cf. L. de Blois, “Army and Society in the Late Roman 
Republic” in Kaiser, Heer und Gesellschaft, 11-31. 
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systems of authority, which he related to a strain in warfare between the charisma of 
individual action and the cohesiveness of rational discipline.
12
 
Weber’s understanding of this tension between charisma and rational discipline in 
the Roman army’s development from the Republic to Empire remains influential.  Phang, 
for example, sees the Roman army possessing aspects of all three types of legitimate 
authority.  While the Republican army was initially more charismatic and patrimonial, it 
became increasingly rational-legal and bureaucratic.  Religious and sacred aspects of 
Republican disciplina militaris, the early commanders’ unlimited imperium and use of 
donatives, aristocratic competition for gloria, and other elements of earlier Roman 
warfare all became routinized under the more bureaucratic army of Augustus and his 
successors.  The elite that dominated the Roman army rationalized traditional ideologies 
towards disciplina militaris to preserve the army’s cohesion. “Disciplina militaris,” 
Phang states, “was a legitimating ideology, in Weberian terms, that practically routinized 
the ‘charismatic’ nature of the late Republican warfare, though it did not realize the 
Weberian ideal type of rational discipline.”13   
Moreover, because the Roman army operated on more than one system of 
authority, Phang asserts that there was a strain created by an emphasis on virtus during 
the Republic that was less compatible with the “rationalized” and professional army in 
the Empire: “A practically Homeric virtus was inconsistent with social control, which 
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Economy and Society, 1150-51. Weber thought to have originated with the heavily-armoured 
Greek hoplites and Roman legionaries. Cf. 1148-49: “It is the fate of charisma to recede before the powers 
of tradition or of rational association…This waning of charisma generally indicates the diminishing 
importance of individual action.” Cf. 954, 970-971, 980. 
13
Phang, Roman Military Practice, 21-29, 35-36. On modern militaries as Weberian-type 
bureaucracies, see D. L. Lang, “Values: The Ultimate Determinants of Commitment and Legitimacy” in 
Legitimacy and Commitment, 30. On military strain between the discipline of armed forces and 
bureaucratic rationality of the state, and the brutality and destructiveness of warfare, see M. D. Feld, The 
Structure of Violence: Armed Forces as Social Systems (Beverly Hills, 1977), 14.  
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required modestia (obedience, respect for authority) in soldiers.”14  Phang places the 
centurions of the imperial legions squarely on one side of this strain.  Weber’s types of 
legitime Herrschaft are evoked to contrast the centurion’s charismatic authority, earned 
through aggressive acts of virtus, with the more rational-bureaucratic authority of the 
emperor and the army’s elite commanders.15 
 Strong objections, however, have been raised to describing the Roman army 
during the Principate as rational or bureaucratic, since there is also strong evidence for 
the continuing importance of patronage and personal connections in developing the 
military authority of commanders and emperors.  More to the point, we should exercise 
greater caution in applying a sense of legal-rational authority extensively to organizations 
that were somewhat amateurish by modern standards, and to an emperor and aristocratic 
elite who sought more personal, social, and uniquely Roman distinctions of honos and 
gloria rather than “strategies of legitimation.”16  While strict categories of legitimate 
authority may be rejected in describing Roman military culture and organization, 
however, Weber’s understanding of the conflict between charisma and discipline has 
remained the basis for discussions of the strains or tension between the heroic virtus of 
the single combatant and the Roman ethos of disciplina. 
 Lendon asserts that an inconsistency is apparent when considering idealizations of 
the centurionate in particular.  Polybius describes the officer’s ideal traits during the 
second century BCE: 
                                                 
14
Ibid., 73. 
15
Ibid., 99-100: “The prestige of masculinity suggests that charismatic authority (vested in the 
personality rather than in the social status or legal powers) persisted in the Roman command.” 
16Lendon, “The Legitimacy of the Roman Emperor,” passim; Empire of Honour, 13-24. Cf. Saller, 
Personal Patronage, 79-103; James, “Writing the Roman Legions,” 39-41. On role of patronage, merit, and 
seniority in the centurionate, see below, Chapter Four. 
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And they want the centurions not to be so much daring and danger-loving as men 
ready to lead, steadfast and profound rather than spirited; not carelessly eager to 
attack or engage in battle, but even when pressed and overwhelmed, to endure and 
die for their duty.
17
 
 
For Polybius, centurions were ideally steadfast (στάσιμος) rather than daring (θράσος) 
or danger-loving (φιλοκίνδυνος).
18
  Polybius’ ideal centurions appear to contrast those 
whom we have seen praised later by Caesar, Tacitus, and Josephus.  Several solutions are 
suggested to address this apparent contradiction.  One is that Polybius’ ideal is more 
Spartan than Roman, and is reflective of a Greek military thinking that focused on 
organization and avoidance of positive and negative excesses (σωφροσύνη).
19
   
More recently, however, Lendon has described this contradiction as the product of 
“a military culture at war with itself” between the contradictory ideals of virtus and 
disciplina.  This contradiction played out in the development of the Roman army’s social 
and institutional ranks.  There was a shift in Roman military culture whereby young 
aristocrats, formerly idealized for their courage in the early Republic, were replaced as 
exemplars of virtus in Caesar’s day by legionaries and centurions of more humble 
background, who themselves formerly had been exemplars of disciplina and obedience.  
Centurions and the milites, in turn, were eventually supplanted in virtus by auxiliary 
                                                 
17
Polyb. 6. 24. 9: βούλονται δ’ εἶναι τοὺς ταξιάρχους οὐχ οὕτως θρασεῖς καὶ φιλοκινδύνους ὡς 
ἡγεμονικοὺς καὶ στασίμους καὶ βαθεῖς μᾶλλον ταῖς ψυχαῖς, οὐδ’ ἐξ ἀκεραίου προσπίπτειν ἢ 
κατάρχεσθαι τῆς μάχης, ἐπικρατουμένους δὲ καὶ πιεζομένους ὑπομένειν καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν ὑπὲρ τῆς 
χώρας.   
18
McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 65. 
19Lendon, “The Rhetoric of Combat,” 299-300. He is supported by Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi, 
96: “The cardinal virtues in a Roman soldier were to follow orders and stand his ground at all costs.” This 
is consistent with Polybius (6. 52; 6. 54). See also McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 64, 71, for a definition of 
virtus that attempts to encompass both aggressive and enduring aspects of courage. 
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soldiers during the later first and second century.
20
  In setting apart the individual, 
competitive virtus of centurions and milites from the collective disciplina and rational 
planning of the tribunes and commander, Caesar’s own admonition of his soldiers and 
centurions after the failed assault on Gergovia is illustrative: 
As much as he admired the greatness of their spirit, since neither the fortifications 
of the camp, nor the height of the hill, nor the wall of the town could impede 
them, to the same extent, he condemned their licentiousness and arrogance, since 
they believed that they knew more than their general about victory and outcome 
of affairs; and that he desired from his soldiers forbearance and self-control no 
less than courage and excellent spirit.
21
 
 
In this sense, a tension between virtus and disciplina in the Roman army persisted 
through changes to its recruitment and organization under Marius, Caesar and other late-
Republican commanders through to Augustus and his successors.
22
  Roman commanders’ 
authority and success relied on their ability to balance their use of rational planning and 
disciplined cohesion with their soldiers’ own desire to perform aggressive feats; the 
commander complemented the aggressive attitudes of the soldiers with his own tactical 
preparations.
23
 
The ideals of virtus and disciplina accordingly developed not only into an 
ideological tension in Roman military culture, but also as an institutional one between 
                                                 
20
Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts, 178, 218-220, 242-248. Phang, Roman Military Service, 99-100, 
likewise identifies centurions be more closely with the milites. 
21
Caes. BG 7. 52: quanto opere eorum animi magnitudinem admiraretur, quos non castrorum 
munitiones, non altitudo montis, non murus oppidi tardare potuisset, tanto opere licentiam arrogantiamque 
reprehendere, quod plus se quam imperatorem de victoria atque exitu rerum sentire existimarent; nec 
minus se ab milite modestiam et continentiam quam virtutem atque animi magnitudinem desiderare. 
22
Changes to recruitment and organization: Sall. Iug. 84-86; Plut. Mar. 9, 25; Plin. NH 5. 25; 
Frontin. Strat. 4. 1. 7. Caesar: Suet. Iul. 24. 2; Augustus: Suet. Aug. 38. 2; 49; App. BC 5. 3; Dio 52. 27-28; 
54. 25. 5; 55.23.1. Successors: Tac. Ann. 4. 4; Jos. BJ 3. 70-107; Suet. Dom. 7.3. See Keppie, Making of the 
Roman Army, 57-79, 132-198. 
23
See speech by Aemilius Paulus in Polyb. 3. 109, which makes this distinction. McDonnell, 
Roman Manliness, 71, notes that Caesar (BG 1. 13, 40; 7. 22, 29; BC 1.58; 3.73) sometimes contrasts the 
traits of diligentia, consilium, ratio, and scientia of commanders with the virtus of the milites. Cf. Lendon, 
Soldiers and Ghosts, 211, 230-231. 
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military ranks.  In the armies of the late Republic and Principate, centurions are 
established with milites as somewhat volatile, yet necessary champions of aggressive 
courage, to be harnessed by the more rational, discipline-oriented legates from the 
aristocracy.  While described effectively as opposing traditional, almost unconscious 
ideals of virtus and disciplina that manifest themselves as a tension specifically in the 
Roman army, this tension is directly related to another strain commonly seen in modern 
militaries: the conflicting institutional emphases on personal initiative versus rigid 
obedience, or between strategies that indirectly encourage soldiers to fight and risk their 
lives in combat, and those that more directly coerce them.   
 
3.2.2 Domination versus Persuasion 
An enduring challenge for military organizations and theorists concerns the most 
effective strategies in acquiring compliance from soldiers.  Lynn has arranged these 
strategies into three categories: coercive (physical and psychological intimidation), 
remunerative (material incentives), and normative (symbolic rewards and punishments, 
social commendation and condemnation).
24
  Most armies have tended to combine these 
strategies – all three of those mentioned were employed in the Roman legions of both the 
Republic and Principate.
25
  More often, however, studies of modern military institutions 
have proposed broader, more binary concepts of disciplinary strategies that draw either 
explicitly or implicitly from Weber’s essential distinction between power (Macht) and 
                                                 
24
Bayonets of the Republic, 23-26, adapted from S. Westbrook, “The Potential for Military 
Disintegration” in S. Sarkesian ed., Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military 
(Beverly Hills, 1980), 244-278. 
25
For general discussion on coercive, remunerative, and normative strategies in Roman army, see 
Goldsworthy, Roman Army at War, 250-264. 
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authority (Herrschaft): obedience versus commitment, external versus internal discipline, 
dominating versus manipulative methods.  The view that most armies have employed 
both in varying degrees is considered the basis for organizational strain in military 
institutions.
26
 
 The first chapter briefly discussed the concept of the distinction between 
domination and manipulation in discussing military discipline.  The goal of domination is 
unquestioning obedience from soldiers – a “mechanical compliance.”  Direct orders are 
issued without need for discussion or persuasion concerning the final end, and the system 
employs negative sanctions and threats (often physical) to elicit the desired behaviour.  
Domination is often equated with institutional discipline, a coercive type that belongs to 
the institution and is external to the individual soldier.  Manipulative or persuasive 
strategies, in contrast, are thought to appear more legitimate in the soldiers’ eyes, 
employing more normative techniques that emphasize consensus and group goals.  Rather 
than seeking mechanical compliance, the army encourages individual initiative and 
practices that generate cohesion and morale, pride in one’s unit and its history, bonds of 
loyalty between soldiers, and a desire for victory.  It is likened to a form of “positive” or 
“self-discipline.”27 
 Studies of military discipline and obedience agree that an officer’s authority 
cannot rely on negative sanctions alone.  Keijzer’s assertion is illustrative: “Ultimate 
dedication cannot be obtained solely by application of penal sanctions.  They will be 
                                                 
26
E.g., Feld, The Structure of Violence, 14, 27, 94; H. Levine, “Between Social Legitimation and 
Moral Legitimacy in Military Commitment” in T. C. Wyatt & R. Gal eds., Legitimacy and Commitment in 
the Military (New York, 1990), 10; Gal, “Commitment and Obedience in the Military,” 554-555. For 
Macht and Herrschaft, see above, n. 5. 
27
See above, Chapter One. 
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ineffective unless there is a general acceptance of the necessity of obedience and a social 
climate in which one’s fellows as well as one’s superiors serve as checks on a tendency to 
infraction, and, ultimately, infraction is inhibited by the individual’s conscience.”28  
Janowitz likewise argued that evolving views towards discipline have led to a shift from 
domination to a greater reliance on manipulative methods.
29
   
This narrative appears to fit well with developments in military discipline and 
justice in western armies.  The use of brutal punishments that included flogging, 
mutilation, burning, and death began to decline during the eighteenth century, while 
capital punishment became rare by the nineteenth.
30
  Definitions of discipline, however, 
continued to emphasize the “dominating” aspect: a strict adherence to rules, regularity, 
subordination, and unquestioned obedience to established government.
31
  The First World 
War is commonly seen to have put an end to the emphasis in many European armies on 
mechanical compliance based on strict adherence to orders.  British officer manuals made 
this shift explicit: “Obedience is not the product of fear, but of understanding…as 
obedience is a moral quality, so must punishment be the same, for it is resorted to to 
foster and nurture it.”32   
                                                 
28
Military Obedience, 50. Cf. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 36-37. 
29
Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 8. See also arguments in Kellett, Combat Motivation, 89-93. 
30
Frey, “Courts and Cats”, 5-11; Gilbert, “The Changing Face of British Military Justice” 80-82. 
On discipline of Revolutionary French army, see Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, 97-118, 24: “Military 
punishments remained, but they became more a matter of justice than of compulsion…Discipline was 
expected to be mainly self-imposed.” 
31
E. A. Ellis, “Discipline: Its importance to an Armed Force and the Best Means of Promoting or 
Maintaining It in the United States Army,” Journal of Military Service Institution 16 (1895), 213. Cf. M. B. 
Stewart, “The Army as a Factor in the Upbuilding of Society,” Journal of the Military Service Institute 36 
(1905), 391-404. 
32
Quoted in Kellett, Combat Motivation, 92. 
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A concept of “positive” discipline thus emerged, emphasizing perseverance, 
psychology, morale, and initiative.  Treatises from the Second World War on the topic 
continued this trend, emphasizing morale, pride, and self-discipline as the keys to good 
discipline: “At its best, [discipline] is instilled and maintained by pride in oneself, in 
one’s unit, in one’s profession; only at its worst by a fear of punishment.”33  The change 
in attitudes is attributed to several factors, including changing attitudes in society at large, 
social origins of recruits, and conditions of combat, especially technology of firepower.
34
 
For increasingly professionalized and specialized armies, then, indirect and 
manipulative strategies are argued to appear more legitimate and to be more successful in 
acquiring compliance and superior performance from soldiers.  This apparent shift in 
favour of disciplinary strategies from domination to manipulation, however, has not 
eliminated the need for coercive strategies in military institutions, and there remains the 
need for a relative balance between negative sanctions and positive incentives.
35
  
According to Janowitz’s model, the persisting debate concerning the correct conditions in 
which to relax or reassert formal discipline causes the organizational strain that is seen to 
be so common in military institutions.  It is a “contradictory interplay of the two styles – 
initiative and consultation one the one hand, rigid subordination and unquestioning 
                                                 
33
E. Wavell, Soldiers and Soldiering (London, 1953), 116. Cf. A. W. Lane, “The Attainment of 
Military Discipline,” Journal of Military Service Institution 55 (1944), 1-19. On the “winds of reform,” see 
Turner, Gallant Gentlemen, 194. 
34
Keijzer, Military Obedience, 35. Social origins of recruits: Frey, “Courts and Cats,” 5. 
Conditions of combat and technology: S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire, 22-23, 44-47. 
35
Cf. Kellett, Combat Motivation, 133; Keijzer, Military Obedience, 50; M. v. Crevald, Fighting 
Power:German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, 1982), passim. Problems with this view: 
O. Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 30-59. 
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compliance on the other hand….”  Military institutions, however, can and do function 
despite these internal strains.
36
   
As we have seen in the first chapter, this traditional view of a strain between 
coercive and normative strategies of discipline has been applied to the Roman army as 
well,
37
 and again the centurionate appears to illustrate the strain.  Although centurions 
were idealized for their individual aggression and employed strategies meant to motivate 
their subordinates indirectly, such as leading by personal example in combat, they were 
also portrayed as exceptionally brutal in their reliance on coercive discipline.
38
   
 
3.3 Military Authority in the Centurionate 
The centurionate, then, appears to represent a structural problem in Roman 
military culture, in which different emphases on self-discipline and aggressive courage, 
or domination and manipulation, created a contradiction or strain in its ideologies and 
practices of leadership, discipline, and behaviour in combat.  There are several 
fundamental problems, however, in applying such strict categories of authority and social 
practices to Roman military culture.  We have already seen in the first chapter that 
modern definitions of coercion and domination are often too absolute to apply to Roman 
disciplinary methods and ignore the social context of corporal punishment in the legions.  
                                                 
36
Keijzer, Military Obedience, 47. Cf. Janowitz & Little, Sociology and the Military 
Establishment, 43-44, 54, 62. 
37
 See above, Chapter One, 32-33. 
38
E.g., Brand, Roman Military Law, 80: “The authority of the centurion was purely disciplinary. 
His badge of office was a vine staff (vitis) with which, through personal chastisement, he compelled instant 
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The centurion’s punitive authority also displayed productive and manipulative aspects 
and had ideological associations beyond their immediate victims and audience.
39
   
By the same token, the entire distinction between domination and persuasion has 
also been challenged, since so-called normative strategies can be interpreted to possess 
violent, dominating elements.  Phang, for example, has recently argued that certain 
behaviour and disciplinary strategies of Roman commanders during the Principate, while 
seemingly normative, were actually a form of violence through which the elite dominated 
their subordinates.  These practices designed to help the elite acquire compliance from 
Roman soldiers are equated with what Bourdieu called “symbolic capital.” 
 
3.3.1 Symbolic Violence in the Roman Legions 
For Bourdieu, definitions of capital and interest were far too restricted because 
social practices were being examined through a capitalist lens, which recognized no other 
economic activities than those that are economically self-interested and geared towards 
maximizing material profit.  This definition, he argued, effectively renders practices not 
perceived to be oriented towards this goal as gratuitous or economically disinterested.
40
  
Many social practices in pre-capitalist societies such as ancient Rome are thus described 
as “traditional” or “value-rational” and understood to be embedded within political, 
social, and religious customs and institutions that are indifferent or even opposed to the 
economic capital of a market economy.
41
  More problematically, this narrow definition 
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Discipline and Punish, 27, 58. 
40
Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, 112-113; Outline, 176-177; Moore, “Capital” 101. 
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“Twenty Years after Moses I. Finley’s The Ancient Economy” in W. Scheidel & S. v. Redden eds., The 
Ancient Economy (New York, 2002), 33-52; R. Saller, “Introduction,” 1-12, and D. P. Kehoe, “The Early 
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“can find no place in its analyses, still less in its calculations, for the strictly symbolic 
interest which is occasionally recognized…only to be reduced to the irrationality of 
feeling or passion.”42  Bourdieu, therefore, advocated a more complex account of the 
relationships between dominant and subordinate groups and individuals, in which one 
should understand any resource, including non-material goods, which functions as a 
social relation of power as capital.
43
 
The fundamental difference between Bourdieu’s concepts of strictly economic 
and symbolic capital lies in the fact that the self-interested nature of the former is obvious 
while that of the latter is latent.
44
  Practices that acquire symbolic capital must appear 
unselfish or unmotivated by considerations of personal advantage.  In military practices, 
for example, the power of command over individual soldiers often works best when it is 
masked or invisible, since orders that appear arbitrary and self-interested can provoke 
greater resistance.  The power of a superior officer relies on persuading inferiors to 
devote themselves to the superior’s interests, while at the same time masking the 
dissymmetry of the relationship.
45
  This “symbolic violence,” as Bourdieu called it, 
causes arbitrary relations of power to become misrecognized or euphemized as self-
evident and virtuous.
46
   
                                                                                                                                                 
Roman Empire: Production,” 543-569, in The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, 
W. Scheidel, I. Morris & R. Saller, eds. (Cambridge, 2007). 
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Bourdieu, Outline, 177. 
43
Swartz, Culture and Power, 42. 
44Moore, “Capital,” 103. 
45
Bourdieu, Outline, 181. Cf. Servan, Le Soldat Citoyen (1780), quoted in Foucault, Discipline and 
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Ibid., 167-169. Cf. Moore, “Capital” 104-105; Hoy, Critical Resistance, 64. Foucault (Discipline 
and Punish, 303) described this process as normalization.  Lendon (Empire of Honour, 23-24) suggests this 
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The Roman world arguably saw little distinction between symbolic and economic 
capital.  Although typically expressed in terms of social status, historians have long noted 
the various ways through which members of the Roman aristocracy sought to strengthen 
their prestige, which could be represented materially by the size and location of one’s 
domus, the size of one’s retinue of slaves and clients, or in the style and quality of one’s 
clothing.  Patron-client relationships, imperial cult, triumphs, and gladiatorial exhibitions 
– practices in the Roman world generally described in terms of an individual or group’s 
concern for dignitas, gloria, or honos –  were, among other things, socially or 
economically interested practices geared ever towards strengthening one’s social 
position.
47
   
Among the most important of these practices for the aristocracy was participation 
in warfare.  Military achievements were transposable (and often essential) to an 
aristocrat’s success in holding public offices, and even those who did not personally 
engage in hand-to-hand combat nonetheless earned praise for membership in a legion that 
secured a military victory.
48
  Roman emperors similarly sought to bolster their prestige 
through military practices.  Legionary worship of the emperors’ genii, depictions of the 
emperor in martial settings, and the personal presence of the emperor on military 
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campaign were practices intended to establish his broader, political authority over his 
soldiers, civilian subjects, and potential enemies.
49
   
Phang explicitly identifies Roman aristocratic goals and practices in warfare with 
Bourdieu’s concepts of social practices.50   The strategies of leadership described in the 
previous chapter, such as the commander being present near the front line or sharing his 
soldiers’ labours, for example, should be understood as forms of symbolic violence. 
Fundamental to these strategies was the promotion of a disciplinary ideology in the 
legions that rendered respect for authority (modestia), courage in battle (virtus) and 
prolonged physical work (labor) as virtues to be praised by all soldiers.
51
  In Phang’s 
scheme of Roman military authority, the corporal punishment that the centurion 
represented was a form of archaic and illegitimate cruelty at odds with the more rational, 
bureaucratic institution into which the legions had apparently transformed during the 
reigns of Augustus and his successors.  More to the point, such a direct, blunt form of 
domination conflicted with the more indirect, symbolic practices employed by the Roman 
elite. 
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On worship, see above, Chapter One, 45-46. Martial depictions of emperors include the 
Augustus of Prima Porta, the Cancelleria Relief of Domitian, the Column of Trajan, and the Arch of 
Septimius Severus at Rome. Cf. Campbell, Emperor and the Roman Army, 142-148. Presence on 
campaign: Caligula (Suet. Cal. 43), Claudius (Suet. Claud. 17), Trajan (Dio 68. 6-9), M. Aurelius (Dio 72. 
11), Septimius Severus (77. 11-15; Herod. 3. 8. 4-5). On the emperor’s relationship to the army more 
broadly, see Campbell, Emperor and the Roman Army, 6; Lendon, Empire of Honour, 250-260; Phang, 
Roman Military Service, 33-35, 108-109, 240. 
50Phang, however, generally avoids Bourdieu’s specific terminology, substituting “prestige” for 
symbolic capital, and “subordination” for symbolic violence, in order to avoid anachronism. See Roman 
Military Service, 34. 
51
See Roman Military Service, 155-162, 199-200, 201-226. On positive associations of discipline 
and conformity, see Sall. Cat. 11. 5-6; Cic. Cat. 2. 2. 10; Tac. Ann. 1. 16, 19, 28; Hist. 1. 5; 2. 19; Agric. 
16. 3-4 Dio 52. 14. 3; 76. 15. 2; Herod. 3. 8. 5. Cf. Campbell, Emperor and the Roman Army, 181-203; 
Mattern, Rome and the Enemy, 141. 
 112 
 
While Phang’s application of Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic practices in the 
Roman legions is innovative, there are several problems with this model of Roman 
military authority.  First, Bourdieu saw these two forms of violence (i.e., overt and 
symbolic) as neither separate nor contradictory, but interrelated and mutually supportive.  
As he asserts, “There is an intelligible relation – not contradiction – between these two 
forms of violence, which coexist in the same social formation and sometimes in the same 
relationship...this coexistence of overt, physical, economic violence and the most refined 
symbolic violence is found in all institutions characteristic of this economy, and at the 
heart of every social relationship.”52  To describe an opposition between formal and 
symbolic aspects of Roman disciplina, therefore, creates exactly the kind of crude 
distinction in social relations of power that Bourdieu refutes. 
 More problematically, Phang’s interpretation is based solely on perceptions of 
elite and imperial attitudes toward military virtues and identities, and how these 
ideologies were “imposed” on soldier and subject; it argues for a sort of ideological 
hegemony, a top-down understanding of structures and ideologies of power in which the 
subordinate or dominated groups are “socialized” into identifying with the established 
order and thereby reproducing its dominant position.
53
  The Roman army, however, 
should not be viewed as a monolithic institution with only a top-down ideology, with one 
group’s interests dictating the rest.54  There can be multiple forms of subjugation within a 
social group or institution, and they do not all begin at the center with the Roman 
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emperor and aristocratic elite.
55
  Roman military ideals and dispositions toward authority 
and leadership, rather, could be influenced by other ranks of the legions, and it may be 
this multiple application of symbolic violence at different levels which rendered the 
legions so formidably and persistently resilient.   
It is unclear what kind of “symbolic capital” legionary centurions might have 
sought according to Bourdieu’s scheme, and the prestige accrued from military 
achievements was certainly far more limited beyond centurions’ military careers than 
those of their aristocratic superiors.  While centurions were militarily and socially 
subordinate to the senatorial aristocracy and emperor, however, they nonetheless needed 
to express their own authority relative to their subordinates, and they thus contributed to 
how Roman military discipline and leadership in combat could be expressed.  What made 
their contribution particularly meaningful to the Roman military was their intermediate 
position between these bases of military authority. 
 
3.3.2 The Sword and the Stick 
To understand the ideological bases of the centurions’ military authority, we need 
to understand that all features of a centurion, from behaviour to physical appearance, 
were part of a military practice with long-term as well as immediate goals in asserting 
their intermediate position in the legions.  The centurions’ disciplinary functions and 
reputation are more obvious.  The execution or threat of physical punishment provided a 
vivid and effective method for centurions to assert their authority and subordinate their 
soldiers to the legionary hierarchy – a soldier obeyed because he was physically 
                                                 
55
On multiple directions of power, see Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 29-30. 
 114 
 
compelled to obey.  The vitis, therefore, became crucial to symbolizing the centurion’s 
disciplinary function, and the execution of that function acquired a sense of virtue, as 
well as social, religious, and political meaning – the centurion and his vitis, for all its 
coercive implications, nevertheless became a positive articulation of Roman authority. 
The less obvious but arguably more important method through which centurions 
asserted their authority in the legions, however, is illustrated best in their idealized 
behaviour in combat.  As combat officers, many of whom were former milites, centurions 
had to associate themselves with the interests of their subordinates, and sometimes paid a 
personal price in doing so.  The price for a middle-ranking officer went beyond the 
occasional gesture of shared labour, or distribution of booty from a commander – it 
required that centurions demonstrate that they possessed the very virtues that 
corresponded to their rank and status.
56
  Caesar’s account of Pullo goading his fellow 
centurion, Vorenus, into rushing into the enemy line of Nervii, colourfully illustrates this 
expectation.
57
  Centurions ideally earned their place in the legions by being the last to 
retreat, the first to scale a wall, or a willingness to throw themselves against an enemy 
when their own soldiers’ spirit was waning. 
 Of course, that combat officers were sometimes expected to fight and die as a 
duty of their rank is not a practice unique to Roman or even ancient armies.  As late as 
the Second World War, American company commanders led their units from the front, 
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and both they and their NCOs suffered casualties disproportionate to their soldiers.
58
  In 
evaluating American performance in the Second World War and the role of modern 
combat officers, however, Marshall even argued that they should not take unnecessary 
risks because of the negative effect on their soldiers’ morale:  
The small unit commander who practices self-exposure to danger in hopes of 
having a good moral effect on men, instead, frays the nerves of troops and most 
frequently succeeds in getting himself killed under conditions which do no earthly 
good to the army…A commander cannot rally his men by spectacular intervention 
in the hour when they have lost their grip if they have grown accustomed to 
seeing him run unnecessary risks in the average circumstances of battle.
59
 
 
This opinion appears to have been shared by American rank and file themselves.  
Soldiers both appreciated and expected their officers to lead by example and be willing to 
sacrifice themselves, but had no tolerance for recklessness or “glory hounds.”  Necessary, 
calculated risks were acceptable, but a dead officer cannot command anyone.
60
 
According to this assessment, a centurion’s competitive exploits in combat cannot inspire 
soldiers if they no longer seem extraordinary, or result in the centurion’s death. 
Roman centurions and soldiers, however, would likely have disagreed with this 
assessment, since there are not only immediate, tactical but also long-term, social 
consequences of these practices.  If one considers centurions’ exploits not merely as 
attempts to acquire individual gloria or inspire soldiers in specific battles, but as acts that 
were part of a continuing practice in asserting their military authority, such behaviour 
appears less wasteful.  For an intermediate officer who lacked his aristocratic 
counterpart’s ability to acquire soldiers’ obedience through appeals to ancestry, legal and 
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political authority, or the promise of land and great material rewards, such individual 
actions were critical to asserting his authority over his soldiers.  The cost of this practice 
to the legions and individual centurions could indeed be high, but arguably remained 
more economical when compared to the dangers facing centurions who relied too often 
on more brutal strategies in asserting their authority.   
What has been described by both ancient and modern writers as acts of altruistic 
leadership and competitive virtus, or the desire to promote the appearance of reciprocity 
with subordinates, therefore, were more complex in their goals.
61
  While a centurion’s 
decision to charge on the battlefield was affected by other factors, from the desire for 
personal glory to the rush of adrenaline before the onslaught of close-ordered combat, 
centurions perhaps also saw the need to use such exploits to fulfil expectations of their 
rank.
62
  This practice is characteristically similar to the normative strategies expressed in 
military theory, in that the centurion persuaded his soldiers to accept his dominant 
position and obey his orders through indirect means that masked his interests and goals.  
It was less immediate and direct than the threat of the vitis, but just as effective in 
asserting their position in the legionary hierarchy. 
Bourdieu’s warning against reducing certain social practices to “the irrationality 
of feeling or passion” is relevant here.  “Rational” is a highly idiosyncratic and contextual 
concept, and we should be cautious in limiting the centurions’ aggressive actions in 
combat strictly to the heedless virtus of a heroic fighter, or the unconscious product of a 
                                                 
61
On reciprocity, Lang, “Values,” 23, discusses the importance “equilibrium” or “what one gives 
to an organization and expects in return.” Cf. definition of “transactional leadership” in J. M. Burns, 
Leadership (New York, 1978), passim, esp. 4-20. 
62
On effect of the conditions of close-ordered battle in Greek and Roman warfare, see 
Goldsworthy, Roman Army at War, 191-227; Hanson, Western Way of War, 96-104. 
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primal Roman ferocia that more rational legionary commanders needed to harness and 
then steer in the right direction.
63
  As officers, centurions too were expected to understand 
the consequences of their actions for their personal authority, and to perform a role that 
strengthened the relationship between soldiers and commanding officers.   
This point also addresses the question as to whether a contradiction existed 
between the Roman ideals of virtus and disciplina.  The question is characteristically 
similar to a traditional subject for military leaders: How does one teach independent-
minded soldiers to exercise self-discipline and accept commands?  Put in another way, 
what is the correct balance between promoting individual judgment and initiative, yet 
also obedience, discipline, and unity?
64
  Marshall noted this earlier: “We say that we want 
men who can think and act. We are just as steadfast, however, in proclaiming that the 
supreme object in training is to produce unity in action.  These two aims are not mutually 
exclusive; in fact, they are the complementary halves of an enlightened battle 
discipline.”65 
The complementary aspect of Marshall’s “enlightened battle discipline” seems 
also to have been expected from Rome’s middle-ranking officers.  Valerius Maximus 
praises at length the brave deeds of Scaevius, a centurion in Caesar’s British expedition 
whom Caesar himself promoted.  The characteristics that Caesar emphasizes are 
instructive: 
                                                 
63On applying “rationality” to military practices, see Lee, “Warfare and Culture,” 1.  
64
See Kellett, Combat Motivation, 293, on finding line between “fear of misdirected violence and 
their recognition that if a man’s will to fight is the ultimate decider of battles, they should cultivate an 
aggressive spirit in their troops.” Cf. R. A. Herrera, “Self-Governance and the American Citizen as Soldier, 
1775-1861,” JMH 65.1 (2001), 35-39. 
65
Marshall, Men Against Fire, 133. Soldiers surveyed in the US Army about ideal traits in combat 
effectiveness rated “courage and coolness” two times higher that all other factors combined. Cf. R. A. 
Beaumont & W. P. Snyder, “Combat Effectiveness: Paradigms and Paradoxes,” in S. C. Sarkesian ed., 
Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military (Beverly Hills, 1980), 25. 
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You were great in battle, but even greater in recalling the disciplina of a soldier. 
And so, with your words and deeds honoured by one of the greatest judges of 
virtus, you were promoted to the centurionate.
66
 
 
Scaevius earned his promotion to the coveted centurionate by demonstrating 
simultaneously qualities in both forbearance and courage.  Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
projects this dual criterion for promotion to the centurionate back even to the age of the 
Roman monarchy: “Out of all the centuries those greatest in war were chosen as 
centurions, and each of them took care that their centuriae should be obedient to the 
orders they receive.”67  To contrast this praise, one needs to look no further than Caesar’s 
own criticism and demotion of three centurions during his African campaign a generation 
earlier: 
T. Salienus, M. Tiro, and C. Clusinus, you have risen in rank through my 
indulgence rather than your own courage, and having attained the rank, you have 
demonstrated neither excellence in war, nor good conduct in peace, and have been 
more enthusiastic in sedition and inciting your soldiers against your general than 
in showing forbearance and moderation. I therefore judge you unworthy of 
leading the ranks in my army….68 
 
Unlike Scaevius, the centurions Salienus, Tiro, and Clusinus had failed to demonstrate 
the twin ideals expected of their rank: individual bravery on the one hand, and 
forbearance and restraint on the other.
69
   
                                                 
66
 Val. Max. 3. 2. 23: magnus proelio, sed maior disciplinae militaris memoria. itaque ab optimo 
uirtutis aestimatore cum facta tum etiam uerba tua centurionatus honore d<on>ata sunt. 
67
 Dion. 4. 17. 4: λοχαγοὶ δ’ἐξ ἁπάντων ἐπιλεχθέντες οἱ γενναιότατοι τὰ πολέμια τοὺς ἰδίους 
ἕκαστοι λόχους εὐπειθεῖς τοῖς παραγγελλομένοις παρείχοντο. The Greek term λοχαγός alternates with 
the more precise ἑκατόνταρχος in describing centurions, in contrast to the alternate terms for tribune, 
ταξίαρχος and χιλίαρχος. Compare above passage with Dion. 11. 60. 5. See H. J. Mason, Greek Terms for 
Roman Institutions: A Lexicon and Analysis (Toronto, 1974), 163. 
68
 B Afr. 54: Tite Saliene M. Tiro C. Clusinas, cum ordines in meo exercitu beneficio, non virtute 
[sitis] consecuti ita vos gesseritis ut neque bello fortes neque pace boni aut utiles fueritis et magis in 
seditione concitandisque militibus adversum vestrum imperatorem quam pudoris modestiaeque fueritis 
studiosiores, indignos vos esse arbitror qui in meo exercitu ordines ducatis…. 
69
 Other examples of Caesar’s praised centurions for steadfastness as well as aggressiveness. See 
Caes. BG 2. 25; 5. 35; 6. 38-40.  
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The Roman military ideals of virtus and disciplina, therefore, while seemingly 
contradictory in their application, were nonetheless complementary in their objective, and 
were expected simultaneously from their middle-ranking officers.  This is nowhere more 
apparent than in the many funerary inscriptions to centurions from the late Republic and 
Principate.  The centurion is shown bearing the vitis in one hand and his gladius in the 
other, representing how his military authority relied on both discipline and bravery.
70
  
This representation differs from that of the combat officer of British army during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, who did not carry weapons, but bore a cane or 
“swagger stick,” with which he differentiated himself from his soldiers.71  Roman 
centurions during the Principate, in contrast, bore the sword and the stick, and they were 
praised for upholding the kind of courage and competitiveness idealized by Caesar, yet 
also the discipline and forbearance idealized earlier by Polybius.
72
 
 
3.4 Conclusion: An Intermediate Form of Military Authority 
As expectations for the centurionate reveal, Roman ideals of virtus and disciplina 
were not understood necessarily to be mutually exclusive or in conflict, either between 
ranks or within one.  Rather than being seen to embody a heroic virtus that existed in an 
adverse (if necessary) tension with the rational planning and disciplina of commanding 
officers, centurions in both textual and visual evidence appear to have been useful 
representations for an army that saw these virtues as both necessary and complementary 
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E.g., Appendix A, figs. 1-4. 
71
See Janowitz & Little, Sociology and the Military Establishment, 101. 
72
Discipline and forbearance: Frontin. Strat. 4.7.8; Jos. BJ 6. 262; Plut. Galba 18. 4, 26. 5; Otho 
13. 5; Tac. Ann. 1. 66; Hist. 1. 56; 3. 22; 4. 19; Veg. Mil. 2. 14. 3-8. Courage and competitiveness: Jos. BJ 
4. 37; 6. 81, 175; Tac. Ann. 15. 11; Hist. 3. 17; Val. Max. 3. 2. 23  Dio 68. 22b. 3; 79. 6.  
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in its centurions.
73
  Moreover, centurions were not strait-jacketed to one cultural ideal or 
the other.  Which style of leadership centurions adopted was determined at least as much 
by their own evaluation of their strength and position relative to their soldiers at a given 
time and place – their individual judgment – as on notions of broad development in 
Roman military culture from Republic to Principate.
74
  
The interpretation that an organizational strain between strategies of domination 
and manipulation existed in the Roman army and was detrimental to its functioning, 
moreover, mischaracterizes what were two differing strategies of asserting a Roman 
officer’s military authority.  The formal, coercive discipline described as “domination” 
still required consensus and persuasion, and had a broader intention than the punishment 
of an individual soldier.  Conversely, practices designed to persuade Roman soldiers to 
obey their centurions more indirectly, such as personal acts of valour in combat, although 
not overtly coercive, were nonetheless a form of domination – the goal of both strategies 
was the legionaries’ subordination and compliance.  Simply put, such categories as 
“normative” and “coercive” were not that far apart in Roman military thinking, and 
reinforced, rather than conflicted with, each other.   
Of course, as Caesar’s demotion of the three centurions in his African campaign 
demonstrates, a gap obviously existed between the ideal and reality of their behaviour – 
many centurions doubtless did not fit either ideal.  Rosenstein’s caution about 
extrapolating Roman soldiers’ behaviour from how it appears in literature is appropriate: 
“The point here is not to assert that Roman soldiers consistently lived up to these high 
                                                 
73
Goldsworthy Roman Army at War, 281. Cf. McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 303-304; Phang, 
Roman Military Service, 287. 
74See Lee, “Warfare and Culture,” 3: “culture provides a repertoire of choices; it does not limit 
individual possibility, but it shapes individual vision.” 
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ideals.  In many cases they probably did not.”75  Moreover, this dual image of the 
centurion comprises but a single and exhortative perspective of the rank that hardly tells 
the full story.   As Lynn might put it,
76
 there is a mismatch between discourse and reality, 
between the traditional centurion depicted in glorious hand-to-hand combat and the 
experienced officer during the Principate, who followed established military careers, 
enjoyed lavish pay and prospects relative to his soldiers, and performed many logistic and 
administrative tasks beyond the realm of warfare.  These aspects of the centurionate also 
helped to form its identity and authority, and need to be addressed.  The next chapter will 
begin by examining the centurionate as an institution in its own right, with distinct 
careers, criteria for promotion, levels of expertise, and corporate identity, and argues that 
the centurions formed the primary corps of officers in the Roman legions. 
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76
Lynn, Battle, xix-xxii. 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: Vir Militaris 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 A professional command structure is widely seen to be an essential component for 
any complex military institution.  By the Principate, although the Roman army comprised 
many positions above the rank of miles, each with separate titles, distinctions, and 
functions, there was no word in Latin for “officer,” and little evidence to suggest a 
Roman concept of a defined cadre of officers or “officer corps” that was distinct in status 
and function from the rank and file.  The apparent lack of such a structure in the Roman 
legions clearly raises questions concerning their organizational structure and ideological 
underpinnings, such as in what rank military expertise was concentrated, or whether 
ranks were distinguished primarily by social status, seniority, or merit. 
 Several reasons for the difficulty in describing officership in the Roman legions 
are readily apparent.  The most obvious is that the Roman army was never “built from 
scratch.”  In typically Roman fashion, rather than possessing any kind of constitution or 
organizational blueprint, its military institutions developed gradually from Republic to 
Principate in their organization, hierarchy of command, recruitment, and functions.  A 
larger problem, however, concerns just how to evaluate ranks in the Roman army 
according to criteria established through any but modern military definitions.  One such 
concept is the “officer corps” itself.  Some studies have had little problem in describing a 
Roman officer corps, although they might disagree on who comprised its membership.  
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Delbrück, for example, considered such a corps to have developed during the Second 
Punic War, but for him, the centurionate of the Principate best characterized officership.  
Smith, meanwhile, in his study of the army of the late Republic, limited that distinction to 
the legates, prefects, and tribunes.
1
  Others resist using the term entirely, defining the 
ranks instead more loosely as a “hierarchy of command,” or according to social status – 
an “officer class.”2  There is also disagreement about the use of the term “professional” 
when describing officers and soldiers in the Roman army.  Several studies have already 
questioned using such a term to describe offices and duties that should be understood as 
social rather than professional distinctions in the Roman world.
3
 
These challenges are nowhere more acute than in analyzing the centurionate.  
Scholars have struggled to define centurions consistently according to their prescribed 
duties, the size of the units under their command, or their perceived social status.  
Centurions have been associated with both modern combat and staff officers, as well as 
commissioned and non-commissioned officers (NCOs).  Their functions, meanwhile, 
have been equated with modern infantry ranks as varied as first sergeant, sergeant major, 
captain, major, and colonel.
4
  The variety of conclusions shows that these modern 
constructs can bring us no closer to answering fundamental questions about the structure 
of the legionary centurionate: What were the criteria for promotion to and within the 
                                                 
1
Delbrück, History of the Art of War I, 336-338; II, 162-163; Smith, Service in the Post-Marian 
Roman Army, 64. 
2
Hierarchy of command: Goldsworthy, Roman Army at War, 33-37, 116. Lendon, Soldiers and 
Ghosts, 220, 231, defines an officer class of senatorial and equestrian families distinct from the centurions, 
who were drawn from the humble background of the soldiers. 
3
E.g., Lendon, Empire of Honour, 21, 247. See also De Blois, “Army and Society,” 30; Alföldy, 
“Das Heer in der Sozialstruktur des Römischen Kaiserreiches” in Kaiser, Heer und Gesellschaft, 37. 
4
As NCO: Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 634. First Sergeant: Delbrück, History of the Art of 
War I, 429-436. Sergeant Major: Parker, The Roman Legions, 30-31. Captain, major, and colonel: Dobson, 
“The Empire” in Warfare in the Ancient World, J. Hackett ed., (London, 1989), 205; Brand, Roman 
Military Law, 52. Cf. Watson, The Roman Soldier, 87. 
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rank?  What level of skills and experience could they acquire, and how did this affect 
their place in the legion’s command structure?  Was there a unified understanding of the 
centurion’s status?  Answering these questions requires a closer examination of textual 
and epigraphic evidence of their careers, duties, and expectations.   
While the previous three chapters demonstrated how the centurionate helped to 
define Roman military ideals in discipline, combat, and leadership, the current chapter 
examines the centurions’ place in the legion’s command structure and their importance 
for understanding Roman attitudes towards officership.  First, it evaluates what criteria 
we must use in describing officership and professionalism in the Roman army of the late 
Republic and Principate.  It then compares the criteria for promotion to and within the 
centurionate with those of higher ranks in the legions, and evaluates the level of expertise 
and experience to be found in this rank.  Lastly, it demonstrates how the rank was defined 
by attractive material and social benefits, but also by unique traditions.  Altogether the 
chapter demonstrates that the legionary centurionate possessed levels of experience, 
expertise, and corporate identity that were unique in the Roman military command 
structure, and argues that those best described in modern terms as “officers” were to be 
found in the legions’ middle ranks. 
 
4.2 Criteria for a Professional Corps of Officers 
Military and sociological studies have proposed extremely vigorous definitions of 
professionalism that consider the concept according to its institutional forms (i.e., 
associations, licensure, and a code of ethics), in which professionals are identified by 
their exclusive possession and application of special skills or knowledge acquired 
 125 
 
through training.
5
  Huntington formulated arguably the most influential model for 
professional officership, which comprises three fundamental characteristics: expertise in 
a specialized skill or knowledge, corporateness, and responsibility to society at large.
6
  
Huntington’s model of military professionalism is widely adopted, and although it has 
been critiqued and occasionally revised, it commonly remains the starting point of 
discussion.
7
 
By most of these criteria, no Roman ranks of officers can be described as 
professional – the Roman world lacked such modern structures as educational institutions 
and a centralized state, as well as a high degree of standardization and bureaucratization.  
We should, however, be wary of such firm definitions that exclude all but the most 
modern institutions, to the detriment of our study of ancient ones.  Different societies 
conceive of professionalism or amateurism differently.
8
   
The label of “professional” has long been applied to the Roman military, but its 
beginnings and criteria are debated.  Earlier scholars argued that the great generals of the 
late Republic, such as Marius, Caesar, and Pompey, established the first professional 
armies, comprising an increasing number of volunteer soldiers who served for extended 
periods of time far from Italy.
9
  Other studies credit Augustus with professionalizing the 
                                                 
5
A. Abbott, The System of Professions (Chicago, 1988), 5-9. D. M. Snider, Army Professionalism, 
the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century (Carlisle, 1999), passim. 
6
Huntington, Soldier and the State, 8-18. 
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Cf. Janowitz & Little, Sociology and the Military Establishment, 45-46; Teitler, The Genesis, 6-7; 
J. W. Hackett, The profession of arms: the 1962 Lees Knowles lectures given at Trinity College, Cambridge 
(Washington, 1986), 3-4; H. Sørensen, “New Perspectives on the Military Profession: The I/O Model and 
Esprit de Corps Reevaluated,” AFS 20.4 (1994), 599-617; W. B. Skelton, “Huntington and the Roots of the 
American Military Tradition,” JMH 60.2 (1996), 325-338. 
8Naiden, “The Invention of the Officer Corps,” JHS 7.1 (2007), 40. 
9
E.g., Delbrück, History of the Art of War, 411-425, esp. 414; Parker, The Roman Legions, 36. 
Smith, Service in the Post-Marian Army, 64. 
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Roman army by establishing more consistent grades of pay, length of service, promotion, 
chain of command, and the use of the cohort as the primary tactical unit.
10
  Most scholars, 
however, see a gradual transformation to professionalism from the Republic to 
Principate.  As early as the second century BCE, soldiers such as Sp. Ligustinus, who 
continually volunteered for service in the Roman army and made it his permanent 
occupation, were “near-professionals.”  The reforms by the triumvirs, Augustus, and his 
immediate successors provided the institutional structures required to professionalize the 
army.
11
 
The debate as to which ranks of officer deserve to be called professional exists 
partly because none of these studies explicitly define their criteria for professionalism.  
For the most part, it seems that when contrasted with the term “amateur,” the term 
“professional” is used here synonymously with “primary occupation.”  In this sense, a 
Roman professional officer committed himself primarily to long-term service.  While this 
criterion distinguishes the established legions of the Principate from those that had been 
levied annually during the Republic, it does not attempt to distinguish officer from 
soldier.  It is perhaps more fruitful, therefore, to determine the existence of a corps of 
officers in the legions.  It its most basic form, a corps of officers includes the following 
components: a system of ranks, titles, and promotion based on merit and experience as 
well as social status; members often possessing technical expertise or training in specific 
tasks; a distinct group with its own identity within a society or military institution. 
                                                 
10E.g., Kiesling, “Corporal Punishment,” 242: “The early Principate completed the transformation 
of Roman legions into long-service professional army.” Cf. W. Eck, The Age of Augustus, 2nd Ed. (Malden, 
2007), 114-122; Phang, Roman Military Discipline, 3, 24; Dobson, “The Roman Army: Wartime or 
Peacetime Army?”, 111-128.  
11
Keppie, Making of the Roman Army, 55: “The Romans adopted professional attitudes to warfare 
long before the army had professional institutions.” Cf. Goldsworthy, Roman Army at War, 33-34. 
Maxfield, Military Decorations, 29. On Sp. Ligustinus, see Liv. 42. 34. 
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4.3 The Legions’ Commanding Officers 
Military service was a traditional role for the Roman aristocracy in the Republican 
period.  Down to the end of the second century BCE, a period of service (stipendium) of 
ten years was nominally required for future senators.
12
  Legates, those men of senatorial 
rank delegated by a consul or praetor to command parts of a legion for limited periods of 
time, only emerged in the late third to early second centuries BCE, as Roman armies 
campaigned increasingly farther away from Italy.  Legates were typically appointed by 
the senate according to a magistrate’s advice, and were usually in the course of a 
senatorial career, perhaps in between offices.  They often had limited military 
experience.
13
   
The next most senior officers of the middle to late Republic, the military tribunes, 
had to be at least of equestrian birth.  All tribunes were traditionally required to have 
served five years in the army, while more senior tribunes had served for ten years.
14
  
While the rank possessed great prestige, the tribunes’ duties appear to have been largely 
administrative.  They are described helping to select soldiers through the dilectus and 
maintaining general supervision of training and affairs in camp, such as directing the 
sacramentum and passing on orders and watchwords from commander to centurions.  
They are recorded most often giving advice in the legionary commander’s council 
                                                 
12
A .R. Birley, “Senators as Generals” in Kaiser, Heer und Gesellschaft, 98. 
13
Cf. Keppie, Making of the Roman Army, 39-40. 
14
Polyb. 6. 19. 1. 
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(consilium).
15
  Their function in battle, however, is unclear.  Young tribunes of the early 
Republic are recorded engaging in individual combat, and suffered high casualties in 
military catastrophes.
16
  They are also seem occasionally to have been given temporary 
commands over legions and detachments, as well as communicating the commander’s 
orders in battle to individual maniples or cohorts.
17
  These latter practices, however, 
became rarer by the second century BCE, when legates were increasingly prominent.  
Tactically speaking, moreover, it is clear that it was the duty of centurions rather than 
tribunes to command the maniples or cohorts in battle.
18
   
Augustus and his imperial successors reformed and regulated many elements of 
the military hierarchy, including, finally, the assignment of individual commanders to the 
legions.
19
  Although legions became permanently commissioned, with their own names, 
symbols, and traditions, the part-time structure of the higher ranks remained.  Until the 
Severan dynasty,
20
 the legateship remained exclusively for senators who were appointed 
by the emperor himself.  Their commands seldom lasted longer than two years.
21
  
Granted, there are examples of commanders who spent longer periods of their career in 
military service.  Some men, such as Cn. Domitius Corbulo, Cn. Julius Agricola, and 
                                                 
15
Dilectus and camp administration: Polyb. 6. 19-26, 33-39; 10. 20. 1; Liv. 22. 38; 26. 51; 44. 33. 
Consilia: Polyb. 8. 7. 5; 11. 25; Caes. BG 4. 23; 5. 28; Liv. 25. 23. On training, see below, Chapter Five, 
182-184. 
16
Hand-to-hand combat: Liv. 7. 9-10; 7. 26; Caes. B Hisp. 25. Casualties; Liv. 10. 20; 21. 59; App. 
Mithr. 89; Caes. BG 5. 15. See Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts, 219, n. 14. 
17
Polyb. 14. 3; 18. 21; Liv. 7. 34; 8. 25; 10. 14; 44. 36. Caes. BG 2. 26; BC 1. 21. 
18
Polyb. 6. 24; Liv. 25. 14. Cf. See Keppie, Making of the Roman Army, 39-40. 
19This development followed Caesar’s ad hoc use of legates in the Gallic and Civil Wars. See 
Maxfield, Military Decorations, 23; Keppie, Making of the Roman Army, 132-136. 
20
Increasing numbers of equites began to occupy commands and governorships under Septimius 
Severus. See Campbell, Emperor and the Roman army, 404-408. Cf. Smith, “The Army Reforms of 
Septimius Severus,” Historia 21. 3 (1972), 481-500. 
21
Cf. G. Alföldy, Epigraphische Studien III (Köln, 1967), 85; Campbell, “Who Were the Viri 
Militares?”, JRS 65 (9175), 19. 
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Julius Quadratus Bassus, held more than one command and acquired reputations for their 
military abilities.
22
  These commanders, however, appear to have been the exception 
rather than the rule.
23
   
Legions now had six military tribunes, one of whom was of senatorial rank 
(laticlavus) and the other five equestrian (angusticlavii).  Both typically held this rank in 
their legion for one year only.
24
  The senatorial tribunate required no prior military 
experience.  It seems to have existed primarily as an opportunity for young aristocrats to 
acquire some military experience (prima rudimenta) before moving on to higher public 
offices and military commands.
25
  Equestrian tribunes typically served as commanders of 
auxiliary cohorts before becoming tribune, so they possessed some prior military 
experience.
26
  Their duties appear to have remained largely administrative, including 
supervising official discharge of soldiers, overseeing distribution of food and supply, and 
leading major religious ceremonies in camp.
27
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Heer Kommentar zu Aemilius Macer, Dig.XLIX, xvi, 12,2” in The Equestrian Officers, 1-15.  Cf. Roth, 
Logistics, 273. On short tenure of tribunate, see Campbell, “Who Were the Viri Militares?”; Gilliver, “The 
Augustan Reform,” 190. 
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In a speech ascribed to C. Marius, Sallust criticizes the amateurish nature of the 
late Republican system by having Marius compare his military experience with that of 
more aristocratic candidates: 
I pray you, ponder well whether it would be better to change your minds and send 
on this or any similar errand one of that cluster of nobles, a man of ancient lineage 
and many ancestral portraits—but no campaigns; with the result that, no doubt, 
being wholly in ignorance of the duties of such an office, he might hurry and 
bustle about and select someone among the people to act as his adviser. In fact, it 
very often happens that the man whom you have selected as a commander looks 
about for someone else to command him.
28
 
 
Sallust’s assessment has given fodder for continued debate in current scholarship 
concerning whether or not there was a regular scheme of promotion for higher officers, 
and just how “amateurish” were such officers.  Historians as early as Delbrück have 
emphasized the amateurism of the higher commands with the professionalism of lower 
ranks such as the centurionate, and have argued that the commander was more or less 
interchangeable.
29
  This assessment goes too far, since it ignores the important actions 
that legionary commanders performed before battle (e.g., reconnaissance, forming the 
line of battle) as well as more intangible elements in leadership that could prove crucial 
in battles.  As Goldsworthy notes, legions with experienced soldiers and lower officers 
were still likely to lose battles if their commanders were weak.
30
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F. E. Adcock, The Roman Art of War under the Republic (Harvard, 1940), 101; Delbrück, 
History of the Art of War, 429-436. 
30
Reconnaissance: Caes. BG 1. 21-22; 5. 36 Frontin. Strat. 1. 2; Jos. BJ 5. 52-53; 7. 190; Arr. Tact. 
1; Dio 68. 31. 3. Line of battle: Caes. BG 1. 24-25; Frontin. Strat. 2. 3; Arr. Tact. 12; See Goldsworthy, 
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Others have argued that patronage (particularly by the emperor) played a more 
important role than seniority or merit in promoting tribunes and legates.  While 
acknowledging that career patterns exhibit certain regularities, Saller and Campbell have 
argued that there is little evidence to suggest any scheme based on seniority and merit 
(which in itself is difficult to evaluate), or that there was any deliberate attempt to ensure 
regular experience.  Many men of equestrian and senatorial background were fast-tracked 
to commands through their relationships with the imperial family.
31
  The desirable 
qualities for such officers as described in official and personal correspondence by such 
authors as Pliny and Fronto generally emphasized competence, loyalty, education, and 
“charm” more than military experience or expertise.32   
James has taken this argument the furthest, arguing that, as part of wider Roman 
society, a system of patronage was crucial to determining promotion and military 
authority not only among the equestrian and senatorial ranks, but all levels.  Using the 
eighteenth century British navy as his model, James argues that personal interest between 
patron and client (i.e., officer and soldier) was accepted as normal, and by no means 
necessarily detrimental to an officer’s authority.  “All officers,” James argues, “were 
inevitably placed in the position of patrons of their men, and were expected to look after 
their interests and to see that they were rewarded materially for their loyalty and zeal; 
                                                 
31
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senatorischen Laufbahn, dar gestellt an der Zeit von 69 bis 138 n. Chr.”, ANRW II.1 (1974), 158-228. 
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Aug. 88. On the “gentlemanly” traits of commanders, see Birley, “The Commissioning of Equestrian 
Officers,” in Documenting the Roman Army, 1-18; Stoll, “Offizier und Gentleman,” 144-145. 
 132 
 
their authority, and sometimes even their lives, depended on their ability to fulfill this 
role, as much as on discipline or any other factor.”33 
Other studies, however, have strongly argued against the idea of the amateurish 
Roman officer or that the Roman legions lacked formal career patterns or criteria for 
promotion.  Imperial legates had to govern their province as well as command their 
legions, so that tactical expertise was hardly the only criterion for the post.  “Merit,” 
expressed as experience serving as commander or tribune and success in military 
campaigns, moreover, seems to have helped one’s promotion, and if war or major 
campaigns were a possibility, emperors might select and transfer qualified men with 
care.
34
  Birley has shown evidence for some regularity in appointment, particularly in 
regions such as Britain, which required men of greater military experience.  Finally, 
Romans would not have understood the distinction between such modern concepts as 
amateur and professional, and we can hardly refer to Roman commanders as amateurs, 
since no military academy existed anywhere to train commanders until modern times.
35
 
Neither interpretation can be confirmed because of the limitations of our 
evidence.  Members of the Roman aristocracy rose through both the traditional, senatorial 
careers as well as through the more rapid posts offered personally by the emperor.  While 
some of these candidates theoretically could have acquired the skills and knowledge 
suitable to their posts, however, our sources give no sense of formal criteria either during 
                                                 
33James, “Writing the Roman Legions,” 40-41. Cf. Rome and the Sword, 169. His use of the 
British navy as parallel is based on interpretation by Rodger, Wooden Walls, 274-303. See, however, D. K. 
Benjamin & A. Tifrea, “Learning by Dying: Combat Performance in the Age of Sail,” JEH 67.4 (2007), 
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the early or later imperial period, and what criteria did exist were likely hard to enforce.
36
  
Whatever the experience or skills that some men acquired before reaching the senior 
military offices, the reality remains that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the 
Roman army ever developed a system of promotion or training for its equestrian and 
senatorial officers.  Although commanders could consult military treatises and acquire 
advice from more experienced lower officers, there was “no formal process for educating 
officers in ordnance, tactics, and strategy, and no systematic means for testing the quality 
of aspirants to top commands.”37  What is more, the limited tenure of a legionary 
command and the high number of men who occupied the rank prevented the Roman 
military from developing an experienced pool of high-ranking officers, such as the 
“Royal Companions” (ἑταῖροι) of Macedonian kings.38   
Indeed, the absence of such an institution during the Principate was likely 
intentional.  Emperors by no means wished to develop a corps of experienced, expert 
commanding officers comprising equestrian or senatorial men, since such officers could 
become too popular or powerful and thereby threaten the authority and position of the 
emperor.
39
  In this sense, while some Roman aristocrats of the Principate did have a 
“military career” of sorts, most were, in all but the strictest sense of the term, amateurs in 
                                                 
36Eck, “Professionalität als Element der politisch-administrativen und militärischen Führung. Ein 
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respect to their criteria for promotion, experience, length of their service, and identity as a 
distinct group. 
 The higher ranks of the legions, therefore, were defined primarily according to 
social status and comprised men of generally limited military experience.  That the 
Roman army had no training or standardized career structure for its higher ranks does not 
mean, however, that it had no corps of officers.  The lack of any defined high command 
necessarily placed a greater burden on the skills and experience of the legions’ middle-
ranking officers.  As early as the middle Republic, centurions such as the legendary Sp. 
Ligustinus were choosing to make the army not only their career, but also their chief 
means of self-identification.
40
  Tacitus later tended describe such individuals as “military 
men” (viri militares), and he applied this title less to senators like Corbulo than to those 
centurions who had risen to the rank of primuspilus.
41
  Unlike legates and tribunes, 
moreover, comparatively regular criteria and avenues of promotion developed for 
centurions.  What skills or knowledge that they could not gain by an education through a 
military academy, many were nonetheless obliged to gain instead through decades of 
daily practice.
42
 
 
4.4 The Centurionate as a Corps of Officers 
4.4.1 Careers and Promotion 
Establishing the existence and development of a Roman military career structure 
for the more junior ranks of the Roman legions during the Republic and Principate has 
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occupied scholars of the Roman military since the nineteenth century.  There are no 
extant diaries of Roman soldiers, and no literary or epigraphic evidence has revealed the 
existence of a single, mandated or strictly-defined set of standards for promotion and 
transfer within the legions.  Despite the notoriety of the Roman army’s record-keeping in 
administrative accounts and rosters, moreover, details actually appear to have been rather 
flexible or inconsistent, depending on the period and location.
43
  In attempting to build 
schemes for Roman military careers, therefore, scholars have been obliged to compile 
epigraphic evidence from broad geographic and chronological sources that detail 
individual careers.
44
  This in itself is potentially a problem, since different legions across 
the empire might have varied in their organization and promotion practices.  As James 
has argued, there was arguably no single, monolithic “Roman army,” but rather many 
armies.
45
 
In addition to the caution needed for drawing conclusions from such a broad 
spectrum of evidence, it should also be remembered that soldiers and officers might 
choose to omit aspects of their careers in commemorative inscriptions, making it even 
more difficult to discern how they rose to their position.
46
  As we shall see, the 
centurionate presents a particular challenge because of the variety in centurions’ 
backgrounds and careers, especially during the Principate.   
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Evidence on diligent record-keeping in Veg. Mil. 2. 19 and Ulpian, Dig. 39. 1. 42 is supported by 
Watson, The Roman Soldier, 53. See, however, Phang, “Military Documents, Languages, and Literacy” in 
Companion to the Roman Army, 286-305.   
44
Prominent works in this vein include Domaszewski, Die Rangordnung, and articles in E. Birley, 
The Roman Army: Papers, 1929-1986 (1988); M. P. Speidel Roman Army Studies (1984); D. J. Breeze & 
B. Dobson, Roman Officers and Frontiers (1993); M. A. Speidel, Heer und Herrschaft im römischen Reich 
der hohen Kaiserzeit (2009). On centurions in particular, see Dobson, Die Primipilares; Summerly, 
“Studies in the Legionary Centurionate”; Richier, Centuriones ad Rhenum.  
45James, “Writing the Legions,” 38-39. 
46
Maxfield, Military Decorations, 184; Lendon, Empire of Honour, 247. See also above, Chapter 
Two, n. 118. 
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During the mid-late Republic, centurions were not appointed as permanent 
officers, but were chosen together with their soldiers for Rome’s army through the annual 
levy (dilectus).  While the exact workings of this process are obscure to us, ancient 
literary sources suggest that the military tribunes had assigned soldiers according to their 
four classes of age and wealth (velites, hastati, principes, triarii).  The latter three classes 
each elected twenty centurions, each pair of whom led maniples of 60 to 120 men, while 
the most prestigious of all centurions, the primuspilus, joined the commander’s body of 
advisors (officium).
47
     
Military experience and a reputation for personal bravery are cited by ancient 
authors as the primary factors in the selection of centurions in the Republican period.
48
  
While Dionysius attributes the origin of the dilectus all the way back to Rome’s 
monarchy, his depiction of centurions, like those of Livy, often reflects his own time 
during the first century BCE.
49
  Despite Livy’s record of the complaints by centurions for 
being recruited into new campaigns without recognition of their prior position, there is no 
evidence to suggest that any standard or coherent system of promotion for centurions 
existed in the Republican army.  Even for those centurions during this period who 
volunteered for additional campaigns, there was no guarantee that they would occupy the 
same rank as before.
50
  It was only during the initial stages of the Principate, as part of the 
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general reforms of the army under Augustus, that more consistent patterns of promotion 
to the centurionate seem to have developed. 
There appear to have been many criteria for entry into the centurionate during the 
Principate.  As discussed previously in Chapter Two, promotion for martial exploits and 
general acts of bravery remained an important factor.  Ancient authors record many 
soldiers promoted to the centurionate for courage in combat (ob virtutem), while 
centurions themselves recorded their promotion according to brave exploits (ex fortia).
51
  
When Germanicus was compelled to revise the list of his legions’ centurions in the 
aftermath of the Rhine mutiny in CE 14, the number of a centurion’s military campaigns 
and decorations was made an important criterion for him to remain in service.
52
 
There is abundant evidence, however, that some men became centurions through 
social connections.  As early as the late Republic, Cicero mentions the centurionate being 
put up for sale by Roman commanders.
53
  While Cicero depicted such promotions as 
either shameful or reflective of darker times, the practice hardly seems uncommon, 
particularly during the Principate.  Pliny is quite casual in describing how he secured a 
position in the centurionate for a friend, Metilius Crispus, although he remains vague in 
how he did so.  There is no evidence that Crispus had prior military experience.
54
  
Epigraphic sources suggests that many centurions were recruited directly from civilian 
life (ex paganus).  One such centurion was directly appointed to the centurionate at only 
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eighteen years of age.
55
   Obviously, he had not acquired much (if any) training and 
experience.  Former magistrates of local city councils (ordines decurionum) and men of 
equestrian rank who joined the centurionate (ex equite Romano) are especially common 
among these centurions who are directly promoted from civilian positions.
56
  Patronage 
and social connections, therefore, do not appear to have been viewed as an illegitimate 
way to secure a position in the centurionate.
57
   
That said, epigraphic evidence clearly suggests that the majority of centurions 
were promoted by rising through various ranks below the centurionate in the legions and 
other military branches.
58
  First among these was the rank of immunis.  These soldiers 
were not offered higher pay, and the position did not technically entail a promotion, but 
they were privileged because the rank exempted soldiers from heavier fatigues (munera 
graviora).
59
  After serving as an immunis, a soldier then might join the rank of 
principales.  Perhaps representing a closer parallel in both status and duties to modern 
NCOs, these subaltern officers received increased pay and had specific administrative 
and combat duties.  Most prestigious and well understood today are the standard-bearer 
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(signifer) and eagle-bearer (aquilifer).  Other ranks, however, whose exact functions are 
unclear, include “staff orderly” (beneficiarius), scout (speculator), officer of the 
watchword (tesserarius), and a “senior administrative clerk” (cornicularius).60  Highest 
in rank below the centurionate was the centurion’s own deputy and second in command 
of his centuria, the optio.  Achieving this rank seems to have marked a soldier for 
promotion to the next available vacancy in the centurionate.
61
 
While the majority of centurions rose through legionary ranks, additional military 
avenues were available.  Some men were promoted directly to the centurionate from the 
legionary auxilia, as well as the vigiles, urban cohorts, and the Praetorian Guard.
62
  
Promotion to the legionary centurionate sometimes also involved temporary transfer to 
other units.  One could, for example, serve as an officer in the auxilia (e.g., decurion) 
before transfer back to the legions and promotion to the centurionate.
63
 
The more clerical duties of the centurionate, including requisitioning supplies, 
assigning duties and fatigues, correspondence between outposts, and approving transfers 
ensured that literacy must have been an important criterion for promotion.
64
  The 
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evidence suggests, indeed, that many centurions, particularly in the African and the 
eastern provinces, seem able to write in both Latin and Greek.
65
  Their duties in 
organizing the construction of camps and other physical structures, moreover, also called 
for some knowledge in a variety of rudimentary technical skills in engineering.
66
  This 
was especially true for anyone hoping to become camp prefect (praefectus 
castrorum/legionis).  As the legions took on more constabulary functions, therefore, a 
general goal seems to have been to provide most prospective centurions with training in 
both military and administrative tasks.
67
   
There appear to have been several levels of promotion within the centurionate 
itself.  By the period of Caesar at the latest, it was common for legions to be organized 
into cohorts rather than maniples, and by the Flavian period, the legion assumed the form 
it would more or less maintain for two centuries.
68
  Legions had a nominal strength of 
4500-5000 soldiers, divided into ten cohorts.  The tenth to the second cohorts comprised 
six centuriae, each nominally comprising eighty soldiers and commanded by a centurion.  
The centurions in each of these cohorts were given symbols and titles according to their 
position in the line: hastatus posterior, hastatus prior, princeps posterior, princeps prior, 
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pilus posterior, and pilus prior.
69
  The first cohort of a Roman legion, however, seems to 
have been larger, with a strength of 800 soldiers divided among only five centuriae.  Its 
centurions, the primi ordines, were the most prestigious in the legion, and they received 
double the pay of the other centurions.
70
   
The most senior member of the primi ordines was the primuspilus.  Epigraphic 
evidence suggests that this was only a one-year appointment, although it could be held 
more than once.
71
  In addition to leading their centuria in the first cohort, they had several 
responsibilities in provisioning the legion and supervising training.
72
  It was an extremely 
prestigious rank, since it offered even greater pay (roughly sixty times that of a legionary) 
and held the honour of being strongly associated with the legion’s aquila.  Perhaps most 
importantly to a soldier who had risen through the ranks, the position guaranteed 
enrolment into the equestrian class upon completion of service.
73
  Because of the 
opportunity to rise in social class, the title of primuspilus itself was special.  While it 
could not be inherited, it was nonetheless commonly referenced when honouring sons, 
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sons-in-law, and other descendants.  Like the title of consularis, it defined the centurion 
permanently, regardless of a change in wealth or transition to a civilian career.
74
 
 By the reign on Claudius, former primipili (primipilares)
75
 could also undertake a 
second career of sorts.  Many served immediately after as the praefectus castrorum.  Our 
evidence for this officer’s duties is limited, but it appears that he was third in rank to the 
legate and laticlavus tribune during the Principate.  According to Vegetius, he oversaw 
camp construction and maintenance, sanitation, artillery, and other logistic tasks.
76
  Their 
proven loyalty and long service also made primipilares only candidates for important 
military positions at Rome, such as the tribunes and prefects of the Praetorian Guard, 
vigiles, and urban cohorts.  After this, they could become primuspilus for the second time 
(primuspilus bis or iterum).  Those few who reached this rank were favoured for some of 
the most important (and desirable) equestrian appointments, such as the imperial 
procuratorships, and the prefecture of Egypt.
77
 
The system of promotion within the levels of the centurionate is unclear.  
Following Vegetius (Mil. 2. 21), earlier scholars argued for a schematic system of 
promotion, whereby one began as a centurion in the tenth cohort, and would be promoted 
through each consecutive cohort until reaching the primi ordines.
78
  Doubts have been 
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raised that such a schematic system of promotion existed, however, since there is no 
evidence for differentiation between the centurions of the tenth and second cohorts in pay 
or status.
79
  It is more likely that the centurions of the second to tenth cohorts were equal 
in rank, yet differed in seniority.  Promotion within the centurionate, then, amounted 
primarily to reaching the primi ordines and, finally, the primuspilus.
80
 
Courage in combat seems to have remained important for promotion within the 
centurionate, and commanders are known to have promoted centurions to primuspilus for 
specific martial exploits during both the late Republic and Principate.
81
  Opportunities for 
many centurions to demonstrate their bravery in combat to their superiors, however, must 
have been limited by the declining frequency of major military campaigns during the 
Principate.   
Epigraphic evidence indicates that an important criterion for promotion to 
primuspilus was seniority through length of service.  Unlike the equestrian and senatorial 
officers above them, as well as the milites below, there was no limit to the centurions’ 
term of service in the Principate.  A miles enlisted in the ranks for up to twenty-five years 
of service before honourable discharge (honesta missio).  According to the author of the 
Historia Augusta, Hadrian felt compelled to issue an edict concerning the length of 
service in the legions: 
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Furthermore, with regard to the length of military service, he issued an order that 
no one should violate ancient usage by being in service at an earlier age than his 
strength warranted, or at a more advanced one than common humanity 
permitted.
82
 
 
In most cases of centurions receiving honesta missio, however, they do not mention any 
fixed term of service.
83
  Many were definitely not discharged after twenty-five years, but 
served well beyond that duration, some even into their sixties, seventies, and even 
eighties.
84
  The youngest attested primuspilus was already forty-nine, while the oldest 
was seventy-eight.
85
  Juvenal jokes about sexagenarians still waiting for promotion to the 
position.
86
 
While centurions are counted among many cities’ magistrates and benefactors, as 
time went on, there seem to have been fewer than might be expected for men of their 
status and potential wealth on retirement.  We can speculate that this is at least partly 
because the length of service for centurions might have left some too elderly to embark 
on much of a municipal career.  Some centurions, indeed, apparently did not retire at 
all.
87
  For milites, death during military service has been estimated at roughly fifty 
                                                 
82
HA, Hadr. 10. 8: De militum etiam aetatibus iudicabat, ne quis aut minor quam virtus posceret, 
aut maior quam pateretur humanitas, in castris contra morem veterem versaretur, agebatque, ut sibi 
semper noti essent, et eorum numerus sciretur. 
83
CIL II 4514; III 6234; 12411; VIII 2354; 7080; AE 1924, 85. 
84
Seventy years old: T. Flavius Virilis (CIL VIII 2877; ILS 2653). Eighty: Petronius Fortunatus 
(CIL VIII 217; ILS 2658). Cf. Goldsworthy, Roman Army at War, 32; Birley, “Promotions and Transfers” 
in Roman Army Papers, 219-220.  
85
ILS 2461 and CIL III 11301. On duration of centurionate and ages, see esp. Richier, Centuriones, 
512-514; Birley, “Promotions and Transfers,” 219-220. 
86
Juv. 14. 197-198: ut locupletem aquilam tibi sexagesimus annus / adferat. See also Suet. Cal. 44. 
1, in which Caligula gives forced pensions to many old primipili for being “too old and infirm.” Cf. 
Dobson, “The Primipilares,” 141-145. 
87Dobson, “The Centurionate and Social Mobility,” 104-105. 
 145 
 
percent.
88
  That centurions served longer than the standard missio, however, and were not 
only exposed to the same conditions as milites but in battle could suffer casualties 
disproportionate to their number, suggests that death rather than discharge terminated the 
military service for many.  More than any officer, centurions were wedded to the army – 
the centurionate was quite literally a lifetime career. 
The primipilate, therefore, can be interpreted somewhat as the “cherry on the 
cake” – the reward for long devotion and service to the legions.  The average age of those 
who reached this prestigious position has two implications for promotion in the 
centurionate.  First, the primipili during the Principate were potentially very different 
from those of the Republic, such men such as Baculus and Crastinus, whom Caesar 
describes fighting with such vigor.
89
  This is not to say that all primipili during the 
Principate were necessarily too old to fight properly, since these officers are still attested 
fighting and dying in battle.
90
  Moreover, while the thought of men of such age actively 
fighting in the modern military would seem impossible, older commanders, officers, and 
soldiers who participated actively in combat are commonly attested in the Greek world as 
well, and, in some cases, such men even formed elite units.
91
  Still, we may guess that 
older primipili were likely more common in quieter areas of the empire, and the prestige 
of the rank during the Principate appears to have been more closely associated with 
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experience and long service than with the martial exploits of their Republican 
predecessors.
92
 
Second, that seniority played a critical role in the ascension to the highest ranks of 
the centurionate suggests also that the kind of patronage that accelerated the military 
careers of many aristocrats through the higher ranks was less important to promotion 
through centurionate.  Younger, direct appointees to the post from among equites and 
local community magistrates were common, but these men hardly fit the image of the 
high-ranking centurions who had served in one fashion or another for decades.  The most 
prestigious ranks of the centurionate seem not to have been reserved for fast-tracking 
equestrians, but for those men who had advanced through the ranks and devoted most of 
their lives in loyal military service to the emperor. 
Alföldy has argued that one’s rank in legionary hierarchy, expressed through 
duties, privileges, and corporate characteristics, corresponded with one’s position in the 
social hierarchy of the civilian society.
93
  This seems to have been only true to a point, 
however, since the centurionate does not fit well with this scheme because of both its 
varied composition and criteria for promotion.  Unlike the higher officers and lower 
legionary ranks, whose membership was strictly defined by social status, the centurionate 
included men of both equestrian and non-equestrian status.  It comprised a variety of 
officers with different skills and social backgrounds, some of whom had risen through the 
lower ranks because of their martial prowess, technical skills, or seniority, while others 
through social connections.  Although evidence suggests that there was not a single, 
predetermined path of promotion either to the rank or within it, the greater emphasis on 
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experience and seniority than social status likely ensured that the majority of regular 
centurions had served for well over a decade in various ranks and functions, with many 
senior centurions remaining in military service for most of their lives.
94
  The potential 
experience and expertise to be found in this group, moreover, were crucial to Roman 
legionary command structure.  
 
4.4.2 Military Expertise 
Almost any definition of officership requires that its members possess a relatively 
high level of expertise in some field.  For centurions of the Republican period, this 
expertise lay primarily in the experience acquired through marching and fighting in 
formation that they had gained through service in the rank and file.  The increasing 
diversity in the legions’ activities and in its soldiers’ careers during the Principate, 
however, illustrates how many centurions were now assuming logistic and clerical 
responsibilities that required expertise in areas beyond hand-to-hand combat.  While the 
broad array of the centurion’s more “administrative” responsibilities during the Principate 
will be addressed in the sixth chapter, their increasingly prominent role in military 
leadership is relevant here to evaluating their status as a corps of officers.   
Despite Livy’s idealized portrayal of grizzled, veteran centurions such as 
Ligustinus, many centurions during the middle Republic were often still the same age or 
even younger than the tribunes and consuls who commanded their legions.  During the 
later Republic, however, this trend reversed, and centurions’ experience and continuity of 
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service became vital as increasingly younger and less experienced tribunes served in the 
military for no longer than three years.
95
  A vivid example of this discrepancy is recorded 
by Pliny the Elder.  In 102 BCE, the soldiers in a legion under the command of Q. 
Lutatius Catulus were in a panic and cut off from retreat by the marauding Cimbri.  Cn. 
Petreius Atinas, the legion’s primuspilus, was forced to kill the tribune whose indecision 
was endangering the legion, and he then single-handedly led it to safety.  Rather than 
being punished by Catulus for killing his superior officer, Atinas was awarded the rarest 
decoration of the Roman military at the time: the corona graminea.  According to Pliny 
the Elder, this was the only recorded occurrence in which the decoration was awarded to 
an officer below the tribunate.
96
   
The story of Atinas’ “fragging” of his commanding officer is extraordinary in 
itself, but it also highlights what was becoming an increasingly common disparity in 
experience between many tribunes and centurions during the late Republic.
97
  By early 
the Principate, the average age of new recruits to the legions was now between eighteen 
to twenty-two years, and most men promoted through the ranks to the centurionate had 
already served between thirteen to twenty years.  Promotion to the centurionate beyond 
this age appears to have been rare.
98
   
Arguably the most valuable area of military expertise for centurions was their 
ability to deploy and maintain the cohesion of their units in battle.  While some 
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commanders are portrayed as fighting with their soldiers, most placed themselves behind 
the line in order to change orders in the course of battle and direct reserves as needed.
99
  
Roman military treatises stress that legions had divisions, each with their names, 
numbers, and officers, primarily so that they might receive new orders quickly.  The 
legionary commander was to give every order or countersign through his officers rather 
than by himself.  To do otherwise, Arrian asserts, demonstrates a commander’s 
inexperience.
100
  Roman commanders usually gave orders through music (horns), 
messengers (by horse), and visual gestures (fires and standards).
101
  Commanders could 
also convey orders vocally, if close enough to their soldiers.
102
  In any case, legionary 
officers below the commander were clearly essential to communicating and executing 
these orders. 
Just how the manipular system functioned in Republican warfare is confusing.  
While centurions commanded the two halves of each maniple, it is unclear if any one 
officer had general command over each entire maniple.
103
  Tactically, the maniples were 
designed primarily for a straightforward advance and crash into enemy lines in an open 
space.  The cohort system, however, which was fully developed by the time of Caesar 
and appears to have become dominant during the Principate, was far more flexible and 
organized, and could deal with smaller groups of concentrated enemies in more difficult 
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terrain.
104
  It is in this system that centurions became essential not only in communicating 
but in executing tactics on the battlefield. 
Legionary soldiers did not identify themselves in inscriptions by their cohort, 
however, and unlike other Roman military divisions, the cohort had no genius in military 
cult.
105
  As Isaac has noted, moreover, if the cohort was primarily a tactical rather than 
administrative unit, then why, unlike the legion, centuria, auxiliary cohort and cavalry 
wing (ala), did it not have its own commanding officer?  Despite the shift from maniple 
to cohort the centurions continued to be designated in manipular terms, that is, hastati, 
principes, and pilani.
106
  Goldsworthy, among others, has attempted to solve this problem 
by positing the most senior centurion of each cohort (pilus prior or primuspilus) as its 
nominal commander.
107
   
There is insufficient evidence, however, to conclude that the senior centurion led 
each cohort, that cohorts operated very independently on the battlefield, or that there was 
an intervening officer between the legate and centurions.  In modern military terms, when 
deployed in cohorts, the legion had a regimental colonel and fifty-nine captains or 
company commanders, but no battalion commanders in between.  Similarly, although 
lower-ranking principales like the optio helped the centurions in maintaining the line of 
advance, there is little to no sense of importance of officership below the centurion, such 
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as we might attach to a modern platoon or squad commander.
108
  Rather than saying that 
the legion was an army of ten cohorts, therefore, we should say that “the legion was 
essentially a force consisting of sixty centuries, some of them of double size.”109   
The centuria was smaller in scale than many modern military companies, but it 
was a subdivision generally common to ancient armies.
110
  Asclepiodotus claims that a 
unit roughly of such number was the maximum size in which one could hear equally well 
commands coming from different directions.
111
  The centurion thus commanded a unit 
whose size and deployment was designed at least in part to strengthen combat 
performance in a system of warfare that generally lacked sophisticated communication in 
the middle of combat. 
The deployment of the Roman legion in either cohorts or maniples, therefore, 
appears to have placed most of the tactical responsibilities on the middle-ranking 
centurionate.  While this does not necessarily mean that centurions exercised tactical 
independence over their centuriae and cohort in pitched battle, they assumed a great 
responsibility alone in bringing their soldiers to the point of battle and holding them 
there.  Adjusting the rate of advance, direction, intervals, and formation of a company of 
men of 80-150 soldiers within a larger cohort required skill and experience, especially on 
uneven ground.  The failure of one cohort to hold an enemy back allowed the opposing 
forces to breach the line, causing panic and disintegration.  A failure of a centuria on the 
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extreme flank to hold its position often led to the enemy rapidly rolling up the entire 
line.
112
  While no legionary centurion attended a military academy, combat experience 
(whether in pitched battle or small-scale conflicts) was generally a quality that centurions 
needed to possess. 
Tactical expertise also made centurions invaluable to legionary commanders as 
sources of military advice.  Roman commanders had a military council (consilium) that 
they could summon at any time either to ask for advice or to convey orders.
113
  
Centurions had long been important resources to these councils.  In the legions of the 
middle Republic, the first centurion to be elected during the dilectus had the privilege of 
attending councils.
114
  As early as 212 BCE, a centurion, Q. Naevius, was widely credited 
and apparently decorated for innovating tactics in fighting Campanians.
115
  Commanders 
of the first century BCE onward often seconded primipili and other centurions to their 
consilium.
116
  These officers could offer political as well as military advice.  Cn. 
Calpurnius Piso was convinced by his centurions to seize the province of Syria illegally 
following Germanicus’ death in CE 19.  Vespasian, meanwhile, invited his most 
distinguished centurions to his council in CE 69 to determine his course of action in the 
coming civil wars.
117
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Centurions certainly seem to have had little hesitation in arguing with their 
superior officers or commander in these sessions.  Caesar portrays a consilium held by 
the legates Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta and Quintus Titurius Sabinus over how to address 
the revolt of the Eburones under Ambiorix in 54 BCE.  Cotta, the tribunes, and the primi 
ordines centurions all argued against the more senior Sabinus that they ought to remain 
fortified in camp.  Sabinus fatally overruled them.
118
  In describing the legion’s 
subsequent ambush and annihilation, Caesar picks out two centurions by name: 
Eventually, T. Balventius, who the year before had been primuspilus, a brave man 
and one of great authority, was wounded in both thighs with a javelin; Q. 
Lucanius, of the same rank, while fighting most valiantly, was killed while 
coming to his son’s aid when he was surrounded by the enemy.119 
 
The grim fate awaiting those who ignore centurions’ advice is a motif in Tacitus.  
He portrays Vitellius as especially culpable.  After the defeat of his legions by Primus 
Antonius at Cremona in CE 69, “singular bravery” was shown by Julius Agrestis, a 
centurion who volunteered to visit Antonius’ camp in order to determine his strength.  
Vitellius was not happy with what he had to report: 
Agrestis returned to Vitellius, and when Vitellius denied that what he reported 
was true, and even accused him of having been bribed, he replied “Since you have 
need of some greater proof, and I have no further use to you than by my life or 
death, I will give you proof that you can believe.” Having thus departed, he 
confirmed what he said by a voluntary death.
120
 
 
Ignoring Agrestis’ advice, Vitellius led his meagre forces against Antonius “against the 
judgment of the most experienced among the centurions, who, had they been consulted, 
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would have told him the truth.”121  Casperius, a centurion at the Roman fortress at 
Gorneae, was similarly ignored in CE 51 when advising against accepting peace with 
Rhadamistus, who had seized the throne of Armenia from Mithridates, an ally of Rome.  
According to Tacitus, the disregard for his advice led to the murder of Mithridates and 
the resulting power vacuum in Armenia.
122
 
In addition to centurions being granted licence to express opinions independent of 
their superiors, they were often given independent military commands.  Centurions had 
long been compelled to take charge of a military situation in the absence or death of their 
superiors.  The earliest attested case occurred after the Roman defeat at the Baetis river in 
211/212 BCE.  With the death of the army’s two commanders, Cn. Cornelius Scipio and 
P. Cornelius Scipio, a primuspilus, L. Marcius Septimus, took charge of the remnants of 
the legions and stabilized a Roman front on the Ebro River until the arrival of Scipio 
Africanus the following year.  He continued to lead an army under Scipio, and even 
forged a treaty with the defeated city of Gades on his own authority.
123
  Similarly, after 
the destruction of Varus’ legions in CE 9, Caedicius, a centurion of the primi ordines, 
rallied the survivors under his command and prevented the Germanic tribes from 
besieging the survivors’ fortress until reinforcements could arrive with Tiberius.124 
Centurions did not find themselves with command responsibilities only through 
emergencies, however, since it appears common for centurions to be formally granted 
commands of their own.  Caesar had appointed his centurions to command individual 
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ships and naval squadrons in his maritime campaigns, both in Gaul and during the Civil 
Wars.  This practice was formalized in the Imperial army to create the rank of centurio 
classicus.
125
  Octavian, moreover, after his annexation of Africa in 42 BCE, placed a 
former centurion, C. Fuficius Fango, in charge of the province.
126
 
The changing nature of Rome’s military responsibilities during the Principate 
guaranteed many centurions the opportunity for extended independent military 
commands and special missions in which they were given tactical initiative.
127
  In CE 22, 
for example, Junius Blaesus, the proconsul of Africa, split his legions into smaller units 
led by centurions who were ordered to hunt the insurgents of Tacfarinas.  The 
aforementioned Casperius was likewise seconded to a garrison at the Roman stronghold 
at Gorneae during the Armenian crisis in CE 51.  In this case, the centurion had a say in 
how to address a critical and immediate strategic situation.
128
  Primipili, especially, 
exercised important military commands.  Perhaps the best example is that of C. Velius 
Rufus.  As a primuspilus in the Twelfth Legion Fulminata, he was put in command of a 
special detachment (vexillatio) formed from nine legions for Domitian’s German 
campaign in CE 83.  This was after he acted as the “army commander” (dux exercitus) in 
Africa, when he had been sent to crush Mauretanian resistance.
129
 
                                                 
125
BG 3. 14; BC 1. 57. Classicus: ILS 2231; CIL XVI 12, 14; Fink, RMD no. 204-205. Cf. D. B. 
Saddington, “Classes: The Evolution of the Roman Imperial Fleets” in Companion to the Roman Army, 
211. 
126
Dio 48. 22. 1; App. BC 5. 3; Cic. Att. 14. 10. 2. Cf. Broughton, MRR II, 373. 
127
Richier, Centuriones, 539-545. 
128
Tac. Ann. 3. 74; Tac. Ann. 12. 45. Cf. Plin. Ep. 10. 27-28; Jos. BJ. 3. 59; 5. 43, 287-288. 
129
AE 1903, 368; ILS 9200; IGLS VI 2796. See also Tac. Hist. 1. 87; CIL VI 2589; II 6183; ILS 
2287; 9193. On primipili in charge of military supply lines and harbours, see P. Kehne, “War and 
Peacetime Logistics: Supplying Imperial Armies in East and West” in Companion, 331. 
 156 
 
By the Flavian period, moreover, the changing nature of campaigns, organization 
of enemies, and the desire to avoid uprooting and transferring whole legions had led the 
Roman army to rely increasingly on the use of vexillationes.  These units varied in size 
and composition (including auxilia, numeri, and legionaries), could operate far from their 
parent unit, and were often placed under the command (praepositus) of centurions.
130
  
They were typically formed for both administrative and military operations.  In the latter 
case, they were deployed for duties as varied as leading reinforcements to other legions, 
providing protection along lines of communication and garrisons, and surveillance.
131
 
In discussing important qualities in military commanders, Onasander criticizes the 
hypocrisy of honouring soldiers for bravery regardless of their origins, yet picking 
commanders based on birth more than merit.
132
  Some Emperors seem occasionally to 
have agreed with him, and we eventually find primipili given military commands of 
entire legions.  Augustus’ policy towards Egypt banned senators from occupying 
important political and military posts there.  Instead of being commanded by legates and 
senatorial tribunes, therefore, the Egyptian legions were commanded by primipilares, 
who were second in power only to the prefect of Egypt (sometimes also primipilares).
133
  
By the beginning of the third century CE, such roles for primipili had become more 
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common.  Known for his practical approach to the military, Septimius Severus, when 
forming three new legions early in his reign (I, II, and III Parthicae), drew his 
commanders from the primipilares rather than senatorial legates.
134
 
 According to Huntington, the education and attitudes required for officership are 
typically incompatible with the prolonged service of an enlisted soldier: the peculiar skill 
of the officer “is the management of violence not the act of violence itself.”135  In Roman 
military culture, however, no such distinction was deemed necessary for the centurionate.  
From the Republic to Principate, centurions remained a crucial resource of military 
expertise, not only as individual combatants, but as officers who could give orders and 
maintain the cohesion of their unit in battle.  The increasing use of smaller organizational 
units, mixed detachments, and garrisons during the Principate, moreover, required a large 
body of officers with a variety of either combat or leadership skills that only the 
centurionate could provide.   
 It must be remembered, however, that by the second century CE, as Augustus’ 
successors stabilized and consolidated the imperial frontiers, major campaigns became 
the exception rather than the norm.  It is estimated that never more than half of the 
legions were ever involved in a full scale war.
136
  This certainly gave potential centurions 
fewer opportunities to acquire operational or tactical expertise.  Depending on the post, 
the duties and experiences of many centurions could often resemble those of a local 
bureaucrat more than a soldier.  Such varied duties and levels of responsibility, moreover, 
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pose the question as to whether or not the centurionate can be described as possessing a 
single, corporate identity.  That the rank was distinct in status and duties from other 
legionary officers is clear, but were officers of such different backgrounds and engaged in 
such different tasks viewed as a single group?  
 
4.4.3 Corporate Identity 
 Martial, who seems to have counted several centurions among his circle of 
friends,
137
 dedicates one of his epigrams to two primipili: 
Here reposes Aquinas, reunited to his faithful Fabricius,  
who rejoices in having preceded him to the Elysian retreats.  
This double altar bears record that each was honoured with the rank of 
primuspilus; but that praise is of still greater worth which you read in this shorter 
inscription:  
“Both were united in the sacred bond of a well-spent life, and, what is rarely 
known to fame, were amici.”138 
 
The inscription presents the idealized friendship (amicitia) expected by modern 
perceptions of the personal bonds between soldiers and esprit de corps.  The term 
amicitia is especially common among Roman military inscriptions, and perhaps helped to 
generate a sense of military identity that transcended rank.
139
  The term frater is similarly 
common to these military inscriptions.  While this term can be taken in many senses (e.g., 
biological brothers, half-brothers, and heirs), it also often carried a sense of “friend” or 
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“comrade” in Roman military inscriptions.140  This fraternity often endured beyond the 
soldier’s death, as fellow soldiers took care to provide for each other’s burial and 
commemoration.
141
  That such fraternity could have existed among centurions, moreover, 
not only demonstrates that individual centurions formed bonds of friendship among 
themselves, but also describes a body of officers who, although engaged in increasingly 
diverse duties and comprising men of various backgrounds, nonetheless identified 
themselves according to their membership within a single, corporate body. 
In modern military institutions, both the vertical and horizontal relationships that 
together comprise the “institutional bonding” between its members are defined in part by 
corporate identities among soldiers and officers.  There is, as Marshall once put it, “an 
inherent unwillingness of the soldier to risk danger on behalf of men with whom he has 
no social identity.”142  This was something that the Roman military understood well.  By 
the last century of the Republic, many soldiers were now serving together in several 
campaigns over many years, often allowing them to form cohesive blocks with their own 
identity.  Typically, this identity was defined by their service under a specific 
commander: the Valeriani (who served first in Asia under L. Valerius in 86 BCE, and 
continued to volunteer until returning with Pompey in 62), the Sullani, the Pompeians, 
and the Caesareans.
143
  Many of Caesar’s legions acquired titles and epithets in the Gallic 
and Civil wars.  Much like modern regiments, during the first century CE, these and other 
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titular legions developed their own reputations, traditions, and history that endured for 
several centuries.
144
 
 It was also during the late Republic and early Principate at the latest that we begin 
to see centurions increasingly defined as a distinct rank of officers within the legions.  
The roughly 660 centurions who served in Caesar’s Gallic legions were defined as a 
category apart from both the tribunes and milites.
145
  How Caesar’s army is described as 
an entire group in Alexandrian War is revealing: “The legates, friends, centurions, and 
soldiers of Caesar” (Caesaris legati, amici, centuriones militesque).146  It is also by 
Caesar that we find the earliest attestations of centurions such as L. Vorenus and T. Pullo, 
both on the cusp of becoming primipili, engaging in the kind of competitive ethos that 
becomes a hallmark for the rank.  Centurions saw each other in their rank as natural 
competitors in courage and steadfastness, and this too encouraged their identification as a 
distinct group.
147
  
Although many centurions during the Principate took on more administrative 
functions, they nonetheless remained a distinct group.  This was especially true for 
primipili.  While regular centurions enjoyed a pay and status distinct from both the 
milites and higher officers, by the reign of Claudius, posts such as the praefectus 
castrorum, or tribune of the Praetorian Guard, urban cohorts, and vigiles, became 
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reserved solely for the pool of former primipili.
148
  This career was specifically structured 
to distinguish primipilares from those officers who joined the military already at the 
equestrian rank.
149
  That centurions who were promoted through the ranks often 
neglected to mention aspects of their earlier career suggests also that they too viewed 
themselves as a group distinct from the milites.
150
  Even in non-military dress, legionary 
centurions were set apart from both soldiers and civilians.
151
   
 A corps of officers also can also possess distinct associations and traditions.  The 
closest parallel to such associations in the Roman army were the social organizations 
(collegia) that developed in the legions of the Imperial period.  While evidence for 
military collegia is limited, it is suggested that they were similar in function and purpose 
to their civilian counterparts, allowing individuals the opportunity to enjoy social circles 
they might not otherwise have had.
152
  Military collegia appear, however, to have 
excluded regular milites and higher officers such as tribunes, but were established for 
such levels as immunes, principales, and centurions, and were organized by rank or 
function (e.g., optiones, signiferi, librarii), each with their own “club houses” (scholae).  
Septimius Severus especially encouraged the formation of collegia, and apparently 
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ordered that room be made for scholae in the camps and fortresses.
153
  On a practical 
level, for those willing to pay their entry fees (scamnarium), they acted as military 
“mutual aid societies” by covering the cost of members’ burial and commemoration or 
providing for expenses incurred through promotion or retirement.
154
   
Centurions were the highest-ranking officers to enjoy membership in their own 
collegia, and they possessed their own cult of genii.
155
  Centurions sometimes referred to 
each other as colleague (collega), indicating a shared rank, and (occasionally) unit.  An 
epitaph to Caecilius Septiminus, a centurion posted at Mainz is illustrative: 
To Caecilius Septiminus, centurion of Legio XXII Primigenia Pia Fidelis, from 
centurion Aurelius Servatus, his collega and friend.
156
 
 
This epitaph illustrates perhaps the most important function of the collegia: to administer 
a soldier’s affairs his death, particularly to collect funds from its members to pay for 
funeral and commemoration.
157
  Whether or not they belonged to a collegium, centurions 
appear often to have taken care of their comrades’ burial and commemoration.  In the 
following epitaph, for example, a centurion commemorates his friend at Dura-Europos: 
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To the gods of the Underworld: To C. Iulius Rufinus, once centurion of Legio IIII 
Scythica, Caesius Domitianus, centurion and best friend, saw to it being done.
158
 
 
In the absence of heirs, freedmen, or close family, a centurion was typically 
commemorated by his comrades of the same rank.
159
  The relationships formed between 
centurions through military service could extend to other activities, including acting as 
guarantors for loans, and as executors and witnesses for wills.
160
   
  One practice in defining the centurionate as a corps of officers that is noticeably 
absent, however, is the lack of any evidence in the Roman legions for dining clubs or an 
“officer’s mess.”  Such institutions have been fundamental to promoting comradeship, 
corporateness, conformity, tradition, and loyalty in British and Canadian regiments.  The 
ἀγωγή system in Classical Sparta served a similar function, although it applied to all 
Spartiates rather than those of distinct rank.
161
  We might speculate that the feasts and 
corporate rites for the collegium’s guardian genius served a similar function,162 but these 
rituals lacked the consistent functions and associations of a modern mess. 
 Centurions were frequently transferred to serve under other legionary 
commanders.  By the first century CE, very few remained in the same unit or place for 
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the duration of their career.
163
  One of the products of this trend was a stronger distinction 
in the centurion’s corporate identity.  The frequent movement of centurions between 
legions, vexillationes, garrisons, and cities allowed them to form relationships with others 
of their rank across the Empire.  It also served to set centurions apart from the soldiers 
under each of their commands – they were viewed more as interchangeable officers with 
relatively similar authority (although perhaps often with different skills and military 
backgrounds), identified by their charges according to their rank instead of specific 
person.
164
 
Over the course of the late Republic and first two centuries CE, therefore, the 
centurionate appears to have developed into a distinct, corporate body within the legions.  
As we have seen, however, the rank was not socially homogenous – its members came 
from different backgrounds in wealth, education, and geographic origin.  This practice 
suggests that unlike both the rank-and-file and higher officers in the legions, one’s 
identification as a centurion was not defined primarily by social status.  Nor were 
centurions during the Principate defined especially by a single, specific function, since 
they performed both combat and administrative roles.  In fact, the feature that was crucial 
to defining the centurionate was also a key motivation to join the rank: its traditional 
prestige. 
 
                                                 
163
Centurions transferred to multiple legions:  ILS 2653, 2656, 2658, 7178, 9200. 
164
Domaszewski, Die Rangordnung, 94-97; Dobson, “The Centurionate and Social Mobility,” 101. 
According to Delbrück, History of the Art of War II, 162-163, it is through these transfers that “the unified 
spirit of the officer corps of the entire army was maintained and nourished.”  For examples of frequent 
transfers, see E. Birley, “Promotions and Transfers in the Roman Army II: The Centurionate” in Roman 
Army Papers, 206-219. 
 165 
 
4.4.4 The Tradition of the Centurionate 
An important topic modern military studies concerns what factors determined the 
level of a soldier or officer’s commitment to their organization.165  Unfortunately, we 
possess no firsthand accounts from centurions or former centurions that hint as to why 
they might have wished to join the rank.  While ancient authors often describe how rising 
or established members of the senatorial aristocracy desired legionary commands to boost 
their political capital at Rome or in the provinces, they saw no such need to elaborate on 
what motivated men to join the ranks of the centurionate – it seems that to them the 
reasons were self-evident.  The silence of our sources makes evaluation of what 
motivated soldiers to join the centurionate largely speculative.   
 Despite the financial and social benefits centurions received on completion of 
service, many chose to remain in the legions, with their pension (praemium) seemingly 
deferred or, in the case of death while in service, defaulted.
166
  Some doubtless remained 
in the hope of reaching the primipilate and the social advancement that came with it.  
Few reached this rank, however, and those that did were often elderly.
167
  Even if one did 
not reach this position, however, remaining as a regular centurion could hardly be 
construed to be a misfortune, as long as one tolerated the military lifestyle.  As major 
campaigns became less common and the legions settled into more constabulary roles 
during the second century CE, the duties became potentially less personally hazardous.   
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The financial incentives for a successful centurion certainly made the position 
attractive to members of the rank and file.  Centurions were receiving two times the 
standard soldier’s pay in the mid-Republic, and more than fifteen times the amount 
during the Principate, with primi ordines and primipili receiving even higher amounts.  
Centurions who received an honourable discharge (honesta missio), moreover, were 
granted rewards upon retirement (praemia militiae) according to a similar ratio.  The 
material privileges of being a centurion are also readily apparent in ancient textual 
accounts.
168
  The increase in pay for the centurionate during the Principate also helps to 
account for the number of direct appointees of equites directly from civilian life.
169
  For 
many equites, steady and relatively generous pay, as well as the chance for later postings 
in provincial administration, likely made service as legionary centurions appealing.   
The material benefits of service in the centurionate, therefore, were substantial, 
and doubtless motivated both experienced rankers and novice equestrians to seek the 
post.  Centurions, however, were likely motivated by factors in addition to the material 
benefits acquired with the position.  There were also benefits internal or intrinsic to the 
rank – goods that could not be acquired or enjoyed through any other practice but only 
through the experience of being a centurion.
170
 
The goods unique to the centurionate must be considered with regard to the 
importance of the traditional ideals of the position discussed in the previous chapters.  In 
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entering any practice, one must relate not only to one’s contemporary participants, but 
also to those who have come before – there is an “authority of tradition.”171  This is 
especially true of military institutions.  A modern corps of officers is a kind of institution 
in itself, each having its own history and personality.  To join it requires that one be 
responsible not only in learning the required techniques and skills in leadership, but also 
in respecting the group’s historical tradition and models; there is an authority of tradition 
in an officer corps to which its members must relate.
172
  For the centurions during the 
Principate, this tradition was directly inherited from the Republic and civil wars: to be 
models of aggressive martial prowess and stern obedience and discipline.  Even those 
who saw little combat and fewer major campaigns, or were perhaps too old to take an 
especially active role in combat, nonetheless wished to be seen as soldiers first.
173
   
Praise for these models was plentiful and enduring.  Steadfastness, obedience, and 
self-sacrifice had been characteristic ideals of centurions as early as in Polybius, to which 
qualities Caesar and writers of the Principate added personal bravery and leadership.  
Moreover, writers from this later period, such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus, established 
these qualities at Rome’s beginnings, thus creating a “centurion tradition.”  The semi-
mythical Roman hero, Siccius Dentatus, explains how in battle against the Volsci in 453 
BCE, he saved the reputation of the centurions: 
With the standards captured by the enemy, I alone, on behalf of all, exposed 
myself to danger, recovered the standards for our cohort, drove back the enemy, 
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and did not allow the centurions to incur undying shame, which would have made 
the rest of their lives more horrible than death….174 
 
Similarly romantic descriptions of centurions’ responsibilities in combat remain a motif 
among ancient authors well into the Principate.
175
   
This military reputation expanded into a more social one in Rome.  Livy has 
centurions play key roles in Rome’s semi-mythological past.176  Most notable is 
Verginius, the noble father of Verginia.  As part of the so-called “Struggle of the Orders” 
between plebeians and patricians, in 449 BCE, this centurion was compelled to kill his 
own daughter rather than see her violated by the decemvir, Appius Claudius.  Verginia is 
cast as a new Lucretia, the victim of a tyrant’s lust, and Verginius as a new Brutus, the 
righteous avenger.
177
  Valerius Maximus later singles out centurions when discussing the 
importance of recognizing merit and character in leading Rome rather than only social 
class:  “the elite of the city will not be resentful if a centurion’s courage is shown among 
their extraordinary brilliance.”178  The family of Augustus apparently agreed, since 
centurions were granted the special honour of bearing the torches to his funeral pyre.
179
   
Centurions had to be mindful of the models and traditions of their institutional 
forbearers – a “centurion’s ethos.”  Authors during the Principate promoted this ethos by 
retrojecting it deep into Rome’s mythical past.  Effectively, this tradition helped to define 
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176
E.g., Dio. Hal. 6. 45; 9. 39-42; 11. 29-44; Liv. 1. 28, 52; 2. 27, 45; 2. 55; 3. 44-51, 69; 4. 34; 5. 
55; 6. 14. See esp. 7. 13. 
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Liv. 3. 44-47. Cf. Dion. Hal. 11. 29-37; Aur. Vict. De Vir. 21. 1. 
178
Val. Max. 3. 8. 7: Non indignabuntur lumina nostrae urbis, si inter eorum eximium fulgorem 
centurionum quoque uirtus spectandam se obtulerit. 
179
See above, Introduction, 1. 
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the centurionate as a corps of officers whose titles, duties, clothing, equipment, and 
decorations were later made to appear as “realized myth” within the Roman military of 
the Principate.  Centurions became viewed as the guardians of the traditions of the 
Roman army.
180
   
The centurionate, therefore, not only offered attractive material benefits and the 
hope of social advancement through reaching the primipilate, but also a position of great 
military prestige.  Unlike the legates and tribunes, whose position in the army granted 
them the social prestige necessary to continue a career in other areas, the centurion was 
considered a vir militaris because he possessed a form of prestige that was based on long 
military service.  Such prestige, moreover, was largely internal to the military 
community, and helps to account for why some centurions remained in service despite 
the poor odds of reaching the primipilate.   
 
4.6 Conclusion: The Centurion as Vir Militaris 
 Despite its comparatively complex organization and efficiency, the Roman army 
never developed a distinct corps of commanding officers.  The chief criterion of the 
higher ranks was the candidate’s social status, with promotion determined at least as 
much by social connections as much as military skill or experience.  Emperors 
discouraged Roman aristocrats from pursuing permanent careers in the military, and few 
represented themselves primarily according to their military service.   Stoll makes the 
essential point: out of an army comprising roughly 300 000 legionaries and auxiliaries 
during the Principate, there were maybe 60-70 members of the senatorial class, and 550 
                                                 
180
Summerly, Studies in the Legionary Centurionate, 235. Lendon discusses at length the powerful 
influence of Rome’s past on its soldiers and officers. See Soldiers and Ghosts, passim, esp. 172-178, 280-
289, 313. For “realized myth,” See Bourdieu, Outline, 163-165.  
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equites.
181
  In lieu of a sizable corps of commanding officers, military experience and 
expertise was necessarily focused more at the level of the centurionate.   
While social connections played a role in appointing men to the centurionate, 
military accomplishments, experience, and seniority also appear to have been more 
important to reaching its highest levels.  The increasing use of cohorts and smaller 
military units required that many centurions needed to possess some expertise both as 
individual combatants and officers.  Although the legions had no military academy, the 
majority of centurions were nonetheless veteran soldiers who developed their skills and 
knowledge through a great deal of practice.   
The functions, social status, behaviour, and even age of some of these centurions 
during the Principate appear far removed from the characters glorified by Caesar 
primarily for their virtus and disciplina.  This idea of centurions, however, endured and 
remained crucial to the rank’s identity.  When one considers the respect given to their 
long service and the relatively lavish rewards that also came with the position, moreover, 
one sees another important basis for the centurion’s authority: the Roman soldier’s own 
desire to be promoted to the centurionate.  Vegetius later makes this point explicit when 
describing the envied status of the centurions, “for whom, according to ancient custom, 
great profits and honours were established, so that other soldiers from the entire legion 
would strive with ample effort and zeal to attain such vast rewards.”182  If at times only 
grudgingly, Roman soldiers likely submitted to their centurion because of the hope that, 
                                                 
181Stoll, “Offizier und Gentleman,” 150. 
182
Veg. Mil. 2. 7: Quibus magnae utilitates et magnus honor esta ueteribus constitutus, ut ceteri 
milites ex tota legione omni labore ac deuotione contenderent ad tanta praemia pervenire. 
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through consistent obedience and loyalty to him, they themselves might eventually join 
his rank. 
This status within a legion’s command structure conferred additional social 
responsibilities on centurions, since they also played a key role in integrating soldiers into 
the legions and helping to define their expectations and status.  As a corps of middle-
ranking officers, moreover, the centurions had to balance their own duties and loyalties to 
the soldiers under their command with those owed to their superiors.  The next chapter 
will address this challenge, and demonstrate that the centurion’s intermediate position 
between higher and lower ranks was crucial to preserving the Roman army’s cohesion. 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: The “Middle” Rank 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Social status was traditionally understood to define one’s prospects, loyalties, and 
relationships in the Roman world.  During the Principate, however, the legionary 
centurionate posed a problem to this ideology.  The behaviour, supposed intentions, and 
abilities of centurions were often not able to be described according to comfortable and 
traditional categories of social status, since their rank was not defined primarily by these 
criteria.  As the previous chapter has demonstrated, moreover, the shifting demands on 
the Roman military during the Principate led to an increase in status for centurions.  They 
were given greater command responsibilities and accorded significant increases in pay 
and social prestige.  Although centurions were still praised for the traditional behaviour 
and military virtues that characterized them during the Republic, they became starkly 
distinguished in status from the milites whom they commanded, while also outranking 
even certain equestrian officers. 
The centurions’ perceived status in the legions, however, is directly relevant to 
another important issue: their responsibilities and loyalties to both their superiors and the 
soldiers under their command.  Modern authors too have wrestled with how to categorize 
the relative status and sympathies of these officers, both within and outside the legions: 
were centurions clearly regarded by their contemporaries as socially and ideologically 
closer to the “mob” (vulgus) of soldiers, or to the aristocratic leadership and the emperor?  
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Several recent studies have favoured the latter, arguing that, particularly during the 
Principate, “a chasm opened up between the centurions and their former comrades.”1  
The increase in pay and privileges granted to centurions was intended to make them more 
loyal to the regime than the soldiers by strengthening the tie between them and the 
emperor.  Keppie goes so far as to describe centurions of the Principate as “bastions of 
conservatism, averse to innovation and change.”2   
  The previous chapters have explored how legionary centurions were often 
expected to occupy an intermediate position between several military types: 
disciplinarians and “natural fighters,” combat and staff officers, commissioned and non-
commissioned officers.  This chapter explores evidence for the impact of this position on 
the centurions’ various social relationships and obligations within the legions of the 
Principate, and argues that centurions occupied a similarly intermediate status within 
Rome’s military hierarchy.  On the one hand, textual evidence suggests that their duties 
and increased pay and status during the Principate left their interests and loyalties more 
often with the higher officers and emperor than the common soldier.  They are sometimes 
portrayed as hostile to the rank and file, as officers whose potential wealth made them 
conservative supporters of the regime and a great bulwark against any disloyalty or 
collective resistance.   
On the other hand, textual evidence also associates centurions strongly with the 
milites, and epigraphic and archaeological sources suggest that their relationships with 
                                                 
1
S. G. Chrissanthos, Warfare in the Ancient World: From the Bronze Age to the Fall of Rome 
(Westport, 2008), 168-169. Cf. Campbell, Emperor and the Roman Army, 102-104. K. Raaflaub, “Die 
Militärreformen des Augustus und die politische Problematik des frühen Prinzipats” in G. Binder ed., 
Saeculum Augustum I (Darmstadt, 1987), 269; M. A. Speidel, “Sold und Wirtschaftslage der römischen 
Soldaten” in Heer und Herrschaft, 432. 
2
Making of the Roman Army, 179. 
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soldiers were defined by strong spatial proximity and social bonds.  This traditional 
association between centurion and soldier was defined not just through combat or other 
military missions, but also through the layout of living quarters in legionary marching 
camps and fortresses.  Although centurions were increasingly distinguished from the 
milites in pay, prestige, and prospects during the Principate, several practices developed 
in order to maintain some of their traditional connection with the rank and file from the 
Republic. 
This intermediate status between their superiors and the rank and file, moreover, 
placed centurions in the perfect position to perform another important role: the 
integration of soldiers into the Roman military community.  Since many centurions were 
experienced, former members of the rank and file, they became responsible for training 
new recruits (tirones) and helping them to adjust to military life.  The centurions’ 
quarters and their physical presence in camp itself, moreover, helped to define their place 
and that of their soldiers within the legions’ military hierarchy.  Beyond the confines of 
the camp, centurions were also the functional head and symbolic representation of the 
centuria, the primary locus for recruitment, tactical deployment, and religious activities, 
and the unit with which soldiers legionaries identified themselves most closely.  In some 
cases, lastly, the relationships and obligations between centurions and soldiers continued 
even after the end of military service through their settlement in veteran colonies.  The 
combination of these specific various duties and traditions, therefore, suggests a strong 
concern in Roman military practices to integrate soldiers into the military community, 
and identifies the centurion as the primary tool to perform this role. 
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5.1 Pay and Privileges during Service 
In addition to their dress and vitis, centurions were distinguished in status from 
the rank and file most obviously through their annual pay.  This distinction developed 
markedly from Republic to Principate.  Polybius states that the centurion of the second 
century BCE received twice the standard pay of the miles.
3
  Caesar, who clearly 
understood the great potential of centurions to secure both military loyalty and political 
influence, set a new standard during the late Republic for generosity.  When Caesar 
doubled the pay of soldiers in his own legions during the 40s BCE, he also increased the 
centurions’ pay to five times that of the legionary.4  It was during the Principate, 
however, that the centurionate acquired significant remunerative benefits.  The evidence 
is unclear, but it appears that the centurion’s pay rose to between fifteen to eighteen times 
that of the legionary by the end of the first century CE, with those of primi ordines rank 
receiving roughly thirty times the normal rate, and primipili sixty times.  This ratio of 
pay, moreover, seems to have remained consistent throughout the Principate.
5
 
  Such a gap in potential wealth clearly distinguished the centurionate from the rank 
and file.  Epigraphic and papyrological evidence of loans, contracts, and expenditure of 
cash by legionaries during the Principate show centurions spending on average ten to 
                                                 
3
Polyb. 6. 39. 12. 
4
App. BC 2. 102; Suet. Caes. 26. See Webster, Imperial Roman Army, 256-260; Patterson, 
“Military Organization,” 99-104.  
5
Figures are conjecture. Milites are recorded earning 912 1/2 HS (3650 asses) per year under 
Augustus (Tac. Ann. 1. 17. 4), 1200 under Domitian (Suet. Dom. 7. 3), and 3600 under Severus and 
Caracalla (Herod. 3. 8. 4; 4. 4. 7; Dio 78. 36. 3). Later papyri (P.Oxy. VII 1047; P.Panop. 2. 197) indicate 
above ratios, which appear consistent with awarding of praemia to milites and centurions (Dio 54. 23. 1; 
Suet. Cal. 44). See Brunt, “Pay and Superannuation in the Roman Army,” PBSR 18 (1950), 67-69; L. 
Wierschowski, Heer und Wirtschaft: Das römische Heer der Prinzipatszeit als Wirtschaftsfaktor (Bonn, 
1984), 2-15, 228, n. 58; Speidel, “Roman Army Pay Scales,” 372-375. Based on these figures, under 
Augustus, centurions annually earned 13500, primi ordines 27000, and primipili 54000. By the second 
century, the pay rates were raised to 18000, 36000, and 72000 HS, respectively, and presumably continued 
under the Severans. There was no increase again until under Severus (Herod. 3. 8. 4). 
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thirty times more than milites.
6
  This potential wealth is illustrated in letters from Egypt 
in which centurions being transferred request that their wives take care to pack their 
many belongings and follow later.  In one particular letter from third century Fayum, 
when a centurion advises his wife to join him, he reminds her to bring all of her gold 
jewellery.
7
   
In addition to generous pay, centurions enjoyed many other luxuries and 
privileges that distinguished them from the milites, including allowances to keep slaves 
quartered with them in the legionary camp, and perhaps even multiple food rations.
8
  Like 
the tribunes and legates and unlike the rank and file, moreover, centurions appear often to 
have possessed horses and ridden on horseback when their army or unit was on the 
march.
9
  As early as the Republican period, rooms for lodging horses were either placed 
nearby or attached to the centurions’ quarters in marching camps.10  Beyond the practical 
advantage of travelling on horseback, the use of the horse was also a status symbol in the 
Roman world, associated with military ranks whose members were of equestrian or 
senatorial background.  Some centurions chose to highlight this status visually in 
commemorative relief.  They distinguished themselves from equestrian officers, however, 
by never depicting themselves on horseback in mid-gallop.
11
 
                                                 
6
See Tables 2 and 12 in Wierschowski, Heer und Wirtschaft, 49-62.  
7
A.S. Hunt & C.C. Edgar, Select Papyri, Loeb ed., (Cambridge, 1932; 1970), no. 155. See also P. 
Oxy. IX 1185. Cf. L. Allason-Jones, “Women and the Roman Army in Britain” in The Roman Army as a 
Community, 43.  On centurions and marriage, see next page. 
8For slaves in camp, cf. B. Hoffmann, “The Quarters of Legionary Centurions of the Principate,” 
Britannia 26 (1995), 111. Papyri from late first century CE show that centurions were kept on separate rolls 
in food distribution, suggesting a greater ration. Cf. Fink, RMR, no. 10; Roth, Logistics, 22. 
9
See PSI 729 for centurion during Flavian period who sold his horse to a cavalryman (eques alae). 
10
See Dobson, The Army of the Roman Republic, 156; Webster, Roman Imperial Army, 132. 
11
Visual commemoration of horses: Appendix A, figs. 10, 11, 15. 
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Centurions may even have been allowed to contract marriages.  The consistency 
or legal applicability of the ban on regular soldiers from contracting marriages during the 
Principate is currently debated.
12
  The ban has traditionally been attributed to the reign of 
Augustus, and, according to Herodian (3. 8. 4-5) was lifted by Septimius Severus.
13
  The 
legal origin or specific stipulations of the ban, however, remain largely conjecture.
14
  
Archaeological evidence demonstrates at the very least that women were not physically 
banned from the legionary camp, and the size and layout of some centurions’ quarters’ 
suggest that women lived with them.
15
  Centurions frequently refer to their “wives” 
(uxores) in letters and inscriptions, although this title does not technically designate their 
exact legal status.
16
  Given the state of the evidence, no firm conclusion can be reached 
on the applicability of the ban to centurions, but it appears at the very least that many 
centurions had families dwelling with them inside the camp well before the apparent lift 
of the ban by Septimius Severus.  
                                                 
12
The debate concerning military marriages and women in the camp has become prominent in 
recent years. See esp. Phang, Marriage, passim, esp. 115-129; C. Van Driel-Murray “Gender in Question” 
in Theoretical Roman Archaeology: Second Conference Proceedings, P. Rush ed., (Aldershot, 1995), 3-21; 
E. Greene, “Women and Families in the Auxiliary Military Communities of the Roman West in the First 
and Second Centuries AD,” PhD diss., (Chapel Hill, 2011). 
13Ban during reign of Augustus: Campbell, “The Marriage of Soldiers under the Empire,” JRS 68 
(1978), 153-166; Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, 148. Dio refers to Claudius easing the ban in CE 
44 (76. 15. 2). Cf. Smith, “The Army Reforms of Septimius Severus,” 489-493. 
14
See Phang, The Marriage of Roman Soldiers (13 B.C. – A.D. 235) (Leiden, 2001), passim, esp. 
115-129; James, “The Community of the Soldiers: A Major Identity and Centre of Power in the Roman 
Empire” in P. Barker et al. TRAC 98: Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Theoretical Roman Archeology 
Conference (1999), 14-25. 
15
See L. Allason-Jones, “Women and the Roman Army in Britain,” in Roman Army as a 
Community, 43; Hoffmann, “The Quarters of Legionary Centurions,” 110. M. Hassall, “Homes for Heroes: 
Married Quarters for Soldiers and Veterans,” in Roman Army as a Community, 35; Hoffmann, “Quarters of 
Legionary Centurions,” 110. For doubts, see Phang, The Marriage of Roman Soldiers (13 B.C. – A.D. 235) 
(Leiden, 2001), 131; R. Friedl, Der Konkubinat in kaiserzeitlichen Rom: von Augustus bis Septimius 
Severus (Stuttgart, 1996), 255. 
16
Inscriptions show centurions referring to uxores: ILS 2662; AE 1960, 28. See also above, n. %.  
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 As discussed above, centurions apparently had no standard age of retirement 
during the Principate.
17
  Although some centurions remained in service well into the old 
age, others who chose to end their service in the legions were well rewarded.  While 
Roman commanders of the late Republic frequently arranged for grants of free land as 
rewards to their veterans, neither they nor the Senate ever instituted anything like fixed 
measures as a policy.  Land seems to have been allotted generally according to rank and 
military achievements, as well as the arability of land itself.
18
  Centurions were treated 
quite favourably in these ad hoc settlements.  Caesar, for example, is credited with 
granting donatives to centurions at two to ten times the rate of those given to soldiers.  In 
deciding to help Caesar during the Civil War, moreover, Domitius Ahenobarbus 
apparently promised troops forty iugera out of his own estates, and in proportion to every 
centurion and volunteer (pro rata parte centurionibus evocatisque).
19
  Among Caesar’s 
veterans, the average allotment was fifty iugera, while centurions acquired one hundred.  
This ratio was later doubled by Octavian and Antonius, who showed similar generosity.
20
 
Augustus, however, attempted to regulate the amounts of money or land given to 
veterans on their discharge, and laid the responsibility for these payments on a designated 
imperial treasury (aerarium militare) rather than individual commanders.  Those soldiers 
who served for twenty-five years obtained honesta missio.  Upon retirement, they 
received praemia in the form of either cash (missio nummaria) or a plot of land (missio 
                                                 
17
See above, Chapter Four, 143-145. 
18
According to the Gromatici: Hyg. 114. 1; Sic. Flacc. 156. 9; Hyg. Grom. 176. 13; LC 214. 12; 
216. 11; 232. 2. 
19
Caes. BG 8. 4; BC 1. 17. One iugerum is roughly half an acre. 
20
App. BC 4. 120; 5. 128; Plut. Ant. 23; Dio 43. 21. Cf. Smith, Service in the Post-Marian Army, 
66-69;  J. Patterson, “Military Organization and Social Change,” 99-103; Brunt, “The Army and the Land 
in the Roman Revolution” in Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays (Oxford, 1998), 271-272. 
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agraria), as well as various privileges (emeritum), such as exemption from tolls.
21
  The 
exact amount of praemia for legionary centurions is never explicitly stated, but by at least 
the early Principate, primipili appear to have received fifty times the amount of the miles, 
and four times that of the regular centurion.  This suggests that the ratio in praemia 
between centurion and miles corresponded roughly with that of each rank’s annual pay.22   
As early as the late Republic, some centurions had accumulated enough wealth 
from either donatives or spoils to possess equestrian status on retirement.  This new 
reality led more conservative senators like Cicero to complain about centurions being 
eligible for the third decury of jurymen.
23
  Even more shockingly for aristocrats at the 
time, some centurions were apparently even being allowed into the Senate.
24
  This period 
of political turmoil in the Republic was hardly typical, but even centurions with less 
spectacular careers during the Principate might still have sons who reached the Senate.  
The Stoic senator, Helvidius Priscus, claimed a primuspilus as his father, while Suetonius 
claims that the emperor Vespasian’s grandfather was a regular centurion and his father a 
primuspilus.  Other senators during the early Principate are likewise recorded as having 
                                                 
21
Rewards were also described as commoda emeritae militiae. See Suet. Aug. 24. 2 and legal 
interpretations by Menander, Dig. 49. 16. 5. 7 and Modestinus, Dig. 49. 16. 3. 8. On Augustus’ award of 
land and cash, see RG 16-17; Dio 54. 25. 5. Exemption from tolls: CIL XVI 12; Cod. Theod. 7. 20. 2. 
Privileges varied over time and according to rank. Cf. G. Wesch-Klein, “Recruits and Veterans,” in 
Companion, 439-443. 
22
That is, twelve to fifteen times, or 300000 HS to 12000 HS. The praemia were increased under 
Caracalla (Dio 55. 23. 1; 77. 24. 1). See Dobson “The Primipilares,” 141; Herz, “Finances and Costs,” 308; 
Speidel, “Pay Scales,” 373. 
23
Cic. Phil. 1. 19-20; 13. 3. See examples in NS 1893, 58 and ILS 6491 = CIL IX 1604 (Keppie, 
Colonization, Syll. nos. 24, 31). The wealth of centurions during this period, however, was likely far below 
the traditional requirement of 200 000 HS for service in the third decury. Cf. Keppie, Colonization, 108 
with n. 41; E. Gabba, “Ricerche sull’esercito professionale Romano da Mario ad Augusto,” Athenaeum 29 
(1951), 171-173. 
24
Cic. Ad Fam. 6. 18. 1. Cf. Div. 2. 23; Off. 2. 29; Dio 42. 51. 5. 
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centurions as relatives.
25
  The generous praemia given to centurions also allowed them to 
become cities’ patrons or magistrates, and they are often found occupying important 
magistracies in municipal councils.
26
  Municipalities seem to have had even higher 
expectations from local men who became primipilares.  Indeed, Tiberius once had to 
punish citizens in the town of Pollentia who had held up and tried to extort money from a 
local primuspilus’ funeral procession.27   
 In pay, privileges, and prospects, therefore, the legionary centurions were sharply 
distinguished from the milites.  While centurions in the Republican period were former 
soldiers with perhaps a few advantages in pay and luxuries, those of the Principate were 
now much closer in economic status to the equestrian ranks – equestrians, as we know, 
frequently sought the position.
28
  This rise in wealth, moreover, seems to have been 
widely recognized in the empire.  Rabbinic texts speak of the vast financial rewards for 
centurions, while Juvenal, as part of his satire on Romans’ unbounded greed, pokes fun at 
someone petitioning to join the centurionate.
29
  The developing gulf in pay and benefits 
between centurion and the rank and file also apparently did not go unnoticed by Roman 
soldiers.  Tacitus records complaints by soldiers against the need to bribe their centurions 
for furloughs or relief from unwanted fatigues.  Apparently, soldiers once even demanded 
in CE 69 that Otho abolish the bribe that they customarily had to pay to centurions to 
                                                 
25
Priscus: Tac. Hist. 4. 5. Vespasian: Suet. Vesp. 1; PIR
2
, F 351. Cf. Tac. Ann. 3. 75; Hist. 1. 84. 
26
E.g., AE 1982, 395; CIL II 4514, 5438; V 906, 7544; IX 2564; X 3903, 5064; XI 1603. Cf. 
Dobson, “The Centurionate and Social Mobility,” 103-105; Le Bohec, The Imperial Roman Army, 88; 
Ando, “The Army and the Urban Elite: A Competition for Power” in Companion, 373. 
27
Suet. Tib. 37. On wealth and status of this rank upon retirement, see Dobson, “The 
Primipilares,” 139-141. 
28
See above, Chapter Four, 138. 
29
Rabbinic texts: Sifre Num., 11. 8-11, Balak 131. See Goodman, State and Society, 144. Juvenal: 
14. 193-195. See also Horace. Sat. 1. 6. 72-74. 
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acquire furloughs.  Otho, afraid of alienating the centurions in his rise to power, promised 
instead to pay them out of his own purse.
30
 
While this gulf in status clearly distanced the centurionate from the rank and file,  
the centurion’s traditional duties still required him to maintain a connection with his 
soldiers in other ways, since too wide a gulf between officers and the rank and file could 
engender the kind of resentment and poor discipline that broke out during the Rhine and 
Danube mutinies.  For this reason, although the status of centurions rose during the 
course of the Principate, various traditional practices and expectations of the rank were 
maintained to ensure that centurions remained closely associated with the milites.  For 
centurions to find this balance, however, was made all the more difficult by some of the 
challenges that the Roman military faced in recruitment. 
Unlike the hoplites of many classical Greek poleis, who formed military units 
based on clan, family, common geography, or political citizenship within the polis,
31
 
Roman soldiers during the Principate seldom had such close social, political, and familial 
connections to one another.  Army recruitment often cut across local identities and 
allegiances, since men were enrolled regardless of geographic, ethnic, or cultural origins.  
A Roman legion during the Principate could thus comprise a variety of soldiers: veterans 
and raw novices; volunteers and levies;
32
 recruits who were integrated, equipped and 
                                                 
30
Tac. Hist. 1. 46, 58; Ann. 1. 17. Cf. Webster, Roman Imperial Army, 122; De Blois “Army and 
society,” 24. 
31
See Hanson, Western Way of War, 201. 
32
Roman citizens remained legally liable for military service at least into the second century CE, 
especially during military emergencies on the frontiers (e.g., Dio 39. 39. 1; 40. 50. 1). Punishment for 
evading summons included enslavement and exile (deportatio). See EJ
2
 368; Suet. Aug. 25. 2; Fronto 2. 54; 
Plin. Ep. 10. 29-30; Veg. Mil. 1. 3; Menen. Dig. 40. 12. 29; P.Oxy. VII 1022; ILS 1068; 1098. On 
punishment generally for evading, see Suet. Aug. 24. 1; Menen. Dig. 49. 16. 4. 10-12. Cf. Brunt, 
“Conscription and Volunteering in the Roman Imperial Army” in Roman Imperial Themes, 188-214; 
Wesch-Klein, “Recruits and Veterans,” 437; James, Rome and the Sword, 128. 
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trained together, or those who joined individually or in small groups over time as 
supplementa; soldiers recruited locally or those who came from farther regions across the 
empire.  The challenge for the Roman army was to turn this host of individual soldiers 
into relatively loyal, cohesive military units.  As the primary combat and disciplinary 
officers, the centurions had a key role to perform in this process, not only in training, 
disciplining, and leading legionaries in combat, but also in integrating them more socially 
into the Roman military community.  This function of the centurionate encouraged 
soldiers to form strong bonds of loyalty both to their centuria and its commanding 
officer.  This process began, moreover, with the recruit’s entry into military life, and 
often continued long after. 
 
5.3 Training and the Camp 
 Like a drill sergeant, the centurions’ strong association with military experience, 
harshness, and formal discipline made them obvious choices for supervising the training 
and drilling of military units.  Their involvement in this activity, however, also had 
important social consequences.  In modern armies, one of the first and most important 
experiences for new recruits is the period of military training.  Weapons drills, marching, 
and other such activities not only assert discipline and sharpen martial skills, but can also 
strengthen social bonds, both between soldiers themselves and their officers.
33
  By taking 
                                                 
33On “muscular bonding” effects of drill and training, see W. H. McNeill, Keeping Together in 
Time: Dance and Drill in Human History (Cambridge, 1995), 116-120; Stoll, “Offizier und Gentleman,” 
146; A. King, “The Word of Command: Communication and Cohesion in the Military,” AFS 32.4 (2006), 
493-512. On respecting rhythms, keeping pace, and not falling out of line, or the “fundamental virtue of 
conformity,” cf. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 161. For doubts on the importance of drill and 
marching in Roman warfare, however, see Phang, Roman Military Service, 49-64. 
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a leading role in this training, legionary centurions were similarly given an important 
context in which to define their authority and integrate newer soldiers into their centuria.   
The evidence for formal training in the legions during the Republic suggests that 
it was limited or left to the initiative of individual commanders.
34
  In several of these 
cases, tribunes appear to have supervised the process, but it is clear that centurions 
functionally took charge of drills and weapons training.
35
  This is illustrated best in 
Livy’s account of the Second Punic War, when Cn. and P. Scipio sent centurions to King 
Syphax of Numidia to persuade him to become allies of Rome.  In discussion with these 
centurions, Syphax was so impressed by their experience and attitudes toward discipline 
and battle-order that he agreed to the Roman proposal, but only if one of them could 
remain behind to serve as a military instructor (magister rei militaris) for his own foot 
soldiers.
36
   
More formal training, however, seems to have developed during the Principate.  
Textual and papyrological evidence describes a four-month period of instruction 
(tiroconium) that new recruits were expected to undergo.
37
  This initial training, however, 
should not be equated to the lengthy and structured environment of a modern military 
“boot camp.”  Authors during the Imperial period advocate rather that training be 
ongoing throughout one’s entire service,38 and it appears that primary supervision of this 
training remained the responsibility of the centurions and former primuspilus, the 
                                                 
34
E.g., Scipio Africanus: Liv. 26. 51. 4; Polyb. 10. 20. 2-3. Aemilius Paulus: Liv. 44. 34. 3. 
Marius: Plut. Mar. 34. 3. Pompey: Plut. Pomp. 64. 1-2. Tribunes: Liv. 26. 51; Polyb. 10. 20. 
35
Cf. Horsmann, Untersuchungen zur militärischen Ausbildung, 53-55: “der centurio für alle Teile 
der Ausbildung zuständig war.” 
36
Liv. 28. 48. 4. 
37
Veg. Mil. 2. 5. See Phang, Roman Military Service, 38-39. 
38
Cic. Tusc. Disp. 2.16; Jos. BJ 3. 72-76; Arr. Tac. 40. This is supported later by Vegetius (Mil. 1. 
27; 2. 23. 2-3). 
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praefectus castrorum.
39
  Centurions themselves set the model by continuing their own 
training through drills in marching or fighting.
40
  During the second century, more 
specialized training positions developed, and a number of centurions appear in the 
epigraphic record with the titles of exercitator, doctor armorum/cohortis, and 
campidoctor.  Their specific duties and status, however, remain obscure.
41
   
The locus in which training typically occurred was crucial to its social impact.  
The Roman military’s attention to marching camps and other fortifications has been 
described by Luttwak as “the most characteristic device of the Roman art of war.”42  
Their construction seems to have become a common practice by the mid-second century 
BCE at the latest.
43
  The legions’ proficiency in this activity impressed contemporaries 
such as Polybius to a degree that he described the process and layout in detail.
44
  During 
the Principate, the increasingly static functions of legions ensured that camps and smaller 
fortifications became the soldiers’ homes.  Archaeological evidence demonstrates the 
increasing complexity and durability of these permanent fortifications, and ancient 
                                                 
39
Veg. Mil. 2. 4. 3-8; Jos. BJ 3. 5. 1. See also Tac. Ann. 13. 35; Veg. Mil. 1. 4, 11-14; Herod. 8. 1. 
5. On training in general, cf.  Webster, Imperial Roman Army, 116; Campbell, The Roman Army, 47; 
Davies, Service in the Roman Army, 14-18; Horsmann, Untersuchungen zur militärischen Ausbildung, 82-
92. 
40See Hadrian’s praise of the centurions in speech to legion at Lambaesis above, Chapter Two, n. 
23. 
41
E.g., T. Aurelius Decimus (CIL II 4083 = ILS 2416), T. Flavius Virilis (CIL VIII 2877 = ILS 
2653). Centurions as exercicatores are most commonly associated with the equites singulares Augustii 
rather than the legions. See Veg. Mil. 3. 8. 11; ILS 2182, 2187, 2453. Centurions functioned as 
campidoctores in the fourth century, but the position appears to have become more prestigious by the fifth 
century. Cf. P. Rance, “Campidoctores Vicarii vel Tribuni: The Senior Regimental Officers of the Late 
Roman Army and the Rise of the Campidoctor” in A. S. Lewin & P. Pellegrini, eds., The Late Roman Army 
in the Near East from Diocletian to the Arab Conquest, (Oxford, 2007), 395-409, esp. 404-406. 
42
Luttwak, Grand Strategy, 55. 
43Aeneas’ first action upon arrival in Italy is to construct a camp (Verg. Aen. 7. 126-129). Camps 
are consistently constructed during the Second Punic War (Liv. 25. 37), and Plutarch (Pyrrh. 16. 5) claims 
that Pyrrhus was impressed by this activity. Earliest secure archaeological evidence is from mid-second 
century Spain. See Keppie, Making of the Roman Army, 36-38, 44-51. 
44
Polyb. 6. 27-37. 
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authors of the Imperial period continued to emphasize their strength and importance to 
the Roman military.
45
  Centurions were involved in almost all aspects of legionary camps 
and fortifications, from their construction and physical layout to the activities within 
them.  The camp, therefore, crucially provided centurions with a context outside of battle 
where they might further define their relationship with soldiers under their command. 
The strong tie between centurion, camp, and soldier began with the camp’s 
construction.  For marching camps of the Republic, Polybius asserts that while tribunes 
maintained overall supervision, the centurions superintended all physical details of 
construction of the camp and stockades for their respective maniples.  It was also typical 
for commanders to send centurions ahead of a marching legion to survey and choose 
suitable position for the camp.
46
  This was not only because of the centurions’ experience, 
but also because the process of establishing a camp (“castramentation”) was understood 
to be a disciplinary activity in itself.
47
 
Roman commanders had long viewed constructive labour as a method to reassert 
discipline.  Corbulo was especially famous for employing this tactic.  In CE 47, for 
example, he ordered his men to dig a twenty-three mile-long canal between the Mosa and 
Rhine rivers.
48
  This construction, moreover, was often the first and most important type 
of training for tirones.  Accuracy in building one’s portion of the fortifications 
                                                 
45
Cn. Domitius Corbulo apparently quipped (Frontin. Strat. 4. 7. 2) that “the pick was the weapon 
with which to beat the enemy” (dolabra id est operibus hostem vincendum). Josephus (BJ 3. 83-84) 
claimed that it seemed that cities sprang up on the spur of a moment. See also Veg. Mil. 1. 4; 1. 21. Cf. 
Davies, Service in the Roman Army, 124-137. 
46
Polyb. 6. 34. 2; Caes. BG 2. 17. 
47
Disciplina castrorum: Polyb. 6. 33-38; Val. Max. 6. 1. 11; Suet. Vesp. 4. 6; Veg. Mil. 1. 1. Cf. 
Horsmann, Untersuchungen zur militärischen Ausbildung, 164-171, esp. 165. 
48
Tac. Ann. 11. 20. Marius had his men improve navigation on the Rhône when waiting to engage 
the Cimbri (Plut. Mar. 15). Cf. App. Iber. 86; Caes. BG 1. 42; Tac. Ann. 1. 35. On the disciplinary aspect of 
labour, see Horsmann, Untersuchungen zur militärischen Ausbildung, 164-186; Phang, Roman Military 
Service, 67-70, 201-247; Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts, 248-254. 
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emphasized individual responsibility for the security of the entire unit.
49
  Since building 
these camps was both a form of disciplina and a phase of training, it was natural that 
centurions were heavily involved.  They were expected to supervise the labour of their 
soldiers very closely, measuring construction with ten-foot rods to make sure that each 
soldier completed his allotted portion:  
After this, it is then inspected and measured by the centurions, and anyone whose 
work has been negligent is punished. The recruit is therefore to be trained in this 
exercise so that whenever necessity demands it, he can fortify a camp quickly, 
securely, and without confusion.
50
   
 
The centurion’s disciplinary authority, therefore, was intrinsically tied to the physical 
construction of the camp. 
 This connection between the centurionate and the camp relates to another crucial 
locus in which the relationship between milites and centurions was defined: the physical 
space of the camp itself.  Social and institutional divisions and hierarchies can often be 
established in spaces between people, things, and practices (e.g., men’s versus women’s 
quarters, public versus private space).
51
  Thus, the position and size of centurions’ 
quarters within legionary fortifications and camps could help to define the status of 
centurions relative to both their inferiors and superiors. 
According to Polybius’ descriptions, in the legionary marching camps of the 
second century BCE, centurions were quartered at either end of each maniple’s line of 
                                                 
49
Veg. Mil. 1. 25. 1-5; 1. 4; Hadrian’s speech at Lambaesis (see above, Chapter Two, n. 23) On 
training in general, see Davies, Service in the Roman Army, 93-123 
50
Veg. Mil. 1. 25. 2-3: Post hoc a centurionibus fossa inspicitur ac mensuratur et uindicatur in 
eos, qui neglegentius fuerint operati. Ad hunc ergo usum instituendus est tiro, ut, cum necessitas 
postulauerit, sine perturbatione et celeriter et caute castra possit munire. On the measuring rod, see Mil. 3. 
8. 13. 
51
On space as the principal locus for objectifying ideologies, see Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 
195-228; Bourdieu, Outline, 89. Cf. Hoy, Critical Resistance, 65, 107. For extensive discussion of Roman 
fortifications, see Webster, Roman Imperial Army, 166-220; Davies, Service in the Roman Army, 124-137. 
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tents.
52
  This arrangement appears to reflect the physical position relative to their soldiers 
that centurions supposedly occupied in combat.  Their tents were noticeably distinguished 
from the larger tribunes’ quarters, which were attached not to those of the soldiers, but to 
the array of tents beside the legionary commander (the praetorium).
53
  This layout might 
be as we would expect for centurions of the Republican period – they flanked their 
soldiers, with whom they were more closely associated in social status and functions than 
with the military tribunes.   
During the Principate, however, when we begin to find evidence for more 
permanent Roman fortifications, there have been some subtle developments.  It should be 
noted that much of the archaeological evidence for specifically legionary camps is limited 
to the western regions of the empire, particularly those in Britain and along the Rhine and 
Danube rivers.  Moreover, there was no “standard” layout for permanent Roman 
fortresses.  Each differed according to available local materials and topography, or the 
category of the unit stationed there (legion, auxilia, numeri, classes).  What evidence 
there is, however, suggests that several features appear to have been common among 
legionary fortresses.  Barrack blocks were now organized according to cohort rather than 
maniple, and were ten in number, each divided into the six rows of centuriae, and then 
divided further into eight-men contubernia.  Placed at the end of each row of contubernia 
were the centurions’ quarters.54  This layout resembles the organization of Republican 
camps as described by Polybius, in that the centurions again lived adjacent to the row of 
                                                 
52
Polyb. 6. 30. 5. See Appendix C, Fig. 1. 
53
Cf. Keppie, Making of the Roman Army, 36-38. 
54
E.g., at Inchtuthil and Caerleon (Appendix C, figs. 2-3). Cf. E. Shirley, Building a Roman 
Legionary Fortress (Charleston, 2001), 15; N. Hanel, “Military Camps, Canabae, and Vici: the 
Archaeological Evidence” in Companion, 407. 
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quarters for the milites.  The size of the centurion’s quarters, however, has become much 
larger.  The earliest evidence from fortresses on the Rhine during the Augustan period 
has their quarters roughly double the size of the cramped eight-men contubernia.
55
   
The centurion’s quarters seem to have grown even larger during the Flavian 
period.  While the average post-Augustan contubernium was a crowded 9m
2
, the average 
centurion’s block now appears to have grown to a rather luxurious 230-259m2, with some 
close to double that size.  This meant that the centurions’ quarters in some camps 
comprised between thirty to forty percent of each entire barrack block.
56
  The quality of 
building materials in centurions’ quarters also improved.  While their quarters’ floors 
during the Augustan period were merely dirt, they later became made of timber by the 
reign of Claudius, and then concrete by the Flavian dynasty.  By the second century CE, 
some centurions’ houses possessed separate drainage outlets, heated brick floors and 
hypocausts, others even with painted plaster walls, and floor mosaics.
57
  The houses for 
centurions of the first cohort (primi ordines), moreover, seem to have been even more 
splendid.  At Inchtuthil and Nijmegen, their houses had central courtyards with exterior 
windows, and were not much smaller in overall size than those of the military tribunes.
58
   
The increasing size of centurions’ quarters is obviously connected with the 
growth of the rank in pay and status during the first two centuries CE.  It is notable, 
                                                 
55
At Oberaden and Dangstetten. The doubled size of the quarters corresponds with Hyginus (127f. 
1). Cf. Hoffmann, “The Quarters of Legionary Centurions,” 134. See also Appendix C, Figs. 4a, 4b, 5a. 
56
Appendix C, Figs. 2-3. Centurions’ quarters were roughly 230m2 at Inchtuthil, but 400m2 at 
Lambaesis. See B. Hoffmann, “The Quarters of Legionary Centurions,” 111; Shirley, Building, 52; 
MacMullen, “The Legion as a Society,” 227. 
57
Drainage outlets: Caerleon. Heated floors: Carnuntum, Vindonissa. Hypocausts: Carnuntum, 
Bonn, Regensburg. Mosaics: Bonn. Wall painting: Nijmegan, Caerleon. Cf. Hoffmann, “Quarters of 
Legionary Centurions,” 118-121, 140; Shirley, Building, 64. 
58
See Appendix C, Fig. 6. Cf. Keppie, Making of the Roman Army, 174-179. 
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however, that while these quarters were now grander and more opulent, they nonetheless 
remained attached to the soldiers’ barrack blocks.  Moreover, in comparing positive 
features (e.g., windows, heating, freshwater basins, concrete floors) of centurions’ houses 
with more negative (e.g., open drains, unlit rooms, crude latrines), it is clear that the best-
quality quarters for centurions were consistently those located closest to contubernia.
59
  
The physical space of the centurions’ quarters in camp, therefore, further defined their 
intermediate status in the legions between rank and file and commanding officers.  While 
enjoying increased pay and some of the luxuries and status of a tribune, they nonetheless 
emphasized their bonds with the milites by locating their quarters beside the barrack 
blocks.  
In addition to their housing, the mere physical presence of the centurions 
themselves in the camp helped to define the soldiers’ activities and responsibilities.  To 
withdraw all the centurions from a camp, for example, could be used as a disciplinary 
tactic against mutinous soldiers.  In CE 69, soldiers of Legio I Germanica refused to 
accept Galba as Rome’s new emperor and mutinied.  While their legionary commander, 
Flavius Valens, fled and concealed himself, the praefectus castrorum (unsurprisingly, a 
former centurion) found a solution that brought the rebellious soldiers back into the fold: 
[He] helped the situation by the device of forbidding the centurions to make the 
rounds of the pickets and of omitting the usual trumpet call to summon the 
soldiers to their military duties. The result was that they were all amazed, and they 
began to look at each other in perplexity, frightened by the simple fact that no one 
was in command.
60
 
 
                                                 
59Hoffman, “Quarters of Legionary Centurions,” 139. 
60
Tac. Hist. 2. 29: addit consilium, vetitis obire vigilias centurionibus, omisso tubae sono, quo 
miles ad belli munia cietur. igitur torpere cuncti, circumspectare inter se attoniti et id ipsum quod nemo 
regeret paventes. 
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The physical withdrawal of the centurions not only left the soldiers disoriented and 
disorganized, but also served to unravel the symbolic structure of the legionary camp, and 
how the soldiers defined themselves according to it.   
The opportunities for the centurion to define his authority and acclimatize soldiers 
to military life in the camp, however, were limited by military developments during the 
Principate.  Massive numbers of soldiers needed to be dispersed across a wide area in 
order to ease the burdens on local food and water supply.  To supply the legionary camps 
and ensure communication between them and local communities also required extensive 
garrisoning, observation, and protection of transportation routes.
61
  As the legions became 
less involved in major campaigns rather than dealing with smaller and diverse threats to 
the security of the frontiers, Rome’s military manpower was increasingly spread over a 
very wide geographic area, with individuals assigned to all kinds of assignments, often 
for extended periods of time.
62
  Annual rosters (pridiana) for a legion’s available 
manpower demonstrate that a significant proportion of some legions’ soldiers and 
officers were away from their parent unit, engaged in activities as varied as building 
projects, tax-collecting, and policing.
63
  Cohorts, centuriae, and contubernia, even within 
a single fortification, could occasionally be mixed or dispersed.
64
   
The legionary camp alone, therefore, was insufficient or too impermanent a 
context for fostering cohesion among its soldiers and for defining the centurions’ 
                                                 
61
This is one reason why Caesar wintered his legions in separate locations within Gaul. See M. C. 
Bishop, “Praesidium: Social, Military, and Logistical Aspects of the Roman Army’s Provincial Distribution 
During the Early Principate” in Roman Army as a Community, 112. 
62
Luttwak, The Grand Strategy, 61, described these as “low-intensity threats.” 
63
These activities are addressed in more detail below, Chapter Six. 
64
M .C. Bishop, “Praesidium: Social, Military, and Logistical Aspects of the Roman Army’s 
Provincial Distribution During the Early Principate” in Roman Army as a Community, 111-118; 
Goldsworthy, Roman Army at War, 25. 
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relationship with them.  As we shall see, however, other duties and aspects of the 
centurionate continued the process of defining the centurion’s authority and loyalties to 
the military hierarchy beyond the confines of the camp. 
 
5.4 Integration beyond the Ramparts 
5.4.1 Self-Identification by Unit  
Discussions on cohesion and integration of Roman soldiers in the legions have 
been strongly influenced by studies in military history.  Marshall argued, for example, 
that the presence or presumed presence of comrades is essential to cohesion and combat 
motivation.  Soldiers will fight better if integrated and maintained in small units rather 
than as individuals in a larger division.
65
  Marshall’s emphasis on the importance of the 
smaller, primary unit was adopted into perspectives on cohesion in Roman units – a 
Roman soldier would be unwilling to risk his neck for a group among whom he had no 
identity.  The eight-soldier unit (contubernium), therefore, seemed the logical place for 
this sort of social bonding between milites.
66
   
Doubts have been raised, however, to assigning too much emphasis on primary 
unit cohesion to combat motivation and military commitment, since factors such as 
individual leadership, ideology, religious belief, and concepts of honour or duty were also 
important.
67
  There is little evidence, moreover, for a Roman emphasis on the identity and 
                                                 
65
Marshall, Men Against Fire, 42, 65, 151-153. 
66E.g., MacMullen, “Legion as society,” 230; Goldsworthy, Roman Army at War, 252-253. On 
contubernia seen as a mess unit, see Webster, Roman Imperial Army, 114. 
67
E.g., Bartov, Hitler’s Army; S. J. Watson, “Religion and combat motivation in the Confederate 
armies,” JMH 58.1 (1994), 29-55; J. M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the 
Civil War (New York, 1997); Kindsvatter, American Soldiers; S. Wessely, “Twentieth-Century Theories on 
Combat Motivation and Breakdown,” JCH 41.2 (2006), 269-286. 
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importance of the contubernia, or the small unit as a factor in combat performance.
68
  
There are also objections against such emphasis on the importance of primary unit 
cohesion in military organizations in general, especially when it fails to account for the 
fact that soldiers might identify with several levels of units at the same time.  Kellett, for 
example, notes that there is identification with the small unit in combat, but outside of 
combat it is more often with the company or unit with relative administrative, tactical, 
and disciplinary self-containment.  An obvious example in the modern Canadian or 
British militaries is the regiment, which has its own colours, battle honours, dress, 
traditions, history, geographic location, or association.
69
   
Another consideration, moreover, is to distinguish between cohesion and esprit de 
corps.  Montgomery is credited with first distinguishing between the two: 
Cohesion denotes the feelings of belonging and solidarity that occur mostly at the 
primary group level and result from sustained interaction, both formal and 
informal, among group members on the basis of common experiences, 
interdependence, and shared goals and values.  Esprit denotes feelings of pride, 
unity of purpose, and adherence to an ideal represented by the unit, and it 
generally applies to larger units with more formal boundaries than those of the 
primary group.
70
 
 
The emphasis on the regiment would seem more applicable to the Roman military, since 
it is widely recognized that the equivalently sized unit, the legion, supposedly possessed 
many of the characteristics of esprit Montgomery listed.  The centuria too, however, was 
critical to defining a Roman legionary’s identity and socializing him with his comrades.  
                                                 
68E.g., Wheeler, “Battles and Frontiers,” 644-648; Harris, “Readings,” 304. Lendon, Soldiers and 
Ghosts, 254-259, 432. 
69
Kellett, Combat Motivation, 44-49, 97. On structural and social weaknesses of the British 
regimental system, however, see French, Military Identities, passim. On overlapping loyalties and bonding, 
see Siebold, “The Essence of Military Group Cohesion,” 277-288. 
70
Speech by Montgomery (1946), quoted in Kellett, Combat Motivation, 46. On identification 
primarily with the regiment and esprit de corps, cf. Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic, 29-30. 
 193 
 
The centurions who commanded this type of unit likewise were essential to this process, 
both functionally and symbolically. 
The previous chapter argued that the centuria rather than the cohort was the chief 
tactical unit in the legions.  It also seems to have been the chief unit of identification for 
soldiers.  It was small enough to allow its members to form personal bonds with each 
other and their officers, yet large enough to require its own administration and 
supervisory officer.  According to Vegetius, soldiers were even arranged in ranks for 
battle that corresponded with the order in which they were first enrolled into their 
centuria.
71
  Inspections, soldiers’ accounts, the issuing of commander’s orders, 
requisitioning of supply (annona), and assigning of fatigues were all managed at the level 
of the centuria, and centurions appear to have had their own staffs for assisting them in 
carrying out these duties.
72
  Archaeological and epigraphic evidence suggests, moreover, 
that the ownership of all kinds of equipment and materials, including small blades, 
bronze washers, and wooden tablets, was identified by which centuria it belonged to, 
usually by the name of the centurion himself.
73
   
By the first century CE, although one’s legion was a source of pride, Roman 
legionaries appear to have identified themselves most strongly by their centuria.  It was 
the locus where camaraderie was formed and military practices were developed.
74
  By the 
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Veg. Mil. 1. 26. 
72Soldier’s accounts: Fink, RMR 74. There is evidence that a legion had a centurio frumentarius 
chosen specifically for acquiring food supplies, under the supervision of the primuspilus, though the 
tribunus laticlavus might have done this for armies in the field. Cf. P. Kehne, “War and Peacetime 
Logistics: Supplying Imperial Armies in East and West” in Companion, 327-331; J. Roth, The Logistics of 
the Roman Army at War (Leiden; Boston; Köln, 1999), 88, 274; Richier, Centuriones, 537-538, 560-570. 
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See CIL  XIII 7060a, 10027, 11525; AE 1926, 11; 1946, 262; 1996, 1176. 
74
See analysis by Le Roux, “Armée et société,” 263-264, on military epitaphs that highlight this 
level of identification.  
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early second century CE, the names of specific commanding centurions become 
commonly used to designate milites.  Official correspondence addressed to a miles, for 
example, could identify him by his centurion’s name.75  Dio claims, moreover, that by the 
reign of Domitian, soldiers inscribed the names of their centurions on their shields.
76
  
This was obviously useful for forming or reforming ranks in battle, but it also reaffirmed 
the unit to which the soldier belonged.  Soldiers also identified themselves by their 
centurion in commemorative documents.  Votive and dedicatory inscriptions by soldiers 
typically list their unit by identifying their centurion’s own name.  A votive dedication by 
a miles at Vindonissa from the Flavian period was supervised by one centurion: 
To Silvanus, Lucius Flavius Burrus, miles legionis of Legio XI Claudia Pia 
Fidelis, in the centuria of Bettuuius Silo, willingly, gladly and deservedly fulfilled 
his vow.
77
 
 
Such specific reference to one’s officer during this period in all likelihood could only 
have been given with centurions, since the average soldier would likely have had ten or 
more legionary commanders during his service.   
More strikingly, this pattern is common also to individual soldiers’ funerary 
inscriptions, such as in this commemorative inscription found in Dalmatia for a soldier 
from the Julio-Claudian period: 
L. Flavius Valens Heraclea, son of Lucius, of the Fabian Tribe, soldier in Legio 
XI Claudia Pia Fidelis, centuria of Iulius Priscus, lived for forty-two years, served 
for twenty-two in the centuria of Iulius Priscus, his heirs saw it to being done.
78
 
                                                 
75
E.g., AE 1996, 1127; BRGK XVII 104. 
76
Dio 67. 10. 1. 
77
CIL XIII, 11508 (Richier no. 128): Silvano L(ucius) Flavius Burrus miles leg(ionis) XI 
C(laudiae) P(iae) F(idelis) (centuria) Bettuui(i) Silonis, v(otum) s(olvit) l(ibens) l(aetus) m(erito). Cf. CIL 
XIII 6739, 7703. Cf. Table III in Richier, Centuriones, 87-95. 
78
CIL III 14999: L. Flavius L. f. Fab(ia) Valens Heraclea mil(es) leg(ionis) XI C(laudia) p(ia) 
f(idelis) (centuria) Iuli Prisci an(norum) XLII stip(endiorum) XXII (centuria) Iuli Prisci h(eredes) 
f(aciendum) c(uraverunt). 
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The mention of the commanding officer of his centuria goes together with his legion.  
This formula for self-identification is found too in a commemoration of a soldier from 
second century Lusitania, in this case without any mention of his origo or voting tribe: 
P. Valerius Flavus, soldier of Legio VII Gemina Felix, centuria of Iulius 
Germanus, lived for thirty years, lies here, may the earth lie lightly on you….79 
 
Most centurions, in fact, are known to us only through their soldiers’ references to their 
centuriae in commemorative inscriptions.
80
   
Epigraphic evidence from the late second and early third centuries CE reveals 
several interesting changes to this practice.  For example, a trend began for soldiers to 
refer to their centuria by the centurion’s rank in his cohort (e.g., hastatus prior, pilus 
posterior) rather than personal name.  In some cases, the sign for centuria is omitted 
entirely, since the rank of its commanding officer (e.g., hastatus prior) takes its place.
81
  
In other cases, the soldier’s entire legionary cohort is identified through a shorthand 
reference to the commanding centurion.
82
  This is likely reflective of the increasing 
tendency to disperse and mix legions into temporary expeditions and vexillationes over 
the course of the second century, making it more difficult to refer to specific centurions.
83
  
Regardless of whether or not these soldiers mentioned their centurion’s name, however, it 
is noteworthy that the officer’s rank itself came to personify the centuria during the 
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Principate, and that soldiers strongly and consistently identified themselves with this 
level of unit. 
A centurion conversely was expected to identify strongly with the soldiers whom 
he commanded.  In addition to praising the centurions’ stern discipline and obedience, as 
well as their individual bravery in combat, ancient authors often moralize about the 
centurions’ responsibility to protect their soldiers.  Caesar gives a speech to M. Petreius, 
a centurion at Gergovia who, badly wounded, attempted to save his soldiers:  
At the same time he rushed into the midst of the enemy, and having slain two of 
them, drove the remainder a little from the gate. When his men attempted to aid 
him, “In vain,” he said, “do you try to save my life, since blood and strength are 
already failing me. Get out of here while you still can, and retreat to the legion.” 
Thus he fell fighting a few moments later, and saved his men by his own death.
84
 
 
Caesar here lays another burden of officership on the centurionate: not only must they be 
exemplars of martial bravery and discipline, but they must also work to ensure the safety 
of their soldiers, and, if necessary, be willing to sacrifice themselves for them.
85
  Plutarch 
takes the point the furthest, when he projects this attitude back to Q. Caecilius Metellus 
Macedonicus, a commander in the Fourth Macedonian War (148-146 BCE).  During a 
battle at Corinth, a centurion told Metellus that he might seize a fortification with the loss 
of only ten soldiers.  Metellus sharply rebuked the centurion, asking him if he wished to 
be one of those ten.
86
  While clearly an example of Plutarch’s moralizing, his account still 
emphasizes the responsibility of centurions toward their soldiers.  The centurion’s 
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responsibility and identification with his unit, however, is illustrated best in their 
religious roles. 
 
5.4.2 Centurion as Religious Representative 
Tacitus has one soldier claim: “The soldier’s particular honour is in his camp – it 
is his patria, his penates.”87  Tacitus here emphasizes two particularly relevant views 
towards the camp.  First, it was the soldier’s community, his patria, of which he was a 
responsible member.
88
  Second, in tying the camp to the Roman household gods, the 
penates, Tacitus makes explicit what all Roman soldiers and officer understood 
implicitly, that the camp possessed the religious significance of a community.  It was a 
sacred space with its own shrines and with walls that furnished its boundaries.
89
  A 
common form of punishment in the legions was to be expelled beyond the rampart walls 
for a period of time.  This punishment had potentially physical consequences, since the 
transgressor was now exposed to the elements, bandits, or enemy soldiers.  Its 
consequences, however, were also ideological because of the great shame of having been 
expelled both physically and symbolically from the community.
90
   
Within this community, the centuria became an important locus for religious 
practice.  The development of the cult of the genii during the Principate, for example, 
strengthened both the milites’ loyalty to the legions and the emperor but also their 
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identification with their centuria, and a sense of esprit de corps.
91
   While there were cults 
to the genius of other sizes of unit, such as the legion and auxiliary cohort, the largest 
number of chapels, altars, and statues by far are those dedicated to the genius centuriae of 
the legion.  At legionary camps such as Lambaesis, moreover, the chapel to the genius of 
the centuria, like the centurions’ quarters themselves, was located directly beside the 
soldiers’ living quarters, emphasizing the social and religious bond of this unit and its 
members.
92
 
As an individual legion was a form of community, moreover, so officers and 
commanders acted as civic officials in presiding over religious ritual, acting as religious 
“intermediaries” between soldier, emperor, and gods.  It was the task of legionary 
commanders, for example, to oversee major activities, such as auspices and augury 
before battle, or the conduct of celebration of the emperor’s birthday.93  Beyond the 
major religious rituals, however, were a host of more “everyday” religious activities.  It 
was in this field of religious practices that the centurions performed a key role. 
In the shift towards the use of smaller-sized military units and garrisons for varied 
assignments later in the Principate, moreover, centurions were usually the senior-ranking 
legionary officers in the vicinity.  This made them responsible for serving as the unit’s 
leader in religious ritual and carrying out the tasks of religious officials.
94
  Individual 
centurions are recorded offering prayers and votive dedications to various cults for the 
                                                 
91
Cf. Stoll, Zwischen Integration und Abgrenzung, 20-21. 
92
CIL XIII 7611; CIR 1360; CIL III 3457; AE 1905, 242. See Speidel, “Cult of Genii,” 1546. See 
also Appendix C, fig. 4a. 
93See Stoll, “Offizier und Gentleman,” 139-141. On celebrations and ceremonies reinforcing 
individual commitment to an organization, see R. Machalek et al., “Suspending Routine Duty: The 
Sociological Significance of Military Holidays and Ceremonies,” AFS 32.3 (2006), 389. 
94
The centurion als Kultfunktionär. See Stoll, “Offizier und Gentleman,” 151-154.   
 199 
 
safety and cohesion of their unit.  These cults included (unsurprisingly) that of 
Disciplina,
95
 but more popular seem to have been cults to genius centuriae, as well as 
aspects of Jupiter, such as Depulsor (“Averter”), and especially Custos (“Guardian”) and 
Salutaris (“Bringer of Health”).96  That centurions especially honoured the latter two 
makes sense in regard to their own responsibilities and concerns as an officer – to 
discipline yet also preserve the health of the soldiers under their command. 
Another common function was to lead the ritual dedication of an altar, as in the 
inscription established by a centurion and his unit in Noricum during the reign of 
Domitian: 
To Jupiter Optimus Maximus and Hercules Saxanus, Sex. Donnius Vindex, 
Centurion of Legio X Gemina Pia Fidelis Domitiana and his fellow soldiers freely 
and deservedly fulfilled their vow.
97
 
 
Centurions also oversaw the consecration of newly built structures.  One dedicatory 
inscription, for example, shows a centurion inaugurating a new sanctuary to Jupiter 
Optimus Maximus Balmarcod at Deir el Kal’a: 
To Jupiter Optimus Maximus Balmarcod, Marcus Verginius Bassus, centurion of 
Legio IIII Scythica, fulfilled his vow.
98
 
 
This temple would have served soldier, civilian, and the veterans of the nearby colony at 
Beirut as a locus of religious activity.
99
  By adopting the role of religious official, 
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therefore, centurions helped to define the soldiers’ membership in the military 
community and acquired for themselves another form of personal authority. 
The religious and institutional association between the soldiers and their 
centurions is apparent even with the highest rank of the centurionate, since the 
primuspilus was associated most strongly with the legionary eagle (aquila).  Marius is 
credited with first assigning the aquila as the chief standard and symbol of the legion 
itself.
100
  While the aquila itself was borne by the eagle-bearer (aquilifer), by the late 
Republic, this totem was most strongly associated with the primipili, and became a 
prominent visual motif on their commemorative reliefs during the Principate.
101
  Juvenal, 
who uses the vitis as a metaphor for the centurion, similarly associates the primuspilus 
with the aquila, poking fun at how old one might have to be in order to “acquire the 
eagle” (i.e., become primuspilus).102  In his work on the divination of dreams, 
Artemidorus Daldianus advises that when a man dreams of giving birth to an eagle, if he 
is not already of high social status, then he is destined to become a soldier and, 
eventually, primuspilus.
103
  Losing the legionary aquila to an enemy was the ultimate 
disgrace for the Roman military, and when the aquilifer was killed or otherwise unable to 
bear the standard, it fell upon the primuspilus himself to do this.
104
  This effort to save the 
aquila sometimes cost the primuspilus his life, as it did Atilius Verus in the second battle 
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of Cremona in CE 69.
105
  The loss of the legion’s primuspilus was devastating, but for 
Verus himself, it was preferable to the shame he would incur through the loss of both his 
and his legion’s symbolic standard. 
 Because of its strong association with both Jupiter and the legion, moreover, the 
aquila was also considered a sacred object with its own spirit (numen).  The “birthday” of 
the eagle (natalis aquilae) also represented that of the legion, and was made to coincide 
on the calendar with the birthday of the emperor himself.  The primuspilus logically 
played a critical role in the religious and ceremonial activity.
106
  Primipili frequently 
venerated the aquila in votive inscriptions, making dedications to the “honour of the 
Eagle” (honos aquilae).  Moreover, primipili even seem to have evoked the honos 
aquilae in worshipping the numina of the emperor and the legion.
107
  Just as centurions 
were required to take on religious functions on behalf of smaller units and expeditionary 
forces, the primuspilus occupied a key religious role for the members of the entire legion. 
 Recruitment and membership within the centuria, therefore, was the most 
important context for legionaries to form social bonds and for the centurion to define 
himself in relation to them.  Outside of life in the camp, one’s centuria remained a key 
unit by which soldiers identified themselves, both in combat and other types of military 
and religious activities.  Centurions themselves were strongly associated with the unit and 
its members, and apparently took pains to emphasize these bonds.  Even concerning the 
soldier’s identification with the larger legion, it is noteworthy the officer most strongly 
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associated with the legion’s sacred symbol is none other than the most senior of 
centurions, the primuspilus.  This association between soldier and centurion, moreover, 
could and often did continue beyond military service. 
 
5.5 The Military Community 
 Military identities, associations, and relationships did not necessarily terminate 
with the conclusion of one’s active service in the Roman legions, so that retirement from 
service offered another context in which centurions socially defined themselves and their 
soldiers.  Many centurions, although upon retirement enjoying praemia militiae and 
prestige that were significantly greater than those of the milites, nonetheless continued to 
associate themselves with their former charges, often in ways that directly reflected their 
institutional relationships in the military. 
 Most of the available evidence for retired centurions and soldiers is epigraphic, 
and there are several challenges in evaluating it.  First, the epigraphic habit for 
establishing stone funerary monuments for soldiers or officers like centurions only 
becomes visible in Italy by the middle to late first century BCE, primarily during the 
early reign of Augustus.  Surviving epitaphs of ordinary soldiers are not numerous before 
Caesar’s dictatorship, so that the evidence excludes most soldiers who were settled by 
either Sulla or Pompey.
108
  Second, one finds significant variety in both style and textual 
description for epitaphs during the Principate.  Styles usually conform to local traditions 
rather than any Roman “military standard,” and there are often differences in information 
and style between an epitaph for soldiers who died in service (usually commemorated 
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among comrades), and those who died having been long retired (usually commemorated 
among family and community).
109
  This variety makes it more difficult to infer both the 
frequency and form in which centurions were settled among others of their rank or with 
soldiers under their command.  In addressing retirement, therefore, we must again speak 
of trends or patterns rather than rules regarding veteran settlement. 
The oldest and most traditional Roman method in rewarding veteran soldiers was 
to settle them in newly-established colonies (coloniae).  By the late Republic, it became 
common practice for Roman commanders to settle veterans in such colonies either nearby 
an established community, or in an entirely new location, usually outside of Italy.  These 
settlements continued to serve an important role, not only providing pools of veteran 
troops for certain commanders, but also in establishing a stronger Roman presence in the 
area.  Augustus himself founded dozens of colonies, from modern Nîmes to Beirut,
110
 and 
later emperors continued this tradition, establishing numerous colonies across the Empire.  
The process by which these colonies were established provides additional evidence for 
the relationship between centurions and their soldiers.  Evidence shows that centurions 
continued to occupy an important position in the lives of the retired soldiers, and wielded 
civic authority in the new communities comparable to their military authority. 
 The evidence for how these colonies were established is limited mainly to 
remarks from ancient authors and soldiers’ epitaphs.  For those of Caesarean and 
Augustan foundation, we are fortunate, however, at least to have the charter for the 
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foundation of a Caesarean colony Iulia Genetiva at Urso (modern Osuna).  It suggests 
that whoever acted as commissioner of the colony during the late Republic selected the 
first magistrates and priests of the settlement, as well as an ordo of up to one hundred 
local councillors (decuriones).  The established minimum wealth requirement for entry 
into a municipal ordo was 100000 sesterces.
111
  The combination of greater pay and 
allotment of land at retirement made centurions comparatively wealthy in these new 
communities.  During this period, therefore, centurions occupied a large proportion of 
these magisterial positions, including the chief magistracies, such as the duumvir.  
Centurions also received comparatively larger plots of land when settled in colonies 
founded by Augustus, while many others were automatically enrolled into the ordines of 
their hometowns as decurions in order for Augustus to secure the communities’ 
loyalty.
112
   
The evidence from the late Republic and early Principate suggests that when 
veterans were settled en masse in coloniae, their organization, allotments of property, and 
political leadership reproduced the social hierarchy from the function and status of the 
ranks of tribune, centurion, and soldier from their military lives.
113
  Tacitus later praised 
this policy: 
For it was not [under Nero], as it once was, when entire legions were settled with 
their tribunes and centurions and soldiers of the same unit, so as to create a 
republic (rem publicam efficerent) through harmony and mutual affection….114  
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This form of settlement had made it easier for M. Antonius to recruit Caesar’s veterans 
following his death into cohesive military units in a short amount of time.  Cicero claims 
that Antonius told men to get back into training, with their drilling and equipment to be 
supervised by the colony’s duoviri.115   These “leaders of the army” (ἡγεμόνες τοῦ 
στρατοῦ) in the colonies, as Appian refers several times to them, can only be centurions.  
Indeed, Antonius eventually formed his bodyguard exclusively from this group of 
centurions, “because they had qualities of leadership and were skilled in war.”116 
 Tacitus, however, contrasts this ideal establishment when he assesses coloniae 
established under Nero and his successors:  
Strangers among one another, drawn from different companies, without a leader 
or any mutual goodwill, were suddenly gathered together, as if from an entirely 
different race of mortals, resembling a crowd rather than a colony.
117
 
 
Tacitus’ contrast is exaggerated.  Grants of missio agraria by Augustus’ successors 
appear largely to have continued as massed settlements in veteran colonies rather than 
individual land grants (viritim).  New coloniae, predominantly in the western provinces, 
continued to be established, albeit in varying frequency, by almost every emperor over 
the next two centuries.
118
  There is abundant epigraphic evidence, moreover, that entire 
                                                 
115
Cic. Phil. 2. 100; Att. 14. 21. 2; 14. 20. 
116
App. BC 3. 5: . For ἡγεμόνες τοῦ στρατοῦ, see BC. 2.  125; 5. 16. On likelihood of duoviri and 
leaders being centurions, see Keppie, Colonization, 52, 105. Centurions of colonies founded by Sulla 
earlier led their fellow veterans in support of Catiline (Sall. Cat. 59. 3). 
117
Ann. 14. 27: sed ignoti inter se, diversis manipulis, sine rectore, sine adfectibus mutuis, quasi ex 
alio genere mortalium repente in unum collecti, numerus magis quam colonia. 
118
Coloniae were founded by Claudius (Camulodunum, Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensium); 
Nero (Antium, Tarentum); Vespasian (Scupi); Domitian (Sirmium, Lindum Colonia); Nerva (Glevum, 
Sitifis); Trajan (Timgad, Poetovio, Ratiaria, Vetera); Hadrian (Italica, Oecus); M. Aurelius 
(Faustinopolis?). Cf. Keppie, “Colonization and Veteran Settlement in Italy in the First Century A.D.” 
PBSR 52 (1984), 77-114; R. F. J. Jones, “A False Start; the Roman Urbanization of Western Europe,” WA 
19.1 (1987), 47-57; C. Ando, “The Army and the Urban Elite,” 372; Wesch-Klein, “Recruits and 
Veterans,” 444.  
 206 
 
legions formed solid blocks within the colony, or were at least distributed in adjoining 
settlements.
119
  Only rarely does the evidence imply that they were mixed together as 
Tacitus suggests, and these cases are primarily found in prior coloniae that 
accommodated successive settlements of legionaries over time.
120
 
Centurions continued to be favoured as the new community’s leading magistrates.  
Nero, for example, founded several colonies, including Antium, where he compelled 
many primipili to take up residence.
121
  Additionally, archaeological evidence from 
Timgad, the colonia founded by Trajan, reveals that allocation of land favoured 
centurions and other officers compared to legionaries.  While such evidence is scanty, it 
appears these conditions of settlement led some veteran soldiers to become tenants on the 
land of their former military superiors.
122
 
 Cases of settling veterans en masse and creating colonies ex nihilo, however, 
appear to have diminished by the reign of Hadrian.  Studies have suggested several 
possible reasons for this trend.  Most practically, the increasingly static deployment of 
legions along the frontiers furnished the emperor with less free, newly-conquered land to 
give away.  Many retiring soldiers and officers during this period, moreover, seem to 
have preferred to receive their praemia in cash, while others simply might have wished to 
remain in the region where they had served rather than be uprooted to a foreign land.  The 
result of this trend was increasing settlement in the canabae that grew nearby the 
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legionary camps.
123
  Even in these situations, however, retired centurions remained an 
important social presence.  For military tribunes, either of senatorial or equestrian rank, 
military service was by and large a temporary occupation before involvement in other 
political or social positions.  This fact, combined with their relatively few numbers in the 
legions, would likely have left centurions generally as the highest-ranking, former 
legionary officers in nearby military communities.   
On the whole, it appears that many legionary soldiers and officers during the 
Principate decided to preserve the identities and bonds that they had formed in the 
context of military service.  Centurions accordingly, whether in local municipalities, 
coloniae, or canabae, maintained a civic and social status relative to veterans that was 
comparable to their military status on active service.  It is thus worth questioning whether 
or not this social and symbolic proximity between centurions and their soldiers might 
have worried Roman military authorities.  While important to strengthening bonds 
between the higher officers and the soldiers, excessive closeness between centurions and 
milites might also have caused centurions to identify themselves more closely with their 
soldiers than commanders.  This problem has obvious implications to a broader question 
about the centurionate, as to whom they associated themselves with more closely – the 
commanders or the rank and file – and whether or not this association could lead to 
instability and mutiny. 
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5.6 The Centurion’s Loyalties 
 One of the oldest challenges for armies and their military officers, especially 
those occupying the middle ranks, is how to find the right balance between showing care 
and affection for their soldiers, yet without running the risk of identifying themselves too 
much with them.  Wellington, for example, considered that “gentlemen” alone were fit to 
lead soldiers of the early nineteenth century British army, but too wide a gulf in social 
status and bearing between an officer and a soldier generated poor discipline, since 
officers who were too aloof could not exercise close control.  On the other hand, the 
officers of a tactical unit must, in the end, represent a coercive, higher authority, to whom 
both they and their soldiers owe their final loyalty.
124
  This issue of hierarchical 
distinction has remained a concern in developing the structure and ideologies of modern 
armies, as Kellet states: 
Even the officers who lived with their platoons tended to think like the enlisted 
ranks and to minimize their contacts with higher echelons. Thus, their response to 
orders involving high risk became uncertain.
125
 
 
As mentioned above, the traditional view among scholars of the Roman military 
is that centurions during the Republic were more reflective of the rank and file in their 
worldviews, whereas during the Principate centurions saw their interests increasingly 
more closely tied with the legionary command and the emperor.  During the Republic, 
while Rome’s aristocracy might praise centurions for their military qualities, their 
members nonetheless associated the rank more closely with the milites.  Cicero, for 
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example, praised a lost primuspilus as a “noble of his own class” (nobilem sui generis).126  
In depictions of early Roman history by writers of the early Principate, centurions are 
consistently portrayed as siding with the plebs against the patricians in the “Struggle of 
the Orders.”  Volero Publius, a centurion described as a “champion of the plebs,” fought 
the senatorial aristocracy to help create the Plebeian Tribal Assembly.
127
  Another 
centurion, Verginius, is credited with leading the charge to overthrow the decemviri in 
451 BCE after an aristocrat violated his daughter.  Livy compares these events with the 
rape of Lucretia and the overthrow of the monarchy in 509 BCE.
128
   
While Republican authors such as Caesar or Polybius often distinguished between 
centurions and higher-ranked officers in both their duties and loyalties, the argument 
goes, authors during the Principate tend to group centurions and military tribunes 
together.  Tacitus especially separates centurions from the greed and of the mob (vulgus), 
as he describes disobedient or crass soldiers during the Rhine and Danube mutinies.  
Praiseworthy are those exemplary centurions who stringently enforce discipline, in 
contrast to those such as Clemens, whose “favourable qualities made them popular with 
the mob.”129   
 This interpretation, however, somewhat oversimplifies the evidence concerning 
centurions’ loyalties and character, or at least many ancient authors’ perceptions of them.  
Livy distinguishes the character of centurions from that of the milites during the 
                                                 
126
Cic. Att. 5. 20. Cf. Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts, 230-231. 
127
Dion. Hal. 9. 39-42; Liv. 2. 55. 
128
See above, Chapter Three, n. 177. 
129
Tac. Ann. 1. 28: alii bonis artibus grati in vulgus. See also Ann. 1. 17-20, 66; 13. 18; 14. 27; 
Hist. 1. 36, 80; 2. 5-7; 4. 19; Vell. Pat. 2. 20. 4; Plut. Galba. 18. 4. Cf. Smith, Service in the Post Marian 
Army, 68.  MacMullen, “The Legion as a Society,” 234. On Tacitus’ characterization of soldiers as vulgus, 
see Kajanto, “Tacitus’ Attitude to War,” 712. 
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Republic.  He does this most clearly when he condemns a centurion’s rape of a captive 
woman in 149 BCE as characteristic of “the lust and greed of a soldier” (libidinis et 
avaritiae militaris) rather than that of a centurion.
130
  Even later during the Principate, 
when the centurions’ pay and status rose greatly, it is clear that the senatorial aristocracy 
remained prejudiced against non-equestrian centurions.  This attitude is most prominent 
in the speech to Augustus by Maecenas that Dio contrives, that although equestrian 
centurions who had been directly commissioned to the rank could become senators, those 
centurions who had initially served as rank and file soldiers, and had only become 
equestrians upon retirement, should be barred, and in no way considered of the same 
social status.
131
  Although eager to praise centurions as models of Roman discipline, 
loyalty, and bravery, the members of Rome’s aristocracy were careful to avoid regarding 
them in any way as equals in status or abilities to those of equestrian or senatorial 
birth.
132
   
Finally, while centurions do indeed bear the brunt of soldiers’ anger in several 
mutinies recorded by Tacitus, that is far from sufficient evidence for concluding that they 
were generally conservative and averse to change.  There are many examples in Tacitus 
and other ancient accounts where centurions not only side with revolting soldiers against 
the emperor, but even appear as the prime movers of the action.  This was certainly the 
case in the civil wars of CE 69, when both soldiers and officers of several legions 
contested the legitimacy of the reigning emperor and sought to raise their own 
                                                 
130
See above, Chapter Two, n. 28. 
131
Dio 52. 25. 6. Cf. Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts, 230-231; Phang, Roman Military Service, 16. 
132See Isaac, “Hierarchy,” 394-395. 
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commanders to the purple.
133
  The disloyalty of some centurions to their commanders or 
emperor became infamous.  Caligula’s assassin and former legionary centurion, Cassius 
Chaerea, murdered him because he evidently could no longer bear the vain emperor’s 
insulting behaviour towards him.
134
  While Caracalla might have called his centurion 
bodyguard “the lions,” his teasing of one particular centurion, Julius Martialis, led the 
officer to murder him.
135
  While the loyalties of many centurions during the Principate 
often did indeed lie with the imperial regime, to whom they owed their livelihood and 
prospects, these loyalties remained subject to specific relationships.  In general, 
centurions seemed to have looked out for their own interests, and placed themselves on 
the sides of either the soldiers or aristocracy depending on the circumstances.   
The relationships between centurion and soldier were similarly complex.  
Centurions during the Principate unquestionably enjoyed great privileges and status in the 
legions.  This position made many centurions envied and others hated by the rank and 
file, while their uninvited entry into higher social and political circles generated 
complaints among the aristocracy.  Their various functions both during service and after 
it, however, reveal also a sense of obligation of the centurion toward his soldiers.  As 
Reali has pointed out, concepts of amicitia in the Roman military helped to define 
relationships among milites, but also between them and members of higher ranks like the 
centurionate.  Amicitia implied a vertical as well as horizontal sense of “friendship,” in 
                                                 
133
Sen. De Ira. 1. 18; Suet. Dom. 10; Tac. Hist. 2. 60; Dio 62. 24. 1; Dio 78. 4. 1. Cf. Summerly, 
Studies in the Legionary Centurionate, 229. For examples of the centurions’ inconsistent behaviour in CE 
69, see Campbell, Emperor and the Roman Army, 107-108. 
134
See above, Chapter Two, n. 30. 
135
His successor, Macrinus, suffered a similar fate from a centurion. Cf. Herod. 4. 13. Dio 79. 5; 
79. 40. Dio’s account of Martialis is slightly different, in that Martialis is awaiting his promotion to the 
centurionate, but is persistently spurned by Caracalla. 
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which military relationships could be emotional or affective, but also obligatory and 
reciprocal.
136
  In this aspect of Roman military culture, James’ interpretation of the role 
of patronage in structuring military authority is perhaps appropriate.
137
  The social 
relationship between a centurion and his soldiers corresponded less with a master and his 
slaves than a patron and his clients. 
 
5.7 Conclusion: Between Vulgus and Nobilitas 
Even for ancient authors, who associated social status so closely with abilities and 
expected behaviour, centurions seem to have been difficult to classify.  On the one hand, 
especially during the Principate, the pay and benefits for centurions during service, as 
well as their gratuities and prospects afterwards, sharply distinguished them from the 
rank and file.  On the other hand, while the social status of legionary centurions rose, they 
were expected to maintain a strong association with their soldiers.  Whether in combat, 
military training, religious activities, and civic life during retirement, centurions 
demonstrated both practical and symbolic obligations toward their soldiers.   
This chapter has argued that because centurions occupied this intermediate 
position between aristocratic commander and common soldier, it made them ideal 
candidates for integrating legionaries into the Roman military hierarchy and helping to 
develop their sense of identity in the military community.  Many modern studies of the 
Roman army have long noted the importance for aristocratic commanders to find the 
right balance between familiarity and detachment with their soldiers in order to earn their 
                                                 
136Reali, “Amicitia Militum,” 35-36. On different kinds of military bonding, see also Siebold, “The 
Essence of Military Group Cohesion,” 287. 
137
See above, Chapter Four, 131-132. 
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respect and obedience.  Phang, for example, discusses how Roman commanders’ 
performance of certain symbolic acts (e.g., sleeping on hard ground, placing themselves 
near the battle) could help to bridge the gap between themselves and the soldiers, and 
foster a sense of pride and unity for their legion.  Lendon, meanwhile, acknowledges that 
since the Roman military community comprised men of widely different social origins 
and expectations, the “military opinion-community” was fragile, requiring commanders 
to emphasize both a broad sense of nobilitas as well as some “grime and spit.”138   
What can be added here is that centurions also performed this critical social role, 
and in a far more immediate way, since they themselves inhabited the intersection 
between vulgus and nobilitas.  While Juvenal might quip in his Fourteenth Satire about a 
Roman seeking easy wealth by “petitioning for the vitis,” he immediately adds: “See to it 
that Laelius notes your uncombed head and hairy nostrils, and admires your broad 
shoulders!”139  Although centurions’ loyalties were expected to lie with the emperor and 
commanding officers, their position equally relied on the support of the rank and file, and 
many centurions went out of their way to demonstrate it – even in their appearance.  This 
position between the soldiers and commanding officers, moreover, had consequences so 
their relationships and functions outside of the military communities.  The next chapter 
will explore how the centurionate was crucial not only to defining Roman military 
authority within the legions, but also among Rome’s imperial subjects. 
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Phang, Roman Military Service, 95; Lendon, Empire of Honour, 241-243. 
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alas. 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six: Military Representatives of Rome 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Among the accounts recorded in the New Testament of the miraculous healings 
performed by Jesus of Nazareth, one concerns a centurion based in Capernaum, a 
community near the Sea of Galilee.  The unnamed centurion appealed to Jesus to heal his 
sick servant, and Jesus replied that he would come: 
The centurion answered, “Lord, I am not worthy to have you come under my roof; 
but speak only the word, and my servant will be healed. For I also am a man 
under authority, with soldiers under me; and I say to one, ‘Go,’ and he goes, and 
to another, ‘Come,’ and he comes, and to my slave, ‘Do this,’ and the slave does 
it.” Jesus was amazed at what he heard, and he told his followers, “Truly I tell 
you, in no one in Israel have I found such faith.”1 
 
This story is the first among many prominent encounters between local inhabitants and 
centurions in the New Testament.
2
  It illustrates that to the writers of these texts, the 
centurion was understood to be not only an important local Roman officer, but a symbol 
of Roman military and imperial authority.   
                                                 
1
Matthew 8:5-10:  ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ ὁ ἑκατόνταρχος ἔφη Κύριε, οὐκ εἰμὶ ἱκανὸς ἵνα μου ὑπὸ τὴν 
στέγην εἰσέλθῃς: ἀλλὰ μόνον εἰπὲ λόγῳ, καὶ ἰαθήσεται ὁ παῖς μου: καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπός εἰμι ὑπὸ 
ἐξουσίαν [τασσόμενος], ἔχων ὑπ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν στρατιώτας, καὶ λέγω τούτῳ Πορεύθητι, καὶ πορεύεται, καὶ 
ἄλλῳ Ἔρχου, καὶ ἔρχεται, καὶ τῷ δούλῳ μου Ποίησον τοῦτο, καὶ ποιεῖ. ἀκούσας δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἐθαύμασεν 
καὶ εἶπεν τοῖς ἀκολουθοῦσιν Ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, παρ᾽ οὐδενὶ τοσαύτην πίστιν ἐν τῷ Ἰσραὴλ εὗρον. See 
also Luke 7:1-10. 
2
Goodman, State and Society in Roman Galilee, 142, n. 136, proposes that this centurion is more 
likely to be Herodian than a Roman soldier, since no Roman legions would have been based in based in 
Galilee. Legionary centurions, however, often served in regions without legions. See also Alston, “The Ties 
that Bind: Soldiers and Societies,” in Roman Army as a Community, 191, n. 61. 
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The previous chapters have demonstrated the centurions’ pivotal role in defining 
important practices of the Roman army – discipline, combat, officership, the training and 
social integration of soldiers – that are strictly military in nature, and largely internal to 
the functioning of the legions.  Another important concern of the Roman army, however, 
was the nature of its relationship to nearby civilian inhabitants, or what in modern terms 
might be described as an aspect of Roman civil-military relations.  It is important, 
therefore, to approach the centurions not just as warriors, but as political and 
administrative instruments. 
Opinions regarding the degree of interaction between the Roman army and local 
inhabitants have varied.  On the one hand, scholars have sometimes described the Roman 
army as a “total institution” or “closed community,” a socially and culturally isolated 
polity sealed off from the civilian society outside, where one’s civilian identity was 
replaced by a corporate military identity, with its own customs and codes of behaviour.
3
  
On the other hand, many studies have challenged this perception, arguing that the 
boundary between the world of the camp and that outside was not as rigid as presumed.  
Archaeological evidence from the Principate demonstrates that soldiers in the legionary 
camps developed strong relationships with people in nearby canabae, and many soldiers 
were quartered outside the camp.
4
  The extensive monitoring by the Roman military of 
major transportation routes and strategic sites along the frontiers through a network of 
forts and garrisons, moreover, suggests that the Roman frontiers (limes) should be 
                                                 
3E.g., MacMullen, “The Legion as a Society,” 226; B. Shaw, “Soldiers and Society: The Army in 
Numidia,” Opus 2 (1983), 133-159; Pollard, “The Roman army as ‘total institution,’” passim; I. Hayes, 
“Introduction: The Roman Army as a Community,” 8. 
4
See study by van Driel-Murray above, Chapter Five, n. 12. 
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understood better as a series of routes for supply and communication than a rigid zone 
that divided military from civilian, or Roman from barbarian.
5
 
Furthermore, the Roman army’s many responsibilities beyond defending Roman 
or allied territory from military threats guaranteed that its members interacted with local 
populations who were both friendly and hostile to Rome.  The legions that were stationed 
along the limes of the empire were not always engaged in prolonged conflict with foreign 
enemies and some soldiers seldom if ever took part in major campaigns, but were 
detailed instead to other, “less military” activities.6  From the reign of Augustus onward, 
the army was by far the largest and most complex state-run institution, and its hundreds 
of thousands of members were assigned to all kinds of civil duties, including provincial 
staffing, engineering and construction, policing, diplomacy, and taxation.   
The presence of the Roman military at the periphery of the empire has long 
attracted the interest of scholars, who have written extensively on the social activities of 
Roman soldiers and their relationships with non-Roman inhabitants.
7
  Some scholars, 
such as Luttwak or Mattern, have examined evidence of Roman military activities along 
the frontiers with an eye towards formulating a Roman “imperial policy.”8  In these cases, 
however, the focus is on the activities of the Roman emperor and aristocracy to an extent 
that overlooks the logistical and geographic realities of Rome’s empire.  There is little 
                                                 
5
Cf., Webster, Roman Imperial Army, 47-48; Bishop, “Praesidium,” 113-117; Hassall, “Homes for 
Heroes,” 39. Stoll, “‘De honore certabant et dignitate,’” 106-136. 
6
R. MacMullen, Soldier and Civilian in the Later Roman Empire (Cambridge, 1963), v, goes too 
far in claiming, “many a recruit need never have struck a blow in anger, outside of a tavern,” but he 
conveys the essential point. 
7
See esp. collected essays in Birley: The Roman Army; Breeze and Dobson, Roman Officers and 
Frontiers; M. P. Speidel, Roman Army Studies; M. A. Speidel, Heer und Herrschaft. Still useful is 
Domaszewski’s Die Rangordnung. 
8
Luttwak, The Grand Strategy, passim; Mattern, Rome and the Enemy, esp. 113-116.  
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evidence of instructions from the emperor for decisions that out-posted officers and their 
garrisons faced on a day-to-day basis.  Indeed, even the local governor and legionary 
commanders appear as very distant individuals.  The evidence suggests, rather, a great 
deal of regional decentralization and local initiative in military affairs, where middle-
ranking officers such as centurions were essential to defining and asserting Roman 
imperial authority.
9
 
This chapter begins to address this oversight by examining broadly the specific 
roles of legionary centurions in Roman civil-military relations.  While several studies 
have noted centurions assigned to specific duties in imperial administration, including 
directing provincial governors’ staffs or maintaining local security in the province of 
Egypt, the evidence has typically been approached piecemeal.
10
  In contrast, this chapter 
combines the evidence for several of the centurions’ non-military activities during the 
Principate in order to present a broader analysis of their role in imperial administration.  
This discussion necessarily remains cursory, since the limitations of our sources preclude 
observing specific centurions over a period of time or examining any one activity in great 
detail.  Papyri, stone stelai, and literary accounts often suggest rather than confirm 
centurions’ relationships with local inhabitants, and illustrate activities that might only 
belong to specific parts of the empire rather than the whole.
11
  In examining the non-
military activities of centurions, therefore, depth must often be sacrificed for scope. 
                                                 
9
Cf., Goodman, State and Society, 141. A. K. Bowman, Life and Letters on the Roman Frontier: 
Vindolanda and its People (London, 1994), 17-18, 23. See also R. Talbert’s review of Mattern in AJPh 
122. 3 (2001), 451-454. 
10
See, for instance, Domaszewski, Die Rangordnung, 29-39; Campbell, The Emperor and the 
Roman Army, 431-435; Alston, Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt, 86-96. 
11
For instance, a majority of legal petitions to centurions are from the Fayum, and there is debate 
over whether this is the result of archaeological contexts or practice. See Whitehorne, “Petitions to the 
Centurion”, 155-169. 
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The primary purpose in adopting this broad approach, however, is to demonstrate 
how centurions served as important intermediaries between Rome’s military and its 
civilian inhabitants.  In analyzing this relationship, this chapter follows the model for 
political relations adopted by Alston.  In this model, the Roman Empire comprised a 
series of sub-polities – social, political, and cultural groups often overlapping and 
interacting with one another – that were “loosely bound together by the imperial polity.”  
As the largest and most versatile Roman institution across the empire, the Roman military 
was crucial to integrating the imperial and sub-polities.
12
  This inter-polity relationship 
depended a great deal on individual interactions between Roman officials and local 
populations: centurions were at the heart of this interaction.  This chapter, therefore, 
argues that through their activities in local administration, engineering, diplomacy, 
policing, and judiciary, centurions were in a position where, to Rome’s subjects, allies, 
and even enemies, they were the most recognizable and immediate representation of 
Roman imperial authority. 
 
6.2 Engineers 
The absence of major conflicts in a given region of the empire allowed Roman 
governors to use the legions’ vast manpower for all kinds of engineering projects.  Both 
legionary and auxiliary troops were frequently detached to vexillationes in order to mine 
precious minerals, haul stones at quarries, acquire timber, or assist in building and 
repairing structures.
13
  The legions offered more than just manpower for hard labour, 
                                                 
12
Alston, “The Ties that Bind: Soldiers and Societies” in Roman Army as a Community, 176-178. 
13
Davies, Service in the Roman Army, 63-4. For more on Roman quarrying, see J. C. Fant, 
“Quarrying and Stoneworking” in J. P. Oleson ed., Oxford Handbook of Engineering and Technology in the 
Classical World (Oxford, 2008), 125-126. 
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however, since they also possessed soldiers with a variety of technical skills.  Legions 
were equipped with their own carpenters, masons, blacksmiths, arrowsmiths, 
coppersmiths, roof-tile-makers, stone-cutters, ditchers, glass-fitters, and sappers.
14
  Such 
personnel were essential to have on hand to assist in building camps, siege engines, 
towers, bridges, and roads.
 
  Some legionaries, especially officers, were skilled in more 
specialized fields of engineering, including architects (architecti), surveyors (mensores, 
agrimensores, gromatici), and hydraulic engineers (libratores).  They were in especially 
high demand on the northern frontiers, where such skills were often non-existent among 
the civilian inhabitants.  In many respects, the army was the most important resource in 
the empire for technical knowledge and labour.
15
   
Legionary centurions were in a natural position to perform a key role in these 
military building projects.  Their traditional duty in supervising the construction of 
marching camps provided them with useful technical experience.  Even more useful were 
their traditional military authority and experience in commanding smaller units of 
soldiers.
 16
  Centurions thus functioned often as both technical experts and supervisors for 
all kinds of engineering projects.  They are attested in commanding detachments formed 
to acquire raw building materials for military construction.
17
  More commonly, they 
                                                 
14
Most of these men were immunes. See above, Chapter Four, 138. 
15MacMullen, “Roman Imperial Building in the Provinces,” HSCP 64 (1959), 214, aptly called the 
army a “technical school for the entire empire.” Cf., Domaszewski, Rangordnung, 25-26; Webster, The 
Roman Imperial Army, 276; Cuomo, “A Roman Engineer’s Tale,” JRS 101 (2011), 160-161. 
16
Importance of both technical and managerial skills: Cuomo, “A Roman Engineer’s Tale,” 160. 
On marching camps, see above, Chapter Five, 186-189. 
17
E.g., TV II. 316; CIL XIII 7703. For more examples of centurions in charge of these types of 
detachments, see table in Richier, Centuriones ad Rhenum, 539-40, 553-560. 
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commanded both legionary and auxiliary vexillationes formed to build strategic 
structures.
18
 
During the second century, especially from the reign of Marcus Aurelius onward, 
we see a marked growth of “imperial building projects” in which army units were 
typically employed.  Some structures were intended primarily for military logistics, but 
scholars have seen an additional, more symbolic attempt by Rome to assert its imperial 
authority.
19
  The construction of guard towers (burgi, or Gr. σκόπελοι), for example, is 
seen not only to have helped to monitor local inhabitants and protect supply routes, but to 
serve also as a symbolic reminder of Roman power, and a warning to potentially hostile 
neighbours.  Since legionary centurions often oversaw their construction and supervised 
their sentinels, they ascribed their own names and those of their unit and legion through 
dedicatory inscriptions.
20
  Following the cessation of a campaign against Germanic tribes 
across the Danube and Rhine Rivers, for example, Commodus ordered the laborious 
construction of burgi at frequent intervals along the great rivers.  An inscription from a 
burgus in Upper Germany details its construction: 
To Jupiter Optimus Maximus, on account of the completion of the tower, the 
vexillatio of First Cavalry Cohors I Equitata Sequannorum et Rauracorum, under 
the command of Antonius Natalis, Centurion of Legio XXII Primigenia Pia 
Fidelis, fulfilled their vow willingly, happily, and deservedly.
21
 
                                                 
18
It was not uncommon for legionary centurions to be placed in charge of a cohort of the auxilia. 
See E. Birley, “A Roman Altar from Old Kilpatrick and Interim Commanders of auxiliary units” in Roman 
Army Papers, 221-231, including list of other examples on 227-230. For other strategic building, see CIL 
III 199-201; ILS 8716a. 
19
See Ulpian, Dig. 1. 16. 7. 1. On imperialist and post-imperialist arguments on the role of Roman 
provincial building, see Cuomo, “A Roman Engineer’s Tale,” 153-156. 
20
See CIL III 3653; P.Fay. 38. Cf., Bowman, Life and Letters, 22; Pollard, “The Roman army as 
‘total institution’,” 214; C. Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire: Soldiers, Administration, and Public 
Order (Oxford, 2012), 224-225. 
21
CIL XIII 6509 = ILS 2614: I(ovi) o(ptimo) m(axmimo) vexil(latio) coh(ortis). I Seq(uannorum) 
et Raur(acorum) eq(uitatae) sub cur(a) Antoni(i) Natalis (centurionis) leg(ionis) XXII P(rimigeniae) P(iae) 
F(idelis), ob burg(um) explic(itum) v(otum) s(olvit) 1(ibens) 1(aetus) m(erito).  
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Other military engineering projects offered a less confrontational image, 
demonstrating instead Roman stability and generosity through structures that supported 
local religious, political, and commercial activities.  These projects could range from the 
building of walls, roads, and canals to more complicated structures like arches, porticos, 
aqueducts, temples, and basilicas, which were often constructed in tandem with local 
civilian labour.
22
   
Here too dedicatory inscriptions preserve the names of individual centurions who 
were directly appointed by provincial governors to oversee important projects.  
Governors in provinces that lacked legionary garrisons could appoint auxiliary officers to 
command the detachments, but might also simply request legionary centurions from 
nearby provinces.  In a Dalmatian monument from CE 173, we find one such centurion in 
charge of a construction detachment:  
During the consulship of Severus and second consulship of Pompeianus, the 
Temple of Father Liber and Libera, which had become dilapidated, was restored 
and had its portico augmented by the First Belgian Cohort, under the command of 
Fl. Victor, Centurion of the Legio I Adiutrix Pia Fidelis.
23
 
 
Since Dalmatia no longer had its own legionary garrison during this period, Victor was 
apparently transferred from Legio I Adiutrix Pia Fidelis, based nearby in Upper 
                                                 
22
Centurion Pomponius Victor oversaw restoration of city walls at Mada’in Saleh in late second 
century. See L. Nehmé et al., “Hegra of Arabia Felix” in Roads of Arabia: Archaeology and History of the 
Kingdom of Saudia Arabia (Paris, 2010), 299-305. Basilica: Statilius Taurus at Syene (CIL III 6025=ILS 
2615). See B. Isaac & I. Roll, "Legio II Traiana in Judaea", in ZPE 33 (1979) 149-156. See also CIL XIII 
8201= ILS 4312, for centurion restoring temple at Cologne, in CE 211. On working with local civilian 
labour, see MacMullen, “Roman Imperial Building,” 32-48. 
23
CIL III 8484 = ILS 3381: Templum Liberi Patris et Liberae vetustate dilabsum restituit coh(ors) I 
Belgicae adiectis porticibus, curam agente Fl. Victore (centurionis) leg(ionis) I Ad(iutricis) P(iae) F(idelis) 
Severo et Pompeiano II c(onsulibus). 
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Pannonia.
24
  Emperors themselves even transferred specific centurions to take charge of 
major projects, as Caligula did in delegating a primuspilus to survey the digging of a 
canal across the Corinthian isthmus.
25
 
In distinguishing between the different types of soldiers in the American military 
during the mid-twentieth century, Janowitz asserted that professional soldiers, especially 
those deemed to be “heroic leaders,” cannot accept the self-image of an engineer.26  Such 
a distinction, however, would not have been understood in the Roman legions of the 
Principate, which were far less compartmentalized and specialized in their activities than 
a modern army.  Indeed, virtues like patientia and virtus were common to both soldiers 
and engineers, and an officer’s involvement in local benefaction was something to be 
advertised with pride.
27
  Some centurions who survived their terms of service and 
involved themselves in civic affairs after their retirement even found other outlets for 
their technical interests and abilities.  Oescus, a veteran colony in Lower Moesia, 
honoured a retired centurion and local citizen during the early third century CE: 
To T. Aurelius Flavinus, son of Titus, of the Papirian Tribe, Primipilaris and 
Chief of City Magistrates of the colony of Oescus, Town Councillor of the cities 
of the Tyrani, Dionysiopolitani, Marcianopolitani, Tungri, and Aquincenses, 
patron of the guild of engineers (patronus collegii fabrum), honoured by the Great 
and Divine Antoninus Augustus with 50 000 HS and 25 000 HS and promotion 
for his bravery against the hostile Carpi, and deeds successfully and courageously 
                                                 
24
The last legion in Dalmatia (IIII Flavia) was moved by Domitian to the Danube for the war 
against Decebalus in CE 86. See Birley, “A Roman Altar,” 225; Keppie, Making of the Roman Army, 196. 
25
Suet. Cal. 21. See also ILS 2612 = I. Pan. 39. Other centurions in dedicatory inscriptions for 
roads and canals: CIL III 200, 201. 
26
The Professional Soldier, 21-22, 46. 
27
E.g., CIL VIII 2728 = ILS 5795, which commemorates Nonius Datus, whose efforts as a librator 
for the colony of Saldae was described by the heading: “Patientia, Virtus, and Spes.” Cf., K. Grewe, 
“Tunnels and Canals” in Oxford Handbook of Engineering, 330-333; Cuomo, “A Roman Engineer’s Tale,” 
159-160. 
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accomplished. Cl. Nicomedes, Town Councillor of the Tyrani (made this) for his 
very worthy friend. Place given by decree of the Town Councillors.
28
 
 
Flavinus’ military honours show that he was clearly no novice on the battlefield, yet his 
interest in engineering was great enough that his patronage of the local guild of engineers 
is advertised. 
In assuming a leading role in these projects that constructed or restored walls, 
community temples, aqueducts and other infrastructure, centurions inscribed their names 
in dedications in order to portray their piety and generosity, as well as that of their legion 
and the emperor, to the welfare of the community.  These projects could be viewed by 
Rome’s subjects in different ways.  On the one hand, such projects could be perceived as 
the manifest of Roman oppression and decadence.  Rabbinic texts record a disagreement 
over Roman rule: 
Rabbi Judah began and said, “How fine are the works of this people! They have 
made market-places, they have built bridges, they have erected baths.” Rabbi Jose 
was silent. Rabbi Simeon ben Yohai answered and said, “All that they have made 
they made for themselves; they built market-places to set harlots in them; baths to 
rejuvenate themselves; bridges to levy tolls for them.”29 
 
Tacitus also famously admits that Roman buildings such as bath houses promoted 
“culture” while bonding local populations to servitude.30   
On the other hand, several dedicatory inscriptions from the Roman provinces of 
Africa, Syria, and Dalmatia during the late second to early third centuries praise 
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ILS 7178; AE 1961, 208: T. Aurelio fil(io) T(ito) Papir(ia) Flavino primipilari et principi ordinis 
col(oniae) Oesci, et buleutae civitatu[m] Tyranorum, Dionysipolitanorum, Marcianopolitanorum, 
Tungrorum et Aquincensium, patron[o] college(i) Fabr(um), honorat[o] a divo Magno Antonino Aug(usto) 
HS L millia n(ummum) et XXV [et] gradum promotionis [ob] alactritatem virtu(tis) adversus hostes 
Ca[rpos] et res prospere et va[lide ges]tas. Cl Nicom[edes] buleuta civitatis [Tyra]norum amico 
dign[issimo]. l(oco) d(ato) d(decreto) d(decurionum). 
29
Shabbat 33b, cited in Cuomo, “A Roman Engineer’s Tale,” 154, trans. By R. Fréchet in M. 
Hadas-Lebel’s Jérusalem contre Rome (Les Editions du Cerf, 1990), with discussion 380-387.  
30
Agric. 21. 
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centurions for their personal generosity in repairing or constructing temples and other 
public buildings from their own money.
31
  Perhaps the best known textual depiction of 
such thanks to a centurion’s benefaction is recorded in the New Testament.  In Luke’s 
account of the meeting between the centurion at Capernaum and Jesus mentioned at this 
chapter’s outset, local Jewish elders actively encouraged Jesus to meet with him: 
When they came to Jesus, they appealed to him earnestly, saying “He is worthy of 
having you do this for him, for he loves our people, and it is he who built our 
synagogue for us.”32 
 
 Whether viewed as sinister or beneficial, Roman building projects were 
undeniable manifestations of Roman imperial power.  Centurions, with both their own 
technical skills and experience in supervising detachments of men, clearly offered a 
valuable pool of officers which the army and local magistrates could employ for such 
projects.  Their substantial involvement and memorialization in the building and 
restoration of imperial structures helped to cast them among local communities as the 
emperor’s immediate military representatives.       
 
6.3 Diplomats and Special Agents 
 The centurions’ activities in Roman diplomacy provided an important context for 
direct interaction with inhabitants both within and outside the empire; curiously, these 
remained unexplored in modern scholarship.
33
  This diplomatic role appears primarily to 
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Africa: CIL VIII 1574; AE 1933, 33 (reign of M. Aurelius). Syria: see A. H. M. Jones, 
“Inscriptions from Jerash,” JRS 18 (1928), no. 10; IG III 1017. Dalmatia: CIL III 8484 = ILS 3381. 
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Luke 7:4-5: οἱ δὲ παραγενόμενοι πρὸς τὸν Ἰησοῦν παρεκάλουν αὐτὸν σπουδαίως λέγοντες 
ὅτι ἄξιός ἐστιν ᾧ παρέξῃ τοῦτο, ἀγαπᾷ γὰρ τὸ ἔθνος ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν συναγωγὴν αὐτὸς ᾠκοδόμησεν 
ἡμῖν. 
33
For a general discussion of Roman diplomacy, see F. Millar, “Government and Diplomacy in the 
Roman Empire during the First Three Centuries,” IHR 10.3 (1988), 345-377, esp. 348, n. 5, with 
bibliography. 
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have comprised two duties.  The first was to escort important individuals across Roman 
boundaries or dangerous territories.  A common opportunity for this task occurred when 
foreign dynasts or hostages were to be brought to meet a Roman military commander or 
magistrate, as occurred early in CE 54, after a failed attempt by King Vologaeses of 
Parthia to invade Armenia.  Having finally withdrawn, Vologaeses entrusted some of the 
leading members of the Arsacid family as hostages to a centurion named Insteius.
34
  In 
CE 72, When King Antiochus of Commagene was accused by the governor of Syria, L. 
Caesennius Paetus, the king fled to Cilicia rather than face Roman legions in battle.  
Paetus consequently ordered one of his centurions to apprehend Antiochus, and escort the 
king in chains to Rome.
35
 
Escorting individuals of such status would obviously have been a great honour for 
a centurion, and worthy of commemoration.  An inscription commemorating the 
extraordinary career of the centurion C. Velius Rufus, for example, advertises among his 
many great honours and positions his appointment under Vespasian to escort Parthian 
hostages:  
To C. Velius Rufus, son of Salvius, primuspilus of the Legio XII Fulminata, 
prefect of vexillationes from nine legions: I Adiutrix, II Adiutrix, II Augusta, VIII 
Augusta, IX Hispana, XIV Gemina, XX Victrix, XXI Rapax, tribune of 
Thirteenth Urban Cohort, (commander?) of army of Africa and Mauretania sent to 
crush the peoples who dwell in Mauretania, decorated by Emperors Vespasian 
and Titus in the Judaean War with corona vallaris, necklaces, ornaments, 
armbands, corona muralis, two spears, two standards, and in the war involving 
the Marcomanni, Quadi, and Sarmatians, against whom he participated in an 
expedition through the kingdom of Decebalus, King of the Dacians, also 
decorated with a corona muralis, two spears, two standards, Procurator of 
Emperor Caesar Augustus Germanicus for the province of Raetia, with right of 
capital punishment. He was despatched to Parthia and conveyed Epiphanes and 
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Tac. Ann. 13. 6-9. See also Jos. AJ 19. 308; Liv. 24. 48. 
35
Vespasian later overruled the order and had Antiochus brought to Greece instead. See Jos. BJ 7. 
238. On Paetus’ authority in Syria, see PIR2 C173. 
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Callinicus, sons of King Antiochus, back to the Emperor Vespasian, together with 
a great number of tributarii. M. Alfius Olympiacus, son of Marcus, Fabian Tribe, 
aquilifer, veteran of the Fifteenth Legion Apollinaris (set this up).
36
   
 
Secondly, centurions were granted authority to serve as envoys.  During the 
Republic, this function appears typically to have required centurions during military 
campaigns to convey important messages or negotiate on behalf of a Roman military 
commander who possessed imperium.  According to Livy, this function of centurions 
existed as early as the Middle Republic.  Roman generals in Spain, for example, 
apparently used centurions as legates to entreat King Syphax of Numidia to join Roman 
forces against Hannibal during the Second Punic War.  Aemilius Paulus similarly sent 
centurions to communities in Epirus to gain their support against Perseus of Macedon 
during the Third Macedonian War.
37
 
This function of legionary centurions appears to have become more common 
during the Principate.  When on military campaign or stationed near the eastern frontiers, 
centurions were frequently appointed to represent Roman legates in communication with 
foreign dynasts.  Common communications included the discussion of Roman treaty 
terms, request for military support, and admonishment against a dynast’s perceived 
intentions.  In CE 62, for example, the Roman legionary commander in Syria, Cn. 
Domitius Corbulo, sent a centurion named Casperius to treat with King Vologases of 
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AE 1903, 368; ILS 9200: C. Velio Salvi f. Rufo, p(rimo)p(ilo) leg(ionis) XII fulm(inatae), 
praef(ecto) vexillariorum leg(ionum) VIIII. I adiut(ricis), II adiut(ricis), II Aug(ustae), VIII Aug(ustae), 
VIIII Hisp(anae), XIIII gem(inae), XX vic(tricis), XXI rapac(is), trib(uno) coh(ortis) XIII urb(anae), duci 
exercitus Africi et Mauretanici ad nationes quae sunt in Mauretania comprimendas, donis donato ab 
imp(eratore) Vespasiano et imp(eratore) Tito bello ludaico corona vallar(i), torquibus, fa[le]ris, armillis, 
item donis donato corona murali, hastis duabus, vexillis duobus et bello Marcomannorum Quadorum 
Sarmatarum adversus quos expeditionem fecit per regnum Decebali regis Dacorum corona murali, hastis 
duabus, vexillis duobus; proc(uratori) imp(eratoris) Caesaris Aug(usti) Germanici provinciae Pannoniae et 
Dalmatiae, item proc(uratori) provinciae Raetiae ius gladi. Hic missus in Parthiam Epiphanem et 
Callicinum, regis Antiochi filios, ad imp(eratorem) Vespasianum cum ampla manu tributariorum reduxit. 
M. Alfius M. f. Fab(ia) Olympiacus aquilife(r) vet(eranus) leg(ionis) XV Apollinar(is).  
37
Syphax: See above, Chapter Five, n. 36. Perseus: Liv. 45. 34. 
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Parthia: Casperius “in strongly worded terms” (ferocius) advised him to withdraw from 
Armenia.
38
  While centurions on the eastern frontier might treat with great dynasts, those 
on the western and northern frontiers during the Principate usually addressed lesser, local 
magistrates or tribal chieftains.  During the revolt of the German Batavi in CE 69-70, for 
example, when the local legionary commander was besieged at Xanten, he sent 
centurions to various Gallic communities to persuade them to raise emergency auxiliaries 
and money for Rome.
39
   
This duty of representing one’s commander was entrusted to centurions even in 
negotiations with other Roman legions during times of political upheaval.  During the 
civil wars of CE 68-69, for example, Fl. Sabinus, brother of Vespasian and consul for 69, 
was besieged on the Capitol by forces in support of Vitellius.  Sabinus sent a primuspilus 
to Vitellius who condemned him for this outrage and advised him to recall his partisans.  
Vitellius, apparently chastened, sent the same centurion through a secret palace exit, so 
that he, as a “mediator for peace” (internuntius pacis), would remain unharmed during 
his return to Sabinus.
40
 
Centurions appear also to have been appointed by emperors themselves to 
represent directly their authority to mediate local disputes.  In CE 19, for example, when 
Tiberius was concerned about another dynastic dispute in Thrace, he sent a centurion to 
order the two dynasts competing for the throne to demobilize their troops and begin 
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Tac. Ann. 15. 1-5. See also Tac. Hist. 4. 37, 57. 
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Tac. Hist. 4. 37. Cf. Hist. 4. 57. See also Hist. 2. 58, in which Cluvius Rufus, governor of 
Baetica, sent centurions to secure support of Mauretanian tribes in favour of Vespasian during the civil war 
of CE 69. 
40
Tac. Hist. 3. 69-70. Cf. Hist. 1. 67; 2. 8; Ann. 12. 46. 
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negotiation.
41
  Although many of these appointments were ad hoc, the centurion’s 
representation of imperial authority could be formalized as an official imperial messenger 
(stator).  This position seems to have been reserved to senior centurions and primipili, 
such as C. Arrius Clemens, who proudly commemorated his official role as stator for 
Trajan.
42
   
In describing Roman diplomacy and “foreign relations,” Millar has raised the 
point that there is no evidence of long-term ambassadors or a permanent bureaucracy that 
maintained formal diplomatic relations between Rome and foreign dynasts and 
chieftains.
43
  The responsibility for ad hoc diplomatic relations, therefore, must have been 
left with local Roman governors and his military forces.  In such cases, centurions were 
especially useful.   
First, to serve as an envoy or escort was important, yet often perilous work, and 
we hear of few high-ranking imperial officials being risked on such missions.  In case the 
point needed to be stressed, the only high official of an emperor sent to treat with a 
foreign enemy was Tarrutienus Paternus, ab epistulis of M. Aurelius in CE 170, who was 
captured and treated poorly by the Cotini.
44
  Emperors and legates required a 
representative who would be respected, yet perhaps was less critical a loss if killed or 
captured through treachery.  Centurions’ intermediate rank, combined with their 
reputation as tough and capable soldiers, made them ideal – or, rather, idealized – for this 
role.  This idealization is illustrated best in an incident during Trajan’s Parthian 
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Tac. Ann. 2. 65-7. 
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ILS 2081. For more on statores, see Domaszewski, die Rangordnung, 28, 48, 73, 82. 
43Millar, “Government and Diplomacy,” 364-368. 
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Dio 72. 12. 3. 
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campaign, when King Meharaspes of Persia betrayed and imprisoned in the city of 
Adenystrae a delegation led by a centurion whom Trajan had sent to negotiate terms.  Dio 
appears to enjoy recalling the consequences of such Parthian treachery, since the 
centurion (characteristically) escaped, freed his soldiers, killed the Parthian garrison 
commander for his treachery, and opened the city to Trajan’s advancing army.45 
Second, centurions and other military officers were perhaps in a better position to 
deal with non-Greek or Latin-speaking peoples (e.g., Marcomanni or Iazyges) beyond the 
limes than high-ranking officials dispatched from Rome.
46
  A rare title found among 
military inscriptions is that of interprex or interpres, roughly translated as “interpreter” or 
“negotiator.”47  The exact functions of the position are not described, but the earliest 
attestation of this position belongs to a centurion, Q. Atilius Primus.  An Italian-born 
centurion during the reign of Claudius, he apparently had learned German dialects in 
order to serve in Pannonia as both an interpreter and negotiator between his legion (XV 
Apollonaris) and the Quadi.
48
  As soldiers were increasingly recruited locally during the 
Principate, we can expect that some centurions would be invaluable as negotiators in such 
languages. 
The great scope of diplomatic situations that Rome faced in the provinces and 
frontiers, including conflicts and alliances with foreign peoples, dynastic disputes, and 
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Dio 68. 22b. 3. 
46See Millar, “Government and Diplomacy,” 372: “The notion that any high-status Romans ever 
learned to speak any of the Germanic, Celtic, Thracian, or Iranian languages...can be safely dismissed...” 
47
E.g., interprex Dacorum: AE 1947, 35; Germanorum: CIL III 10505; Samatarum: CIL III 14349; 
at Damascus: IGRR III 1191. 
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AE 1978, 635. See T. Kolnik, “Q. Atilius Primus – Interprex Centurio und Negotiator: eine 
beteutende Grabinschrift aus dem I. Jh. U. z. im Quadischen Limes-Vorland,” AAASH 30 (1978), 61-75. 
On the interprex, see D. Peretz, “The Roman Interpreter and His Diplomatic and Military Roles.” Historia 
55.4 (2006), 451-470. 
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revolts, often required quick responses from local Roman governors and officials.  Since 
the centurions’ varied duties and assignments often brought them into regions far away 
from major cities and legionary camps, we might assume they were in an ideal position 
both to assess the situation on the ground, providing a crucial source of information to the 
governor, and to form relationships and trust with local peoples that could prove critical 
during times of unrest.
49
   
During the later Principate, we find evidence for a new institution: the 
frumentarii.  To call them the Roman “secret service” goes too far, but they appear to 
have acted as the emperor’s special agents, conveying important messages and carrying 
out executions, arrests, domestic espionage.  They were placed under the command of a 
senior, former legionary centurion, the princeps peregrinorum, when in Rome.
50
  In 
giving this position to a centurion, the emperors appear to have continued a traditional 
practice in which centurions themselves acted as the personal agents of Roman 
commanders and emperors.  This practice had its roots in the Republic, when they were 
depicted as useful agents for ambitious Roman politicians.  During the civil war between 
Sulla and Marius’ supporters, Cinna was slain by a centurion who supported the young 
Cn. Pompeius.
51
  When Sulla himself was dictator in 81 BCE, he sanctioned a centurion 
to butcher Lucretius Ofella, a political rival.
52
  Caesar, who consistently praised the 
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Alston, Soldier and Society, 95. 
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This title derives from the camp of the frumentarii, the Castra Peregrinorum. For examples of 
this centurion, see CIL II 484; VI 354, 428, 1110, 3325, 3326, 3327, 30423. Cf., Rankov, “The Governor’s 
Men,” 30; Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman World, 152-163. 
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 Cinna: Plut. Pomp. 5.1. Pompey himself was murdered in Alexandria by a centurion formerly 
under is command. See Caes. BC. 3. 85; App. BC. 2. 84; Dio 42. 3. 
52
Plut. Sull. 33. According to Sallust (Hist. 1. 55. 21), the centurion himself suggested and 
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bravery and hardiness of his centurions in his histories, eventually made them the 
backbone of his bodyguard when he was dictator.
53
 
The role for centurions as feared bodyguards became especially important during 
the civil wars that followed Caesar’s assassination.  M. Antonius seems to have been the 
first to employ a praetorian guard entirely of legionary centurions,
54
 and Cicero’s 
diatribes against Antonius refer to several of these “belligerent and burly” (pugnaces et 
lacertosos) officers.
55
  Octavian similarly employed them to form his guard during this 
period.  After his victory over Antonius’ forces at Mutina in 43 BCE, Octavian sent 
several centurions ahead to Rome obtain payment for the army and a consulship for 
himself.  When the senate balked at these demands, one centurion, Cornelius, was said to 
have grasped his sword’s hilt and threatened, “This will make him consul if you do 
not.”56  Centurions were also portrayed as the chief assassins in the proscriptions of the 
newly-formed triumvirate.  Appian’s dramatic account of the slaughter noted at least 
twenty such murders, including, of course, that of Cicero.
57
  His account of the murder of 
Salvius, a tribunus plebis, is typical of this role for centurions: 
When soldiers burst in while the feast was going on, some guests froze in a 
chaotic fright, but the commanding centurion ordered them to stay still and 
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Cic. Div. 2. 9. For Caesar’s centurion’s as allies and political agents, see Syme, The Roman 
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remain quiet.  Then, snatching Salvius where he was by his hair, the centurion 
drew him as far as he needed across the table, cut off his head, and ordered the 
guests to stay where they were and make no disturbance, unless they wished to 
suffer a similar fate.  They remained in this way even after the centurion’s 
departure, bewildered and speechless, sitting by the tribune’s decapitated body, 
until the middle of the night.
58
 
 
Ancient writers intensified this thug-like portrayal of centurions who served 
emperors during the Principate.  Both legionary and Praetorian centurions appear 
frequently in the hostile accounts of the “bad emperors.”  Tiberius had a centurion 
murder the last of Augustus’ grandchildren, Agrippa Postumus, and reportedly ordered 
another to beat Agrippina the Elder savagely.
59
  Gaius secretly sent a centurion to 
Alexandria to arrest A. Avilius Flaccus, the prefect of Egypt, while others under Gaius 
play a prominent role in Seneca’s writings, in which the Stoic praises those who calmly 
faced the centurions as they came to men’s homes in order to drag them off to death. 
(Seneca himself was told to end his life by a centurion sent by Nero).
60
  Tacitus records a 
centurion being dispatched from Rome in CE 70 to trump up charges and then summarily 
execute L. Piso, the proconsul of Africa.
61
 
Centurions continued to be used as special agents of the emperor well into the 
second and third centuries CE.  A centurion and decurion assassinated the usurper 
Avidius Cassius, in Syria in CE 175.  In the tumult that preceded Septimius Severus’ rise 
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to power, potential contenders employed one named Aquilius, who was described as a 
“notorious assassin of senators.”62  The extent of textual evidence that records centurions 
as bodyguards, thugs, and assassins is remarkable, and certainly offers a more sinister, 
less noble image of them compared to those idealized elsewhere in battle.  It also attests 
to their increasingly important association with the emperor during the Principate. 
If centurions’ involvement in local building projects only hinted at their status as 
important representatives of Roman imperial authority, then their function as escorts, 
envoys, and special agents of the emperor made it explicit.  For a community’s town 
council, a tribe’s chieftain, a major foreign dynast, or a potentially disloyal Roman 
official, legionary centurions served as powerful representatives to communicate Roman 
imperial authority.   
 
6.4 Police 
The Roman army was the empire’s sword and shield, carrying out raids and major 
campaigns against foreign enemies, and defending the boundaries of the empire from 
invasion.  Not all threats to internal security, however, came from major invasions; small 
barbarian raids, riots, banditry, and crimes of all sorts were a constant problem in most 
provinces, especially in less developed regions.  Although Rome typically preferred 
communities to police themselves, the task of protecting the great expanse of Rome’s 
territory and communication routes, as well as the need to guard and regulate travel 
between harbours, communities, mines, quarries, and other important sites, lay far 
beyond  local capabilities.  While the Roman army never deployed a level of organization 
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similar to a modern police force, we nonetheless find during the course of the Principate 
that it adopted more of a constabulary role, in which soldiers and officers were heavily 
involved in preserving local law and order.
63
  How to interpret evidence for policing in 
the Roman world is complex and lies beyond the scope of this chapter.  Several points 
can be made, however, concerning evidence for centurions acting as agents of local 
security, and how this activity again illustrates their role as important representatives of 
Roman authority to local inhabitants.   
The foremost concern of occupying legions was to provide static defense against 
banditry and barbarian raids.  Legionary soldiers and auxilia were posted to smaller 
garrisons (stationes or praesidia) that were established in sparsely populated or under-
exploited areas, often near important lines of communication and trade.  By the age of 
Trajan, we find out-posted soldiers designated as milites stationarii.  These soldiers could 
remain in a given area for short periods of time, while others might serve there for 
months or years.
64
  They seem to have had many functions, including apprehending 
bandits, protecting public or imperial property, and reporting the movements of hostile 
peoples nearby.  They were most commonly employed in securing roads and lines of 
communication, not only to protect travellers from assault or robbery, but also to monitor 
and control traffic.
65
  In addition to this group were a category of soldiers posted to 
administrative stations: the beneficiarii consularis.  Although originally attached to the 
local governor’s staff, they became over the course of the second century CE an 
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institution in their own right, with privileged immunity from certain military duties.  
Their primary task, however, was not policing, but regulation of traffic, customs, and 
taxes.
66
 
Vulnerable points along major roads were given burgi with their own 
detachments of men (burgarii).  These outposts could be quite numerous.  By the reign of 
M. Aurelius, they were established between fifteen to thirty minute intervals (by horse) 
on the road between Bostra and Damascus in Syria.
67
  Since centurions were the legions’ 
chief disciplinary officers and were experienced in commanding vexillationes, they were 
logical candidates for commanding these vulnerable outposts.  While the distinction of 
“garrison commander” (curator praesidii) is often not indicated in epigraphic and 
papyrological evidence, where it is listed, centurions and decurions predominate.  
Clearly, there could not have been sufficient legionary centurions to command every 
outpost, so that decurions and lower-ranking officers such as principales are found more 
commonly in command of burgi.
68
  Most praesidia and other more important garrisons, 
however, seem typically to have been under the command of centurions.  In Egypt, 
garrison commanders near the wealthier and more important Lower Nile region were all 
legionary centurions.
69
  Such a post was occupied by the centurion Annius Rufus, who 
was appointed directly by Trajan to supervise the valuable imperial mining center at 
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Mons Claudianus.
70
  As with their engineering activities, legionary centurions could also 
be transferred to serve in provinces without legionary garrisons.
71
 
Another aspect of the centurion’s role in maintaining security was to monitor 
certain transportation routes that were important for trade and security or received heavy 
traffic.  Centurions based along important routes in Egypt demanded that travellers 
acquire and present specific passes in order to proceed.  Dozens of ostraka from the reign 
of Trajan, for example, describe centurions granting passes to all those taking the road to 
and from Mons Claudianus: 
Quintus Accius Optatus, Centurion, greets the curatores praesidii of the Via 
Claudiana: allow this Asklepiades to pass.
72
 
 
Centurions stationed at such posts served a role similar to the beneficiarii, collecting tolls 
on trade goods or acting as imperial tax collectors (exactores tributorum).  Several of 
them are recorded exacting an eight-drachmae harbour tax at Alexandria,
73
 while a badly 
damaged imperial rescript from Caracalla to Thuburbo Maius (Africa Proconsularis) 
likewise contains details concerning the regulation of tolls at a garrison there commanded 
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by a primuspilus.
74
  Centurions are also commonly attested in Talmudic scripts as 
collecting taxes from farmers and travellers alike.
75
   
The centurion’s potential personal wealth and role in regulating trade and taxes 
made them potentially useful business partners.  Papyri from the Babatha archive, for 
example, describe various loans and transactions between centurions and local men in 
early second century CE Judaea, at Ein Gedi.  Magonius Valens, a centurion in command 
of the First Infantry Cohort of Thracians that was stationed at the praesidium at Ein Gedi, 
engaged in lending money to a Judah, a local non-Roman citizen.
76
  Other financial 
accounts recorded in papyri demonstrate that these kinds of commercial relationships 
were common in nearby Egypt.
77
  
Among centurions’ more active policing roles, in a context where they interacted 
with local inhabitants, was their service as a kind of local sheriff.  The rise in frequency 
of banditry during the early third century led to an increasing reliance on the military and 
the appointment of special local commanders (praepositi).  Centurions and primipilares 
appear to have been favoured for these ad hoc appointments, particularly in Italy.
78
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Provincial governors or military commanders could also order centurions to summon or 
detain people who were accused of criminal activities or were required for legal 
proceedings.  Late in CE 198, for example, Gemellus Horion, an Egyptian man from 
Arsinoe, petitioned Calpurinus Concessus, the epistrategos of his region.  He asked 
Concessus to contact the local centurion to bring an accused man to court, so that 
Horion’s charges against him could be heard.79   
In the view of Roman authorities during the Principate, even the mere presence of 
a legionary centurion in a given community or region was thought to deter potential 
problems among a local populace.  Trajan, for instance, ordered the governor of Lower 
Moesia to transfer a single legionary centurion to Byzantium, apparently in order to 
discourage disturbances there caused by a high influx of traffic.
80
  Nor was such a 
transfer confined to gatherings of Roman subjects or allies.  In addition to appointing 
centurions to construct burgi along the Danube following a treaty with Marcomanni in 
CE 180, Commodus apparently also stipulated that the tribe’s members could not 
assemble as they wished in any part of the country, but only once per month, and only in 
the presence of a legionary centurion.
81
   
As Trajan’s rejection of Pliny’s own request to send a centurion to the city of 
Juliopolis in his own province of Bithynia demonstrates, however, Roman authorities 
appear to have been wary of placing undue burdens on military manpower and 
resources.
82
  The Roman legions neither supplanted nor reduced the need for local 
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civilian policing.  Epigraphic evidence from the Gallic provinces shows that local 
magistrates and officials such as “prefect of the watches” (praefectus vigilum) continued 
to function in local policing roles.
83
  The unique system of police offices (e.g., 
στρατηγός, ἀρχιφυλαξ, εἰρήναρχαι) in cities in Asia Minor not only continued but also 
became compulsory liturgies for local citizens.
84
  The Roman army’s presence in Egypt 
did not diminish the multi-layered system of magistrates and officials (e.g., στρατηγός, 
νυκτοφύλαξ, παραφύλαξ) of local security there.
85
 
Dio Chrysostom compared the soldiers and emperor to shepherds whose task it 
was to guard the imperial flock.
86
  The relationship between the Rome’s military and its 
imperial subjects, however, was hardly so congenial.  Soldiers and other local Roman 
officials were characterized by their brutality and greed, and supposed agents of policing 
themselves were committing the crimes.  As Juvenal quips, “who will guard the guards 
themselves?”87   
Evidence of local resentment toward Roman military officials is widespread, and 
centurions certainly were no exception.  While their policing activities might occasionally 
earn centurions thanks for deterring criminal acts and providing some small measure of 
security along transportation routes, they might equally make them hated.  Providing 
security and monitoring traffic and trade, for example, could inevitably put centurions at 
odds with local merchants and travellers.  As collectors of taxes and tolls in both 
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communities and the numerous burgi along major roads, centurions occupied a position 
resented by local merchants, and it is not difficult to imagine the grumbling of travellers 
in having to provide passes to and from centurions along the major regional roads.
88
   
Centurions also often appear to have been characterized by their use of violence 
against civilians unjustly and apparently with impunity.  One of the more dramatic 
examples of this problem occurs in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, when the transformed 
protagonist and his master are stopped on the road by a centurion, who asks in Latin 
where they are going: 
[My master], ignorant of the Latin language, pressed on in silence. The soldier 
was unable to control the insolence that came naturally to him, and considering 
my master’s silence as contempt, threw him off my back while striking him with 
the vitis that he held. The gardener humbly replied that he could not understand 
what was said because he was ignorant of the language. Switching to Greek, the 
soldier said: “Where are you taking that ass?” The gardener replied that he was 
going to the next town. “But I have need of its labour,” he said.89 
 
The centurion’s behaviour fits with Epictetus’ warning not to resist the “military 
requisitions” of Roman soldiers: “For if you do, you’ll take a beating and lose your mule 
anyway.”90   In one letter to Hadrian, a merchant similarly complained that, while 
travelling through Britannia, a centurion had beaten him severely and without 
provocation.  He also complained that he had been unable to approach the other 
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centurions of that unit about his problem.
91
  Talmudic texts, often hostile against Rome, 
criticize legionary centurions as both violent and powerful: 
It is like a man who stands up in the market place and defies a town councillor. 
Those who heard him said to him, “You utter fool, you defy the town councillor?  
What if he wanted to beat you or tear your clothes, or throw you in prison? What 
could you do to him?  Or if he were a centurion (qitron), who is greater than him?  
How much more so?
92
 
 
Members of the Roman military might just as often have been a source of 
criminality as its obstacle.  The repeated attempts by Roman authorities to stop such 
behaviour show that local Roman authorities did care about the problems caused by 
Roman soldiers and officers, but they also demonstrate a problem that was endemic and 
never solved.  This is at least partly because in issuing edicts and assigning manpower 
and resourses, the emperor and local Roman authorities appear to have been far more 
concerned with suppressing sedition and the impact of banditry or unruly provincials on 
Roman authority than in dealing with local complaints of petty crimes and assaults.
93
 
While military policing might have been intended primarily to maintain Roman 
control over a region, however, the evidence demonstrates that many citizens nonetheless 
chose to take advantage of Roman presence and seek redress for local crimes.  Likewise, 
although attitudes toward Roman soldiers could be quite hostile, we nonetheless also find 
evidence of stationarii and the centurions who commanded them being well liked by 
local communities.  Statue bases at Aphrodisias praise centurions “for serving honourably 
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and courageously in the province of Asia.”94  The security and protection offered by 
centurions appear positively in texts of the New Testament.  Paul of Tarsus, for example, 
was grateful for the security provided by centurions.  In several occasions he was 
protected by centurions from being lynched by locals and flogged by Roman officials.  
One centurion mentioned by name, Julius, is particularly praised in Acts for being kind to 
Paul when escorting him to Rome, and even preventing him from being killed by Roman 
soldiers after they were shipwrecked.
95
 
From the perspective of the Roman emperor and governors, the reasons for 
assigning centurions to duties in local policing were obvious.  Their reputation for loyalty 
to the emperor, discipline, and fierceness in battle were as clear a message as Rome could 
send to a group or individual that no sedition or military actions would be tolerated.  For 
more serious problems of banditry, kidnapping, or raiding, moreover, the military 
experience of centurions would be invaluable.  For local populations, however, 
centurions were also characterized by their despised role in collecting taxes and well-
earned reputation for thuggery.  The strong attitudes toward centurions presented in the 
textual evidence, whether hostile or favourable, equally demonstrate the impact of their 
involvement in policing among local populations. 
  
6.5 Judicial Representatives 
The Roman military was often involved in local legal affairs, and here too 
legionary centurions were crucial intermediaries between Rome and local populations.  In 
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addition to summoning, apprehending, or escorting persons, centurions are attested 
personally investigating local crimes of all kinds in a specific region.  Papyrological 
evidence from Egypt is again invaluable in illustrating this practice.  One letter from 
second century Fayum, for example, records a centurion’s efforts to deal with a property 
dispute regarding crops: 
From Centurion Domitius Julianus: on receipt of my first letter, you should not 
have ignored my summons, but come to me and informed me to whom belonged 
the crops that have caused the dispute.  Now, on receipt of this second letter, 
come to me, since the advisors of the magistrate, Heron, are making accusations 
against you.
96
 
 
In some circumstances, centurions were designated by a Roman magistrate to perform 
certain functions or judge specific cases.
97
  The first recorded example of this designation 
comes from the reign of Gaius, in which the governor of Dalmatia appointed several 
centurions to act as iudices dati.
98
  Centurions with such a designation typically seem to 
have been required to mediate legal disputes between communities (and kingdoms).  M. 
Coelius, for example, was appointed by a later governor of Dalmatia to represent him in 
judging a boundary dispute in Dalmatia: 
L. Arruntius Camillus Scribonianus, legatus pro praetore of C. Caesar Augustus 
Germanicus, appointed M. Coelius, Centurion of Legio VII, as mediator between 
the Sapuates and Lamatini, in order to establish boundaries and set up markers.
99
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Even the emperor himself could appoint a centurions local judges or mediators.  Tacitus 
credits Casperius, the aforementioned centurion who had treated with Vologaeses, for 
being assigned by Claudius to negotiate a truce in CE 52 between the king of Armenia, 
Mithridates, and the Iberian Prince Radamistus.  Antoninus Pius similarly assigned a 
centurion to deal with a boundary dispute in Latium.
100
 
 Strictly speaking, unless officially appointed as iudices dati, centurions did not 
themselves have the authority to make legal decisions.  With centurions placed among 
civilians to engage in policing roles, however, they inevitably acquired informal or de 
facto legal authority.  Papyri from Egypt and other eastern provinces reveal that by the 
reign of Trajan, civilians were frequently appealing to centurions directly rather than to 
local governors, and that these centurions do not seem to have hesitated in tackling the 
cases on their own authority.
101
  Petitions were made to centurions concerning all types of 
crimes, including contract disputes, attempted murder, assault, and robbery.
102
  The latter 
two are most commonly attested, and the following case from Arsinoe during the reign of 
Sepitimius Severus is typical: 
To the centurio stationarius of the region, from Statornilos, son of Aamatios, and 
Ptolemaios, son of Turannos, both from the metropolis: 
My lord (κύριε), while we were returning from the temple, some brigands rushed 
out, attacked and overpowered us, and beat me to my knees. For a long time we 
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lay like corpses. They stole from Ptolemaios a cloak (a very fine cloak), and glass 
flask, and from me, a ring.
103
 
 
This case illustrates that centurions acting as local magistrates were sometimes implored 
first to apprehend and then judge criminal suspects.  In one remarkable case, a farmer 
from Theadelphia complained that his wife stole some of his property, and then eloped 
with another man.  He petitioned a centurion at Fayum specifically both to summon them 
and judge the case as soon as possible.
104
   
 As discussed above, however, a common context in which centurions might be 
compelled to issue legal judgments involved abuses by members of the Roman military.  
Abuses by soldiers toward civilians such as robbery, intimidation or assault were 
frequent, despite the efforts of the imperial administration to curb them.
105
  Although 
centurions were often responsible for receiving petitions and accusations concerning 
improper behavior by members of the military, it was likely not an easy thing for an 
aggrieved civilian to petition them – particularly if it was another centurion who was the 
accused).
106
  Under Hadrian, soldiers were not to be summoned from their legions and 
forced to travel long distances “without good reason,” especially not merely for the 
purpose of giving evidence.
107
  Even if a plaintiff managed to arrange a hearing with a 
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centurion, accused soldiers were to be tried in a military camp, often by centurions 
appointed to the case.  Roman authors saw the potential problems in this system.  Juvenal 
depicts a grim situation for the plaintiff in his Sixteenth Satire:  
To those desiring recompense a judge with hobnailed shoes is appointed  
before hefty-calved jurors seated at a great bench, 
According to the ancient laws of the camp and tradition of Camillus  
That no soldier may be tried beyond the ramparts  
And far from the standards. “How just it is,” you think,  
“That a centurion sentence a soldier – nor will justice  
Fail me, if I lodge a complaint.”108 
 The legal scene depicted by Juvenal was likely not uncommon.  While the 
criminal acts committed by soldiers could develop into a broader breakdown in military 
discipline, it is difficult to imagine many cases of centurions handing over comrades in 
their unit or garrison to civilian authorities on account of the complaints of local 
merchants.  The soldiers likewise would have been unlikely to report centurions who 
procured a little extra food or gifts for them through illegal means.
109
   
One could of course appeal to other Roman officials, such as beneficiarii, who 
appear commonly to have received local petitions.
110
  As with policing duties, moreover, 
centurions and other Roman officials do not appear to have supplanted or been in 
jurisdictional conflict with local civilian officials.  In Egypt, for example, στρατηγοί 
continued to receive petitions and there is little evidence of conflict between them and 
Roman military authorities.  In fact, it appears to have been common to petition multiple 
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authorities simultaneously – a “blanket effect” to increase the likelihood of receiving an 
audience or recompense.  One letter from Philadelphia in CE 236, for example, records a 
petition to a decurion, centurion, and local στρατηγός.
111
 
Whatever the opinions of individual centurions’ skill in jurisprudence, if a 
plaintiff’s prospects were so patently hopeless, it would be difficult to explain the mass of 
petitions that we find issued to local centurions.  During the second and early third 
centuries CE, centurions posted among communities across the empire appear to have 
developed de facto legal powers, including the ability to summon litigants or witnesses, 
interrogate, grant bail, issue subpoenas, assign civilian arbiters, and themselves offer 
judgment.
112
  This quasi-magisterial authority developed for several reasons.  Through 
their military duties in the legions, many centurions were personally experienced in 
judging acts of indiscipline and other transgressions.  The appointment of centurions by 
imperial governors to their officia or as iudices dati confirms this expectation.  If needed, 
centurions could also seek advice from their own consilia.
113
   
From a more practical perspective, centurions already had the authority to detain 
and hold criminals, and were posted to regions that were often isolated from the seat of 
the provincial governor and his comites.  For many rural dwellers, centurions were the 
chief source of Roman authority to whom they might even think to appeal concerning 
such legal issues.  The product of this development was yet another context where, for 
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many inhabitants of the empire, centurions were the most immediate and authoritative 
representatives of Rome. 
 
6.6 Regional Administrators 
 One of the most important roles of the Roman army during the Principate was to 
provide soldiers and officers to serve as members of the provincial staff (officium) of 
imperial governors (legati Augusti pro praetore), procurators, and proconsuls.
114
  While 
the evidence is insufficient to describe a standard composition or method of forming an 
officium, there seem to have been some common practices.
115
  In the imperial provinces 
where legions were stationed (comprising roughly three quarters of the empire during the 
Principate), a primary task of the officium was to administer the army.  The staff’s 
members were largely drawn from the legions, comprising roughly 100-150 soldiers and 
officers.
116
   
The officium was largely managed by special staff centurions, of whom there 
were at least several types that appear to have been distinguished by function rather than 
grade.  Their exact duties, however, are difficult to elucidate.  The exercitatores, for 
example, are recorded in charge of the cavalry and infantry bodyguard of governors and 
the emperor.
117
  Centurions described as stratores are attested commanding auxilia in 
                                                 
114
When addressing his army in Africa in CE 128, Hadrian stated that his legatus legionis had told 
him that the chief centurions (primipilares) had been compelled to send one cohort each year to serve the 
proconsul (CIL VIII 2532, 18942 = ILS 2487). On proconsuls employing an officium similar to that of 
imperial legates, see A. H. M. Jones, “The Roman Civil Service (Clerical and Sub-Clerical Grades)” JRS 
39 (1949), 44-45; Richier, Centuriones, 549-552. 
115
The primary study on this topic is by Domaszewski, Rangordnung, 29-39. 
116See Rankov, “The Governor’s Men: The Officium Consularis in Provincial Administration” in 
Roman Army as a Community, 16-20, 25; Webster, Roman Imperial Army, 263-264. 
117
See above, Chapter Five, n. 41. 
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senatorial provinces where no legions were stationed.
118
  While these two centurions’ 
duties were obviously military in nature, the most important staff centurion was the 
princeps praetorii.  There is again no explicit description for these centurions, but they 
are attested being attached to the governor and his headquarters, and likely carried out 
various administrative functions, such as supervising the governor’s staff and acting as 
liaisons to local armed forces.  They appear also to have had greater authority than other 
centurions, and possessed their own staff.
119
 
 In imperial provinces where legions were stationed, staff centurions seem 
generally to have been selected locally.  The practice was flexible, however, and 
centurions could be transferred to provinces without permanent legions from those 
nearby.  For example, as governor of Bithynia during the reign of Trajan, Pliny the 
Younger was ordered to transfer ten beneficiarii, two cavalrymen, and one centurion out 
of his own legionary cohort to help form the staff of Gavius Bassus, the new prefect of 
nearby Pontic Shore.
120
  Just as in choosing other members of their officium, newly-
appointed governors could also select centurions whom they knew or had worked with 
before.  Pliny himself was on very friendly terms with a former primuspilus, Nymphidius 
Lupus, and was so trusting of the man’s advice that he recalled him from retirement to 
                                                 
118
Strator: CIL II 4114; VIII 2749, 7050; XIII 6746, 8150, 8203. Cf. Domaszewski, Rangordnung, 
97-98; Richier, Centuriones, 548-549. 
119
On the princeps, see ILS 2283; IGRR III 1230; CIL XIII 8187; VIII 2586; AE 1916, 29. See also 
P.Oxy. XIV 1637, where one is described as πρίγκιπτος τῆς ἡγεμονίας. In contrast to Domaszewski, 
Rankov, “The Governor’s Men,” 18-20, suggests that they were attached to the governor’s headquarters 
rather than his staff, and are inferior to a cornicularius. Richier, Centuriones, 550-552, is unsure. On staff 
(adiutores), see ILS 2448, 4837. 
120
Ep. 10. 21. Pliny also transfers ten beneficiarii to the procurator Virdius Gemellinus (10. 27-8). 
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advise him during his governorship of Bithynia.
121
  Such patronage was apparently a 
common enough practice that Tacitus praised his father-in-law, Agricola, specifically for 
being opposed to appointing centurions to his officium according to personal likings or 
private recommendations.
122
 
The centurionate was an ideal resource for a governor’s officium.  A reasonable 
level of literacy was obviously required for such positions, and as discussed in Chapter 
Four, the centurions’ military duties ensured that most were literate.123  The necessary 
logistical and clerical skills required for centurions to administer their centuriae, 
moreover, could easily be adapted to a governor’s use, and the authority of their rank 
made them natural candidates to command other military members of the officium.   
The most important consequence of this function of centurions, however, was 
opportunity given to them to gain administrative experience.  During the Principate, this 
experience led centurions to acquire their own staff and direct authority to manage a 
specific region of the empire on their own.  The earliest known example of such an 
appointment occurred during the 30s BCE, when Octavian placed C. Fuficius Fango in 
charge of the province of Africa following a truce with his rival, S. Pompey.
124
  Fango’s 
appointment was a case of expediency during a time of political instability, but the 
practice itself became common during the Principate.
125
  By CE 100, we find an 
inscription for a district centurion based at Luguvalium (modern Carlisle), Annius 
                                                 
121
Ep. 10. 87. Pliny had served with him when he was a military tribune. Fronto (ad Pium 8) 
similarly plans to employ a friend with military skills from Mauretania, Iulius Senex, but it is unclear 
whether he was a centurion. See PIR
2
, I 367. 
122
Tac. Agr. 19. 2. 
123
See above, Chapter Four, 139-140. 
124
Dio 48. 22. 3. Cf., Cic. Att. 14. 10. 2. 
125
Vespasian similarly appointed centurions in city garrisons before marching west in CE 69 (Jos. 
BJ 4. 442). 
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Questor, who is described officially as regionarius.
126
  Unlike the title of stationarius, 
which could designate any rank of out-posted soldier or officer, regionarius appears to 
have been reserved for legionary centurions alone.  Evidence for these “district 
centurions” (Gk. ὲπὶ τών τόπων), increases during the second and third centuries.  
Unlike the title of praepositus, moreover, which designated a centurion with a temporary 
command for a specific task, the district centurion seems to have been a long-term 
assignment with broad duties maintaining law and order in a given region, usually in 
areas at the periphery of the empire and far from the seat of the governor.
127
   
The appointment of regionarii appears to have been ad hoc, in that not every 
region had them.  There is also no clear indication of how long a typical tenure might 
have been, but one district centurion at Koranis during first century CE remained in the 
post for at least four to five years.
128
  Centurions appear to have distinguished themselves 
from other centurions by this title, as shown by this second century inscription from Bath: 
This sacred place that has been destroyed by insolence, C. Severius Emeritus, 
centurio regionarius, restored to the Virtue and Numen of Augustus.
129
 
 
This practice was not particular to any one province or region, since we find evidence of 
such centurions across the empire, from Britain and Pannonia to Phrygia and Egypt, well 
into the third century CE.
130
   
                                                 
126
TV II 250.  
127
Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire, 222-223. 
128
P.NYU, inv. 69. See also P.Thomas 5. Cf., Alston, Soldier and Society, 187-188. 
129
ILS 4920 = RIB 152: Locum religiosum per insolentiam dirutum Virtuti et N(umini) Aug(usti) 
repurgatum reddidit C. Severius Emeritus (centurio) reg(ionarius). 
130
Britannia: RIB 583, 587. Gallia Lugdenensis: CIL XIII 2958. Pannonia: AE 1944, 103; 1950, 
105. Noricum: AE 1953, 129. Phrygia: IGRR III 301. Egypt: P.Oxy. I 62. Cf. For other examples of 
regionarii, see CIL III 7449, 7633; AE 1957, 326; 1969/70, 577. See also examples in Africa in Rebuffat, 
“L’armée romaine à Gholaia,” 228, 244-245. 
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Tacitus records a speech by Julius Civilis, the leader of the Batavian revolt in CE 
69, in which he exhorts his troops by cataloguing some of the evils of Roman rule:  
“For we are no longer regarded as allies, as we once were, but slaves! When does 
a governor with imperium, although his retinue is arrogant and burdensome, ever 
come to us? Instead, we are delegated to prefects and centurions.”131 
 
As Civilis’ speech illustrates, in serving as the highest local representatives of Roman 
authority, these centurions had the potential to earn great hostility from the inhabitants.  
Another incident recorded by Tacitus emphasizes the former.  A revolt by the Frisians in 
Lower Germany in CE 28 occurred when a primuspilus, who had been appointed as 
regionarius to govern the Frisians, particularly earned their wrath by his liberal 
interpretation of their required tribute to Rome.
132
   
On the other hand, centurions appointed to administer a region might also earn the 
thanks and admiration of the local inhabitants.  Au. Instuleius Tenax, a centurion placed 
in command of a praesidium by Vespasian during the civil wars, was publicly honoured 
at Askalon for his kind treatment of the town during the reconstruction after the Jewish 
revolt: 
The people and council of Askalon (set this up) for Aulus Instuleius Tenax, 
Centurion of Legio X Fretensis, on account of his kindness.
133
  
 
Similarly, at Aire (south of Damascus) during the reign of Commodus, a centurion was 
honoured for acting as “benefactor and founder of the Airesians” (εὐεργέτης Αἰρεσιων 
                                                 
131
Tac. Hist. 4. 14: neque enim societatem, ut olim, sed tamquam mancipia haberi: quando 
legatum, gravi quidem comitatu et superbo, cum imperio venire? tradi se praefectis centurionibusque. See 
also Hist. 4. 15, for primipilus Aquilius in charge of Roman soldiers on an island in the Rhine delta at the 
revolt’s outset. 
132
Tac. Ann. 4. 72. See also Tac. Hist. 4. 14; 12. 45. 
133
SEG I 552: ἡ βουλὴ{ι} καὶ ὁ δῆμος Ὦλον Ἰνστολήιον Τένακα ἑκατοντάρχην λεγιῶνος 
δεκάτης Φρετησίας, εὐνοίας ἕνεκα. Tenax was likely a primuspilus centurion, since he had achieved this 
position with Legio XII Fulminata in CE 65, according to CIL III 30. 
 253 
 
καὶ κτίστης) for constructing from his own funds a temple to Tyche.  Regionarii are 
commonly praised for their role in guaranteeing local commerce and trade against 
corruption and brigandage, such as the centurion acclaimed at Pisidian Antioch for 
maintaining justice and peace.
134
  The evidence suggests that district centurions played a 
prominent role in local religious benefaction, especially in constructing and restoring 
altars and temples.  These services combined with their functions as local religious 
representatives in the legions may have helped to form connections between Roman 
soldiers and local communities.
135
 
The increasing use of district centurions during the Principate should be 
understood as the logical development of the participation of these officers in so many 
facets of imperial administration.  Considering the many tasks to which centurions were 
already assigned within a given region, from building projects and tax-collection to 
policing and judicial responsibilities, it was natural for local governors to rely on them to 
administer smaller regions of the empire themselves.  By being posted far from their 
legionary camps and performing all kinds of administrative tasks, moreover, centurions 
were brought directly into the communities and daily activities of local inhabitants.  
While the evidence is scarce, it appears again that local attitudes toward centurions were 
mixed.  Depending on the circumstances, centurions could be portrayed as symbols of 
brutality and oppression, yet also as guarantors of a measure of peace and prosperity.  In 
sum, centurions were the embodiment of local attitudes towards Rome itself.   
                                                 
134
Aire: SEG XXXIX 1568. Antioch: IGRR III 301. Similar thanks to nearby regionarii: IG III 
1116-17; 1120-22, 1128; SEG 39, 1568. On similar gratitude for regionarii, see Stoll, Zwischen Integration 
und Abgrenzung, 71: „Einige der centuriones werden sich entsprechende Ehrungen dadurch verdient haben, 
dass sie als regionarii für ein Florieren von Wirtschaft und Handel durch Eindämmung des in ihren 
Aufgabenbereich fallenden Räuberunwesens gesorgt hatten.“ 
135
Ibid., 297-298, 334-336. On religious activities, see also above, Chapter Five, 197-199. 
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6.7 Conclusion: Intermediaries between Rome and its Subjects 
 During the Principate, the Roman army evolved into an important organ of 
imperial administration, with both its soldiers and officers called upon to fulfill a variety 
of civil duties.  The increasingly dispersed deployment of legions along the frontier and 
the use of vexillationes, moreover, ensured that Roman soldiers and outposts were 
typically far removed from the local governors and commanders, so that middle-ranking 
officers such as legionary centurions were relied on to manage Rome’s affairs along the 
limes.  Their experience in military logistics and in commanding smaller units of men 
made them ideal candidates for supervising detachments and ensuring efficient work in 
building projects.  In addition, as provincial staffers and imperial envoys, centurions were 
important points of contact between a Roman governor or emperor and local inhabitants, 
both friendly and hostile.  Their local authority occasionally translated into constabulary 
and legal responsibilities, guarding transportation routes and communities against both 
internal and external threats, and judging disputes as a de facto magistrate.  The logical 
extension of these duties was the development of the regionarii, at which point they 
became the highest Roman authority in a given area.   
In describing the interaction between the Rome’s military and its imperial 
subjects, James states how contact “ranged from the murderous and oppressive to the 
commercial, the amicable and the matrimonial.”  This description seems to fit opinions of 
the centurionate well.  Rabbinic text lists the specific representatives of Rome from 
whom the Jews would eventually exact vengeance: consuls, imperial legates, centurions, 
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senators, and beneficiarii.
136
   That centurions are indicated among this group is telling of 
the kind of hostility that they might incur from local inhabitants.  In contrast to this 
hostile text, however, accounts in the New Testament portray centurions in a positive 
light.  In addition to the centurion at Capernaum who is thanked for rebuilding a 
synagogue and praised by Jesus for his faith, it is also a centurion who, at moment of 
Jesus’ death, is credited as the first Roman to recognize Jesus’ divinity, declaring, “Truly, 
this man was the Son of God.”137  Cornelius, another centurion based in Caesarea, is 
praised in Acts as an upright, God-fearing man, generous both in his prayer and alms-
giving.  He received a vision from an angel to send for Simon Peter, and is credited as the 
first gentile to be baptized by the apostle.
138
  
As with the centurions’ military characterizations as both brutal disciplinarians 
yet courageous leaders, non-Roman opinions of them could vary to the extreme.  For the 
writers of early Rabbinic literature, who were mindful of the Romans’ brutal suppression 
of Jewish revolts during the late first and early second centuries, the centurion 
represented Roman oppression and injustice.  To the authors of the Gospels and early 
proponents of Christianity, however, who were eager to win support from local Roman 
authorities and to demonstrate to gentiles the appeal of the young religion, centurions 
were instead desirable candidates to be portrayed as early converts.  While these 
characterizations are in stark contrast, both nevertheless demonstrate that among many 
local inhabitants of the eastern provinces, centurions were understood to be crucial 
                                                 
136
Sifre Deut. 317. Cf., Goodman, State and Society, 151. 
137
Matthew 27:54:  Ἀληθῶς θεοῦ υἱὸς ἦν οὗτος. Cf., Mark 15: 39. Compare with Luke 23: 47: 
Ὄντως ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος δίκαιος ἦν. 
138
Acts 10. 
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representatives of Roman authority.  Whether appreciated or hated, they could not be 
ignored. 
The previous chapters have emphasized the centurion’s intermediate position in 
Roman military culture, between discipline and aggression, combat and staff officer, 
commissioned and non-commissioned, aristocratic commanders and rank and file 
soldiers.  Matthew’s portrayal of the centurion from Capernaum as a Roman officer being 
under authority (ἐξουσία) yet also possessing it, stresses another essential point.  The 
centurion’s intermediate status and rank within the Roman military hierarchy translated 
into an intermediate position in Roman civil-military relations.  In the Roman army’s role 
of integrating the center and periphery of the empire, centurions were a crucial point of 
intersection. 
  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: The Intermediate Officer of the Roman Military 
 
To be imbued in the spirit and essence of this practice, to make use of, to arouse, 
and to absorb the forces that it requires; to penetrate the practice completely with 
understanding; to gain confidence and ease through exercise; to give oneself 
completely, and to transform from a man into the role which has been appointed 
to us: that is the military virtue of the army in the individual.
1
 
 
This statement has been taken (and sometimes translated) to mean the “the virtues 
of the individual,” describing the ideals of officership on which a successful military is 
based.  The emphasis, however, is explicitly on military virtues in the individual.  
Clausewitz’s concern here is how military virtues and assumptions are internalized and 
manifest themselves in the individual’s outlook and behaviour, and affect an army’s 
cohesion, combat performance, and identity. 
In broad terms this dissertation has similarly explored how Roman military 
virtues and assumptions became manifested in a specific rank of the legions: the 
centurionate.  That the centurions’ duties were important during the Republican and 
Principate is well established by modern authors, but none has sought to explain 
comprehensively this rank’s broader role in the legions, or what its functions, careers, 
expectations, and idealizations can tell us about Roman military practices.  The 
limitations of evidence – the lack of a centurion’s diary, officer manual, or any complete 
                                                 
1
Clausewitz, On War, 187: „Von dem Geiste und Wesen dieses Geschäftes durchdrungen sein, die 
Kräfte, die in ihm tätig sein sollen, in sich üben, erwecken und aufnehmen, das Geschäft mit dem 
Verstande ganz durchdringen, durch Übung Sicherheit und Leichtigkeit in demselben gewinnen, ganz darin 
aufgehen, aus dem Menschen übergehen in die Rolle, die uns darin angewiesen wird: das ist die 
kriegerische Tugend des Heeres in dem einzelnen.“ 
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records of an individual careers, to name a few – require an analysis that is broad both in 
scope and quality of sources, and often leaves us with a frustratingly incomplete picture.  
Adopting such a wide array of sources from different regions and periods, however, does 
allow us at least to form a “portrait” of the rank, one which clearly illustrates that the 
centurionate was functionally and symbolically central to the culture, organization, and 
activities of the Roman legions.   
The centurionate was important to expressing Roman attitudes toward military 
service.  On the one hand, positive Roman military virtues such as forbearance, 
obedience, bravery, and fierceness were defined through the centurionate in several ways, 
from the clothing and equipment visualized in commemorative relief, or the duties in 
legionary discipline and combat leadership of Roman literary tradition.  On the other 
hand, the centurionate also served to represent the “darker side” of the Roman legions.  
The extortion and rough treatment that centurions inflict on their own soldiers, as well as 
their apparent talent as thugs and assassins, help to illustrate the fears and reservations of 
the Roman aristocrat and provincial alike toward the danger of soldiers and their use in 
the empire.  The centurionate, therefore, seems often to have represented the best and the 
worst traits of Roman soldiers. 
Although innovative sociological and philological approaches to disciplina have 
generated more complex, cultural interpretations to understanding why Roman soldiers 
obeyed their commander and officers, I demonstrate that Roman attitudes towards 
military punishment cannot be easily taken to reflect modern ones, and that physical 
violence in this context requires methodical analysis of its political, institutional, and 
especially religious implications.  Similarly, while many studies emphasize the more 
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cultural, aggressive features of the behaviour of Roman soldiers and commanders in 
combat, I argue that calculation or individual judgment on the part of the legion’s middle-
ranking officers must not be minimized; aristocratic commanders were not the only 
officers capable of considering the impact of their actions.  In relation to both these 
points, models for Roman military or civil institutions will benefit from greater caution 
when applying modern categories of legitimacy or military authority. These categories 
have been useful in the past to framing discussion of Roman military organization, but 
they now appear to be inflexible in moving beyond a dichotomy between force and 
persuasion that is more apt to Greek thinking than Roman. 
The centurionate, moreover, occupied also a key position in the command 
structure of a legion.  The rank originally developed during the Republic as a way to 
promote experienced Roman soldiers, thus rewarding loyalty and skill while producing a 
level of tactical command that was needed in the use of both maniples and cohorts in 
battle.  During the Principate, however, with the expanding use of smaller military units 
and the assignment of manpower to tasks of imperial administration, centurions acquired 
a far greater number of duties and opportunities for independent commands, with 
increased status, pay, and benefits to match.  This development led to the rank becoming 
an important representative of imperial authority at the local level. The centurionate was 
also a key component of the Roman military’s social hierarchy.  Since the centurionate 
changed during the Principate to comprise both former milites and direct appointees from 
equestrian backgrounds, it was a major point of social intersection in a military whose 
ranks were otherwise starkly distinguished by social status.  This made the rank central 
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not only to a legion’s administrative organization and combat performance, but also to its 
social cohesion and the self-identification of its soldiers. 
Although the wide-ranging approach of my dissertation has addressed many 
topics in Roman military studies, several of them in particular demand greater attention 
and would prove fruitful in further discussion of both Roman military and social 
practices.  The fourth chapter, for example, raised the problem that despite the Roman 
military’s reputation for tactical proficiency and discipline, the legion relied on 
surprisingly few levels of command, even by ancient standards.  The function of tribunes 
in battle was limited and ill-defined, leaving essentially no degrees of command between 
general and centurion, particularly in the use of the cohort during the Principate.  If the 
legion is best described as comprising many centuriae rather than few cohorts, this point 
raises important questions for how the legion actually functioned in pitched battle.  To 
answer these questions, a study must analyze in detail textual sources on Roman military 
warfare not just concerning the methods used to deploy legionaries in battle, but also for 
existence of communication between units and their flexibility after the commencement 
of battle. 
The sixth chapter also discussed the centurions’ many civic activities among local 
military and civilian communities, particularly his religious role, which ranged from 
dedicating altars and leading his unit in cultic activities, to restoring and constructing new 
religious structures out of his own money as a form of benefaction to local communities 
and veteran colonies.  This role needs to be investigated further in context with recent 
approaches to Roman civil-military relations that are only briefly addressed in the 
chapter.  Prominent among these are Oliver Stoll’s work on how the religious functions 
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of Roman officers served as link between military and civilian communities, and 
Cuomo’s in-depth analysis of Roman building projects that consider the potential goals of 
the supervisor or dedicant in advertising his achievements in construction as well as the 
perspectives of the local inhabitants.  Both of their approaches share a similar focus in 
understanding the role of Roman military officers in local infrastructure and civic life 
across the empire.  Since centurions were active participants in the religious life in local 
communities, a study that analyzes in detail centurions’ roles in public building and 
benefaction will help us to understand better the relationships between the military and 
non-military communities at the periphery of the empire. 
The conclusions of this dissertation also demonstrate an approach to consider in 
future studies on Roman military culture.  The fact that so little attention has been given 
to such an important organizational feature of the Roman military as the centurionate 
illustrates a disproportionate focus in scholarship on aristocratic perspectives and goals, 
and how they determined soldiers’ attitudes toward discipline, behaviour in combat, 
political loyalties, religious activities, social identity, and interaction with Rome’s 
imperial subjects.  This excessive focus on a “mass versus elite” dichotomy is more 
conducive to dialogues on Greek political or military institutions than Roman.  The 
centurion’s intermediate status, seen in so many aspects of his roles in the Roman 
military, demonstrates instead the prominence of the middle rank in Roman military 
practices.  Indeed, the Roman legions arguably represent a military force in which skill, 
experience, and prestige were focused in the middle rank. 
Additionally, studies of Roman military history that focus on its intermediate 
ranks can consider recent trends in military history.  Earlier studies on combat 
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motivation, military commitment, obedience, and professional identity shifted focus away 
from the paramount importance of the general and battle tactics to the perspective of 
individual soldiers in combat and how cohesion is encouraged among the members of the 
primary unit.
2
  More recent studies, however, have emphasized instead the role of 
leadership at the junior level in determining soldiers’ attitudes toward motivation, 
performance, leadership, and identity.  As Kindsvatter states in his analysis of the 
American soldier, this intermediate position was an immensely important yet difficult 
one, because such an officer was expected simultaneously to take care of his soldiers and 
be willing to sacrifice himself for them, yet also was the “the final representative of 
coercive higher authority,” required to exact obedience from them and punish 
transgressions.
3
  This unique position ensured that junior leaders’ behaviour and attitudes 
create the norm for their soldiers to follow.  These leaders, good or bad, are the 
exemplars of their military institution.  Indeed, as Moskos and Wood have similarly 
argued in their analysis of commitment in the modern professional army, “immediate 
leaders are the institution to their subordinates.”4 
I suggest that this focus on the role of junior leadership in defining military 
attitudes and practices should be applied to studies of Roman military culture.  To the 
milites who chose to join and serve in the legions, the centurionate was the most 
immediate form of military authority, the highest rank to which one could aspire, and it 
was through this rank that military skills, habits, and doctrines were transmitted.  Study 
                                                 
2
See above, Introduction, n. 17, and Chapter Five, 191-193. 
3
Kindsvatter, The American Soldier, 235. 
4Moskos & Wood, “Institution Building” (emphasis added), 287. 
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of the centurionate, therefore, provides a fresh and potentially rewarding approach to 
understanding Roman military practices. 
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Appendix A: Visual Imagery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Minucius Lorarius (AE 1982, 395) 
Middle 1st century BCE  
Note: Wearing tunic and cloak; vitis in right hand; pugio attached to belt 
Image from Franzoni, tav. XIII, 1 
Fig. 1 
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M. Caelius, (CIL XIII. 8648; ILS 2244 AE 1952, 181) 
Early 1st century CE 
Note: Vitis in right hand; torques and phalerae attached to cuirass; armillae at wrists; 
paludamentum at left shoulder 
Image from Franzoni, Tav. XXXII, 2 
Fig. 2 
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Fig. 3 
Q. Sertorius Festus (CIL V 3374) 
Middle 1st century CE 
Note: vitis in right hand; scale armour 
with phalerae and torques, corona 
aurea on head; paludamentum 
Image from Franzoni, tav. XVI, 1 
Fig. 4 
M. Favonius Facilis (RIB 200) 
1st Century CE 
Note: vitis in right hand; wearing padded 
garments as armour; paludamentum 
Image from Birley, (1980), Fig. 4 
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Fig. 5 Fig. 6 
C. Aemilius Severus (CIL XI 340) 
Late 2
nd
 to early 3rd century CE 
Note: vitis in right hand; greaves 
Image from Franzoni, tav. XXI, 3 
Aurelius Mucianus (Istanbul, Arch 
Mus. Inv. No. 116) 
First half of 3rd century CE 
Note: vitis in right hand; greaves 
Image from Pfühl Taf. LV, 303 
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Fig. 7 
Fig. 8 
Unnamed Centurion (Scrinari no. 348) 
3rd century CE 
Note: sword at left; greaves 
Image from Franzoni, tav. V, 4 
Unnamed Centurion (Gabelmann no. 112) 
Late 3rd century CE 
Note: staff-like vitis; greaves 
Image from Franzoni, tav. XXVIII, 3 
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M. Aurelius Nepos (RIB 491) 
3rd Century CE 
Note: vitis at right; sagum 
Image from Birley (1980), Fig. 5 
Fig. 9 Fig. 10 
Valerius Aulucentius (CIL V 940) 
Late 3rd century CE 
Note: vitis at right; sagum 
Image from Franzoni, Tav. IX, 2 
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Fig. 11 
Flavius Augustalis (CIL V 914) 
3rd century CE 
Note: vitis in left hand; sagum 
Image from Franzoni, Tav. VIII, 1 
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Fig. 12 Fig. 13 
Fig. 14 
C. Anarius Felix (Montanari, No. 
10) 
Middle 1st Century CE 
Note: “Coiled” vitis at bottom 
Image from Franzoni, Tav. XX, 1 
M. Creperius Primus (Montanari, No. 2) 
Middle 1st Century CE 
Note: “Coiled” vitis at center 
Image from Franzoni, Tav. XX, 2 
M. Pompeius Asper (CIL XIV 2523; ILS 
2662) 
Late 1
st
 Century CE 
Note: Aquila at center; torques, phalerae, 
and greaves at bottom 
Image from Maxfield (1981), Pl. 12a 
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Fig. 15 Fig. 16 
Fig. 17 
T. Calidius Severus (CIL III 11213; ILS 
2596) 
Early to Middle 1st Century CE 
Note: Ring mail, greaves, transverse 
crest, and horse 
Image from Robinson, Pl. 445 
Unnamed Centurion (Dütschke V, no. 978) 
Early 1st Century CE 
Note: greaves at bottom 
Image from Franzoni, Tav. XXVIII, 2 
L. Blattius Vetus (AE 1893, 119) 
Early to Middle First Century CE 
Note: phalerae and torques at left; 
greaves at right 
Image from Franzoni, tav. XV, 1-2 
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Fig. 18 
M. Petronius Classicus (CIL III 4060) 
Early to Middle 1st Century CE 
Note: transverse crest at top; 
phalerae at center; greaves at bottom 
Image from Maxfield (1981), Pl. 10b 
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Appendix B: Clothing, Arms, and Armour 
 
 
Clothing 
 
 The basic dress of the centurion matched that of the milites.  The primary garment 
during the Republic and Principate was the sleeveless, wool tunic (tunica), held together 
at the waist by the belt (balteus or cingulum militare).  The basic form of the tunica 
appears to have been maintained into the Principate, and according to Quintilian, 
centurions were distinguished by fitting their tunica so that it did not drop below the 
knees.
1
  The colour of these tunics is debated.  While the long-standing view adopted by 
historical re-enactors favours a deep red, it is also possible that soldiers wore white tunics 
and centurions alone wore red, in order to distinguish them in battle.
2
  On special military 
occasions such as triumphs or religious processions, however, centurions appear to have 
worn more formal white tunics (candida vestis).
3
 
Centurions also wore a cloak over their tunics.  During the Republic, this was 
typically the standard soldiers’ cloak (sagum), a rectangular, reddish-brown garment 
draped around the neck and fastened at the right shoulder by a brooch (fibula).  The 
dedication to Minucius Lorarius from this period illustrates how the tunica and sagum are 
combined.
4
  During the Principate, however, centurions are often depicted wearing the 
larger, more ornate cloak, the paludamentum.  This cloak was worn by officers of 
                                                 
1
Quint. Inst. 11. 3. 138. 
2See N. Fuentes, “The Roman Military Tunic” in M. Dawson ed., Roman Military Equipment: The 
Accoutrements of War, Proceedings of the Third Military Research Seminar; British Archaeological Report 
(Oxford, 1987), 41-75. 
3
G. Sumner, Roman Military Dress (Stroud, 2009), 18-29, 117-118. On centurions’ white dress in 
triumphs, see Tac. Hist. 2. 89. 
4
Appendix A, fig. 1. A variation on the sagum was the cape (paenula), which was slightly larger, 
circular, and folded. See Bishop & Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, 68; Sumner, Roman Military 
Dress, 72-89. 
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equestrian and senatorial rank, and distinguished them from the rank and file.
5
  Later 
funerary monuments from the third century, however, suggest that centurions still 
occasionally wore the more functional soldiers’ cloak.6  Centurions appear additionally to 
have worn padded leather garments both under and over their armour.  This includes the 
linen or leather strips (pteryges) made famous in Hollywood films.  The pteryges were 
attached to the armour, both at the shoulders or below, forming a “skirt” over the bottom 
of the tunic, and are depicted in several monuments to centurions.
7
 
Roman centurions adopted different footwear depending on the period.  During 
the Republic, they appear to have worn enclosed boots (calcei), evidence of which is 
more common for higher officers in the army.  By the Principate, however, centurions 
wore the newer strapped boots (caligae) that were now standard for all soldiers.  These 
caligae were hobnailed to offer greater grip on soft ground, although they slipped more 
easily on rock or smooth surfaces.
8
 
 
Arms and Equipment 
 From the Republic to the late Principate, legionary centurions appear consistently 
to have borne the same arms as the milites.  These included the heavy javelin (pilum), 
which came into use during the third century BCE at the latest and became the chief 
weapon of the legionaries for centuries.  They also bore the standard short sword of the 
Republic and early Principate, the gladius, as well as the longer sword of the late second 
                                                 
5
See examples of paludamentum in Appendix A, figs. 2-4. On distinction between soldiers’ cloak 
and those of senior officers, see Liv. 7. 34. 15. Cf., Sumner, Roman Military Dress, 72-73. 
6
E.g., Appendix A, figs. 8-12. See also HA Pertinax, 8. 2-4. 
7
E.g., Appendix A, figs. 3-4, 9. 
8
Minucius Lorarius (Appendix A, fig. 1) is depicted wearing calcei.  On centurions wearing 
hobnailed caligae, see Juv. 16. 13; Jos. BJ 6. 81. 
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to early third centuries CE, the spatha.  Centurions were initially distinguished, however, 
from legionaries by sheathing their sword at their left, rather than right side.
9
  Centurions 
additionally are more often depicted bearing a large dagger (pugio) on their belt.
10
   
Most distinctive among the centurion’s equipment, of course, was their vitis.  As 
it was described in literature and represented visually during the Principate, the 
instrument was waist-high and straight, with a knobbed end.  Two commemorative 
inscriptions from Ravenna from the first century CE, however, depict a coiled or “knotted 
vitis,” perhaps suggesting the living branch on which the tool was based.11  The 
instrument seems to have grown longer and more staff-like during the early third century 
CE, reflecting its more symbolic than practical use as a disciplinary tool.
12
 
 
Armour 
 Centurions in many cases bore armour similar to that of their soldiers.  Most basic 
was the shield (scutum).  During the Republic, it was ovular and made primarily of 
plywood and animal hides.  It was later studded with iron bosses and strips, and made 
more rectangular in shape during the Principate.  It served both centurion and soldier for 
centuries.
13
  Centurions wore the same helmets as the rank and file, from the 
                                                 
9
E.g., Appendix A, figs, 1-6. The earlier gladius Hispaniensis was tapered, but was phased out 
during the first to second centuries CE by a parallel-edged blade. Spathae appear more popular beginning 
with the Antonine period. See Bishop & Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, 78-83, 130-134.  
10
Appendix A, figs. 1, 4. 
11
Appendix A, figs. 12-13. These two examples come only from Ravenna. 
12
Later staff-like appearance: Appendix A, figs. 5-6, 8, 11. On the vitis and its development, see C. 
Franzoni, Habitus Atque Habitudo Militis: monumenti funerari di militari nella Cisalpina Romana  (Rome, 
1987), no. 15, 19, 59; Pfühl & Mobius, Die ostgriechischen Grabreliefs, (Mainz am Rhein, 1977), nos. 
302-303, 305, 308; Bishop & Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, 120.   
13
Bishop & Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, 61-63, 91-95, 137-139. 
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“Montefortino” and “Coolus” types of the Republic, to the “Imperial Italic” or “Imperial 
Gallic” types of the Principate (figs. 2-4).   
Types of body armour were less standardized.  During the early-middle Republic, 
the cheapest and most basic form of armour borne by many legionaries was a simple, 
brass breastplate (pectorale) formed by one large disc or by several fastened together. 
Centurions and those soldiers of higher property qualification, however, more often bore 
scale armour, or the more flexible and expensive ring mail.
14
  During the late Republic 
and early Principate, these latter types became more common.  First century CE 
monuments to centurions Q. Sertorius Festus and T. Calidius Severus show examples of 
the scale mail and ring mail, respectively.
15
  During the late first century to third centuries 
CE, legionary body armour appears to have been dominated by the so-called “lorica 
segmentata,” a heavier cuirass of iron and leather strips fixed together with copper-alloy 
fittings that offered better protection to the chest and shoulders (fig. 1).  Centurions, 
however, are conspicuously never depicted or described wearing this form of armour, nor 
the muscled cuirass of higher officers, but appear to have maintained use of the scales or 
mail.
16
   
The commemorations to M. Caelius and M. Favonius Facilis also depict 
centurions wearing some kind of garment (leather or reinforced linen?) over their torso.  
It is unclear, however, whether such garments were worn in addition to scale or ring mail, 
or served as their primary protection, like a padded jack or jerkin.  Facilis’ monument, 
                                                 
14
Polyb. 6. 23. Cf., Bishop & Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, 63-64. 
15
Appendix A, figs. 3, 16. 
16
The lorica segmentata become rarer during the third century CE, probably because of the cost 
and complexity of their construction. Cf., Robinson, The Armour of Imperial Rome, 147-169; Bishop & 
Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, 170-173. 
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moreover, also depicts the use of the leather reinforcements worn over top of the armour 
at the waist and shoulders.
17
  Additionally, some centurions appear to have worn a leather 
harness with overlapping straps.  These straps evidently were used to suspend one’s 
military decorations, such as phalerae and torques.
18
 
 Centurions primarily distinguished themselves from their soldiers, however, 
through two additional features of their armour.  First and foremost was the transverse 
crest (crista transversa) borne on their helmets, which served to distinguish the centurion 
in the confusion of battle and to emphasize his height and fierceness.
19
  Earlier crests 
were attached through small, separately cast knobs attached to the top of the helmet, 
while later crests favoured a detachable, U-shaped holder attached to the crest box.
20
  The 
material of the crest itself seems to have varied, including both the earlier (goose?) 
feathers and later horse-hair crests that are ubiquitous in Hollywood films.  Both kinds 
are depicted in monuments to centurions from the first century CE, T. Calidius Severus 
and M. Petronius Classicus.
21
 
 Another form of armour that distinguished the centurion from both his soldiers 
and superior officers were greaves.  While officers and certain soldiers of the auxiliary 
cavalry bore them, greaves are unique to centurions in the legionary infantry.  They are 
commonly depicted in visual commemoration to centurions and, in the cases where only 
military equipment is depicted, such as on the epitaphs of of T. Calidius Severus, M. 
                                                 
17
Appendix A, figs. 2 and 4. On garments as armour, see Sumner, Roman Military Dress, 170-175. 
18
Appendix A, figs. 2-4, 14, 17-18. Cf. Maxfield, Military Decorations, 92-95. 
19
See above, Chapter 2, n. 38. 
20
Robinson, The Armour of Imperial Rome, 140-143. 
21
Appendix A, figs. 15 and 18. 
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Petronius Classicus, and L. Blattius Vetus, they are highlighted along with the 
centurion’s crest and dona militaria.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
See Appendix A, figs. 16, 18, and 20. See also figs. 3, 4, and 6. Cf., Robinson, The Armour of 
Imperial Rome, 187-188. There is one case in surviving evidence for milites wearing greaves found in the 
Adamclisi metopes. See Bishop & Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, 86, n. 46. 
Fig. 1 
Lorica Segmentata (Reconstruction) 
First Century CE 
Image from Robinson, Pl. 191 
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Fig. 2 Fig. 3 
Montefortino Type 
Middle-late Republic 
Image from Robinson, Pl. 10 
Coolus Type 
Late Republic to first century CE 
Image from Robinson, Pl. 41 
Fig. 4 
Imperial Gallic Type 
First century CE 
Image from Robinson, Pl. 100-101 
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Appendix C: Centurions’ Quarters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 
Polybius’ plan for legionary camp during middle-Republic (not to scale) 
Image from Roth (2009), Fig. 14 
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Fig. 2 
Recreation of Caerleon (Wales), f. late first century CE 
Image from Roth (2009), Fig. 41 
Note: Centurions’ quarters (A) visible at end of each row of barracks near walls; note also row of 
larger quarters for the primi ordines and primuspilus of first cohort by western wall 
A 
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Fig. 3 
Plan for Inchtuthil (Scotland), late first century CE 
Image from Webster (1969), Fig. 34 (adapted) 
A: standard barrack blocks 
B: first cohort barracks 
C: primi ordines quarters 
D: military tribunes’ quarters 
E: Barrack store houses 
Note: similarity in layout of barrack blocks with fortress at Caerleon, with centurion quarters at end 
of barrack block, and greater size of primi ordines’ quarters at centre-left 
 
A 
D 
B 
D 
C 
A 
A A 
A 
E 
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